DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 260 841 PS 015 311

AUTHOR	Asche, Justice Austin; And Others
TITLE	Social Change and Family Policies. Final Papers, Part 5. International CFR Seminar (20th, Melbourne, Australia, August 19-24, 1984).
INSTITUTION	Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne (Australia).
REPORT NO	ISBN-0-642-87081-0
PUB DATE	Mar 85
NOTE	352p.; For related documents, see PS 015 308-310.
AVAILABLE FROM	Institute of Family Studies, 766 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3000, Australia (no price quoted).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC15 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Demography; Family (Sociological Unit); *Family Life; Family Structure; *Federal Legislation; Global Approach; Guidelines; Older Adults; *Program Administration; Public Policy; Social Change; *Social Problems; Welfare Services; Youth
IDENTIFIERS	*Australia; China; Equal Rights; Family Law; *Family Policy; France; Income Security; Netherlands; Population Policies; Quebec; Shared Housing; Social Policy; West Germany

ABSTRACT

This document contains final papers presented at an International Committee on Family Research (CFR) seminar; included are key, discussant, and free papers as well as closing and farewell addresses. Key papers covered (1) worldwide trends in administrating family policy and (2) work, economic policies, and welfare consequences and responsibilities. Clio Presvelou's "World Survey on Availability of Family Policy Guidelines," Jacqueline Ancelin's "Family Policy and Social Changes in France," and Pierre Cliche's "Quebec's Family Policy: Social Policy or Demographic Policy" address the first topic. Orjan Hultaker's "Income Security Policies and the Application of Marginal or Universal Approaches" addresses the second. Discussant papers focus on several conference issues, including the desirability of supporting the family and pressures, conflicts and expectations of family life; major demographic trends affecting family policy; worldwide trends in the administration of family policy; youth policies and the family/work/education relationship; and legal regulation of the family and the effect of changes in family law. Free papers are Wei Zhangling's "Effects of Population Policy on Families in Contemporary China"; Wolfgang Voegeli and Barbara Willenbacher's "Family Policy and the Implementation of the Constitutional Equal Rights Clause in the Federal Republic of Germany"; Iteka Weeda's "Changing Ideals about the Family and Other Life Styles in Their Macro-Sociological Significance in the Netherlands"; and Gordon F. Streib's "Family Change and Social Policy: Shared Living for the Elderly." The document concludes with Don Edgar's closing address and farewell addresses by Lazlo Cseh-Szombathy, Andre Rauget, Roland Eckert, and Don Edgar. (RH)

ED260841

International Sociological Association
Committee on Family Research

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Australian Institute of Family Studies

International Union of Family Organizations

PART 5

XXth International CFR Seminar on

SOCIAL CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES

Melbourne, Australia,
19-24 August, 1984.

FINAL PAPERS

Sponsored by the
Australian Institute of Family Studies

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ISA International Sociological Association
CFR Committee on Family Research

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March 1985

National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-publication data

International CFR Seminar on Social Change and Family Policies
(20th: 1984: Melbourne, Vic).

XXth International CFR Seminar on Social Change and Family
Policies, Melbourne, Australia, 19-24 August, 1984.

Includes bibliographies and index.
ISBN 0 642 87081 0 (set).

1. Family policy – Congresses. 2. Social history – Congresses.
I. Australia. Institute of Family Studies. II. International
Sociological Association. Committee on Family Research.
III. Title.

362.8'2

Institute of Family Studies
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Melbourne VICTORIA 3000
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CONTENTS

Part 5

INTRODUCTION 1

The Australian Institute of Family Studies 3

The Seminar Program 9

Welcome Addresses — Justice Austin Asche; Professor Cseh-Szombathy; M. Andre Rauget 19

Official Opening Address — Rt. Hon. Sir Ninian Stephen 24

KEY PAPERS

Session 4: The administration of family policy: world-wide trends

World survey on availability of family policy guidelines
CLIO PRESVELOU (delivered by Gordon Carmichael) 29

Family policy and social changes in France
JACQUELINE ANCELIN 45

Quebec's family policy: social policy or demographic policy?
PIERRE CLICHE 58

Session 7: Work, economic policies and welfare consequences and responsibilities

Income security policies and the application of marginal or universal approaches
ORJAN HULTAKER 91

DISCUSSANT PAPERS

Session 1: Is the family worth supporting? Pressures, conflicts and expectations of family life

Comments on papers by Collins, Glezer and Lewis
BETTINA CASS 149

Comments on Glezer's paper
THOMAS LASSWELL 182

Session 2: Major demographic trends affecting family policy

Comments on McDonald's paper
WEI ZHANGLING 189

A comment on papers by Thornton and McDonald
ORJAN HULTAKER 192

Session 4: The administration of family policy: world-wide trends

Comments on the IUFO papers
ADAM GRAYCAR 199

Comments on Cliche's paper
GORDON STREIB 209

Session 5: Youth policies and the family/work/education relationship

Comments on papers by Eckert/Willems and Edgar/Maas
ARTHUR PEARL 217

Session 9: Legal regulation of the family and the effect of changes in family law

Comments on papers by Commaille, Harrison and Eekelaar
DAVID HAMBLY 231

FREE PAPERS

Effects of population policy on families in contemporary China
WEI ZHANGLING 247

Family policy and the implementation of the Constitutional Equal Rights Clause in the Federal Republic of Germany
WOLFGANG VOEGELI and BARBARA WILLENBACHER 276

Changing ideals about the family and other life styles in their macro-sociological significance in the Netherlands
ITEKA WEEDA 292

Family change and social policy: shared living for the elderly
GORDON F. STREIB 304

SUMMARY SESSION

Closing Address
DON EDGAR 317

Farewell Addresses
LAZLO CSEH-SZOMBATHY; ANDRE RAUGET; ROLAND ECKERT; DON EDGAR 327

Index of Key Speakers 331

List of participants 333

INTRODUCTION

The International Sociological Association's Committee on Family Research (ISA-CFR) organises international seminars at two to three year intervals for leading family researchers. At the 1981 seminar in Leuven, Belgium, Dr. Don Edgar, Director of the Australian Institute of Family Studies was asked to host the twentieth seminar in Australia.

The Institute of Family Studies and the ISA-CFR have been jointly responsible for organising this seminar. The International Union of Family Organisations (IUFO) has been included as a co-sponsor. IUFO is an international, non-governmental organisation with consultative status with various United Nations organisations (ECOSOC, UNESCO, UNICEF) and the Council of Europe.

Traditionally, ISA-CFR seminars have been held in Europe or North America and have been attended by the leading researchers in various areas of family studies. Key Papers are invited well beforehand to allow them to be prepared and distributed in advance. This allows participants to read them before attending so that most time at the seminar can be devoted to the more productive pursuits of discussion and questioning.

The seminar theme 'Social Change and Family Policies' was chosen to emphasise the links between changing social conditions, research and the policies of governments. The need for governments to ensure that their policies, programs and legislation are responsive to changing social conditions and reflect contemporary values and attitudes is a cornerstone of the Institute of Family Studies' work. Some of the many areas of policy affecting families that were addressed at the seminar are economic conditions, employment, income security, education, children's services, marriage, divorce and the aged. Within the broad seminar theme, each day's proceedings were organised around one or two sub-themes. Key speakers for each sub-theme offered a short (15 minute) summary of their paper followed by comment from nominated Discussants and open discussion from seminar participants.

The total number of participants was 250. Of these, around 70 came from overseas.

Details concerning key personnel of the organisations responsible for the seminar are as follows:

1.	ISA-CFR	President:	Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy (Director, Institute of Sociology, Hungary)
		Secretary:	Professor Orjan Hultaker (Uppsala University, Sweden)
2.	INSTITUTE OF FAMILY STUDIES	Presiding Member, Board of Management:	Justice Austin Asche (Senior Judge, Family Court of Australia, Melbourne)
		Director:	Dr. Don Edgar
3.	IUFO	President:	Mr. Pran Nath Luthra
		Secretary General:	Mr. Andre Rauget

THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF FAMILY STUDIES

History

Calls for the establishment of an organisation along the lines of the current Institute date back at least to 1964. At that time, the National Marriage Guidance Council suggested first an 'Australian Institute of Family Relations', then an 'Institute of Family Living', should be established as an independent research unit. By 1970 this concept had broadened because so little information was available about Australian families and an 'Institute of Family Study' was proposed.

However, it was not until the introduction of the Family Law Bill in 1975 by the then Attorney-General, Senator Lionel Murphy, that the goal became a reality. Clause 116 provided for an Institute of Family Studies. Some fears had been expressed that the new Family Law Act, with its removal of 'fault' provisions and its use of twelve months' separation as the indicator of irretrievable breakdown, would threaten the stability of marriage and the family. The new Institute was to investigate factors affecting marital and family stability and, by implication, to monitor the impact of the Family Law Act on the institution of the family.

Legislative problems, including the method of appointment of the Director, meant that some years passed before the Institute came into existence. As a result, no adequate research-based data collection system was devised for the Family Court and an important opportunity was lost. However, one advantage from the delay was that the Institute's role was broadened beyond an interest only in marital breakdown and divorce.

The functions of the Institute, as stated in S.114 of the Family Law Act, are:

1. to promote, by the conduct, encouragement and coordination of research and other appropriate means, the identification of, and development of understanding of, the factors affecting marital and family stability in Australia, with the object of promoting the protection of the family as the natural and fundamental group unit in society; and

2. to advise and assist the Attorney-General in relation to the making of grants, out of moneys available under appropriations made by the Parliament, for purposes related to the functions of the Institute and the supervising of the employment of grants so made.

The Institute's foundation Director, Dr. Don Edgar, was appointed by the Governor-General in late 1979 and formally took up duty in February 1980. Dr. Edgar, BA,MEd(Melb.), PhD(Stanford) had previously been Reader in Sociology at La Trobe University and prior to that had lectured in both Sociology and Education. He has written widely in the areas of sociology of education, sociology of the family, social change and socialisation processes.

Development of the Institute

The Director's first task was to develop a plan of activity to allow the Institute to meet its functional responsibilities. A number of guiding principles which helped develop priority areas for an initial seven year research plan are set out in the attachment to this paper. These are taken from the Institute's first Annual Report (1980-81) and are important to an understanding of our direction of development. The research plan, which has formed the basis for an ongoing program of research and policy analysis, was approved by the Institute's Board of Management in March 1980 as setting the general directions of the Institute's work.

While a multitude of separate 'topics' for research on families suggested themselves, following that path would have invited piecemeal, unintegrated results. As an overall framework then, it was decided that the Institute would explore three broad areas. These are:

- Family Formation - the attitudes and actual behaviour of young Australians as they decide to leave (or not to leave) home, to marry (or not to marry), to have (or not to have) children.
- Family Reformation - the other end of the process; what leads families to break down (in a functional sense), to break up (via separation, divorce or widowhood), or to take new forms (via remarriage, step-parenting or group living).
- Family Policy Impacts - the actual effects of government policies and administrative procedures on families of different types living in differing circumstances.

The Institute's Activities

A variety of methods has been employed in exploring these areas in order to identify and develop understanding of the factors affecting marital and family stability in Australia.

First, the Institute has conducted its own data collection surveys. This has involved developing questionnaires, drawing samples of the population, conducting interviews, analysing the data on our own computer and writing reports on the findings. The Australian Family Formation Study, the Australian Marriage Breakdown Study, the Family Support in Australia Study and the Australian Children in Families Study have all been conducted in this manner. They each contribute important qualitative data of people's experiences, their expectations, attitudes and values concerning aspects of family life. Some, particularly the

Australian Family Formation Study, are designed with a longitudinal element so that we can return to the original sample at intervals to see how their expectations and attitudes change over time. With each of our own surveys we are gaining insights into the experience of Australian people as they themselves perceive it to be.

As data collection is an extremely time consuming and costly exercise, the Institute also makes maximum use of data sets compiled by other organisations, principally the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Secondary analysis of ABS data is important to the task of filling out the picture of Australian families in a quantitative sense. Such data provide comparisons with our own findings and enable us to set them in the broader context.

A third area of activity involves examination of the impacts of government policies on families of all types and across a range of economic circumstances. Part of this activity flows directly from the findings of Institute studies, all of which reveal information on how government policies and programs at all levels inhibit or promote family functioning. In other cases policy background papers have been commissioned on areas of particular influence on families, for example, housing, child care, family support services, taxation. Such papers are published and disseminated in order to promote discussion of current policies and alternative options and have been discussed at public seminars around Australia. An important recent initiative in the policy impact area has been the development of a computer program based on Australian Bureau of Statistics census and income survey data which enables the Institute to model different taxation and income security options and assess their effects on various family types (such as two-parent, single parent, with/without children, two-earners, single earners, unemployed). Known as the Australian Family Incomes Transfer Project (AFIT), this promises to be a major contribution to policy formation in an area of major interest to all families.

The Institute has also acted collaboratively with a number of organisations in conducting surveys, designing data collections, conducting seminars and workshops, publishing, providing comment on reports of committees of review and the like, and providing representatives to sit on Councils, Boards, Research Committees, etc. At present, for example, the Institute is conducting a study of the Economic Consequences of Divorce in conjunction with the Australian Law Reform Commission's Matrimonial Property Inquiry. The findings of this study will play an important part in the Matrimonial Property Inquiry's overall report.

Through a program of Support Grants, the Institute meets its responsibility to encourage and coordinate the research of others working in the family studies area. Grants are offered to support work that may be more narrowly focussed than the Institute would undertake, outside our area of expertise or being conducted in another institution as part of the requirement for a higher degree. A report of the work supported is required and it is publicised either through the IFS Newsletter or, where warranted, as part of our publication series.

A major feature of IFS work is the dissemination of information. This takes the form of publications based on Institute studies, a regular Newsletter, media releases, radio and television interviews as well as the public seminars and workshops mentioned previously. The Institute's Family Information Centre, as well as housing a research library for the use of staff, also provides a public reference service to visitors and telephone or mail enquirers. Work is currently proceeding on a bibliographic database on family studies in Australia (known as FAMILY) which provides on-line information on published work related to families throughout Australia. The FAMILY database is also available in a print version as an annual volume with quarterly updates in April, July and October.

Staffing

The Institute's approved staffing level is 31 persons (21 full-time and 10 part-time). The backgrounds of staff are varied including sociology, education, law, economics, computing, information science, demography, psychology and social studies. From time to time, additional assistance is engaged to assist with specialist tasks such as interviewing, coding, and data analysis.

Further Information

For further information about the Institute and its many publications write to:

Family Information Centre,
Australian Institute of Family Studies,
766 Elizabeth Street,
MELBOURNE, VIC. 3000
Australia

THE SEMINAR PROGRAM

Day 1 - Monday, 20 August 1984 - MORNING

WELCOME ADDRESS

- Justice Austin Asche, Presiding Member, IFS Board
  Part 5, pp.19-20
- Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy, President, ISA-CFR
  Part 5, pp.21
- Andre Rauget, Secretary, IUFO
  Part 5, pp.22

SESSION 1

Theme: Is the family worth supporting? Pressures, conflicts and expectations of family life

---

Chairperson: Dr. Don Edgar (Director, IFS, Australia)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Professor Randall Collins (San Diego, USA)
  'Social conflict and the place of the family: toward a theory of moral politics' Part 1, pp.3-57
- Helen Glezer (IFS, Australia)
  'Antecedents and correlates of marriage and family attitudes in young Australian men and women' Part 1, pp.81-147
- Professor Bob Lewis (Purdue University, USA)
  'Some changes in men's values, meanings, roles and attitudes toward marriage and family in the USA' Part 1, pp.59-80

DISCUSSANT: Professor Bettina Cass (University of Sydney, Australia) Part 5, pp.149-181

DISCUSSANT: Dr. Thomas Lasswell (University of Southern California, USA) Part 1, pp.703-710
Part 5, pp.182-185

OPEN DISCUSSION

Day 1 - Monday, 20 August 1984 - AFTERNOON

SESSION 2

Theme: Major demographic trends affecting family policy

Chairperson: Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy (Director, Institute of Sociology, Hungary)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Dr. Arland Thornton (Institute for Social Research, USA)
  'Modernization and family change' Part 1, pp.151-190
- Dr. Peter McDonald (Deputy Director, IFS, Australia)
  'Implications for families of third world fertility trends'
  Part 2, pp.191-206

DISCUSSANT: Professor Stella Quah (National University of Singapore) Part 3, pp.713-723
DISCUSSANT: Professor Orjan Hultaker (Uppsala University, Sweden) Part 5, pp.192-195
DISCUSSANT: Professor Wei Zhangling (Chinese Academy of Social Science, China) Part 5, pp. 189-191

OPEN DISCUSSION

EVENING: OFFICIAL OPENING DINNER

Opening Address by His Excellency the Rt.Hon.Sir Ninian Stephen, AK,GCMG,GCVO,KBE,KStJ,Governor-General Part 5, pp. 24-25

Entertainment provided by the Victorian College of the Arts, School of Music and School of Dance.

Day 2 - Tuesday, 21 August 1984 - MORNING

SESSION 3

Theme: Families with children and social policy approaches to family support and education

---

Chairperson: Ms. Mary Finn (Board, IFS, Australia)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Dr. Gilbert Steiner (The Brookings Institution, USA)
  'Family policy as latter-day children's policy' Part 1, pp.209-229
- Professor Jan Trost (Uppsala University, Sweden)
  'Divorcees, children and the public' Part 1, pp.231-245
- Gay Ochiltree and Dr. Paul Amato (IFS, Australia)
  'The child's use of family resources' Part 1, pp.247-322

DISCUSSANT: Professor Marcia Lasswell (University of Southern California, USA) Part 3, pp.729-745

OPEN DISCUSSION

Chairperson: Professor Hiroko Nishimura (Soka University, Japan)

DISCUSSANT: Dr. Len Tierney (University of Melbourne, Australia)

OPEN DISCUSSION

Day 2 - Tuesday, 21 August 1984 - AFTERNOON

SESSION 4

Theme: The administration of family policy - World wide trends (IUFO Session)

Chairperson: Andre Rauget (Secretary, International Union of Family Organizations, France)

PAPER PRESENTERS

- Dr. Clio Presvelou (International Union of Family Organizations, Netherlands) Part 5, pp.29-44
- Madame Jacqueline Ancelin (Assistant Director, Caisse Nationale de Allocations Familiales, France) 'Family Policy and Social Changes in France' Part 5, pp.45-57
- Mr. Pierre Cliche (Ministry of Social Affairs, Canada) 'Quebec's Family Policy, Social Policy or Demographic Policy' Part 5, pp.58-87

DISCUSSANT: Dr. Adam Graycar (Director, Social Welfare Research Centre, Australia) Part 5, pp.199-208

DISCUSSANT: Professor Gordon F. Streib (University of Florida, USA) Part 5, pp.209-213

OPEN DISCUSSION

EVENING: PUBLIC FORUM (ANZ Pavilion - Arts Centre)

- Professor Margrit Eichler (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada)
- Professor Randall Collins (San Diego, USA)
- Professor Karen Altergott (University of Missouri, USA)

Day 3 - Wednesday, 22 August 1984 - MORNING

SESSION 5

Theme: Youth policies and the family/work/education relationship

---

Chairperson: John Davoren (Board, IFS)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Professor Roland Eckert and Helmut Willems (University of Trier, West Germany)
  'Youth conflicts and public policy challenges in Western Europe' Part 1, pp.325-353
- Dr. Don Edgar and Frank Maas (IFS, Australia)
  'Adolescent competence, leaving home and changing family patterns' Part 1, pp.355-426

DISCUSSANT: Professor Art Pearl (University of California, USA) Part 5, pp. 217-227

DISCUSSANT: Beth Thyer (Victorian Trades Hall Council, Australia)

OPEN DISCUSSION

Chairperson: Professor Jan Trost (Uppsala University, Sweden)

DISCUSSANT: Professor Lea Shamgar-Handelman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel) Part 3, pp.749-759

OPEN DISCUSSION

Day 3 - Wednesday, 22 August 1984 - AFTERNOON

SESSION 6

FREE PAPERS AND POSTER SESSIONS

Dr. Frances E. Baum (Southern Community Health Services, Adelaide, Australia)
'There's no room in the nuclear family: sharing as an alternative housing option' Part 4, pp.855-893

Helmut Willems and Professor Roland Eckert (University of Trier, West Germany)
'Youth protest in Western Europe - four case studies'
Part 4, pp.997-1630

Professor Paula Dail (University of Wisconsin-Stout, USA)
'Parental role perceptions among young, dual parent families in America: family policy implications for the future'
Part 4, pp.895-908

Dr. Graeme Russell (Macquarie University, Australia)
'Changing patterns of divisions labour for paid work and child care' Part 4, pp.1069-1096

Dr. Daniel Hunter and Dr. Edna Hunter (San Diego, California, USA)
'Mandated visitation for grandparents in custody disputes - Will Little Red Ridinghood visit Grandma?' Part 4, pp.909-921

Oded Start (Harvard University, USA)
'Migration, remittances and the family: a theory'
Part 4, pp.965-996

Dr. Fumie Kumagai (International University, Japan)
'Ageing and social policies in Japan' Part 4, pp.923-940

Dr. Peggy Koopman-Boyden (University of Canterbury, New Zealand)
'Mothers, Fathers and 'Big Brother' in New Zealand - changes in New Zealand families and the policy response'
Part 4, pp.1031-1067

Professor Wei Zhangling (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China)
'Effects of population policy on families in Contemporary China'
Part 5, pp.247-275

Wolfgang Voegeli and Barbara Willenbacher (Germany)
'Family policy and the implementation of the Constitutional Equal Rights Clause in the Federal Republic of Germany'
Part 5, pp.276-291

Iteke Weeda (Agricultural University, Wageningen, The Netherlands)
'Changing ideals about the family and other lifestyles in their macro-sociological significance in the Netherlands'
Part 5, pp.292-305

Professor Gordon F. Streib (University of Florida, USA)
'Family change and social policy: shared living for the elderly
Part 5, pp.306-316

EVENING

VICTORIAN STATE GOVERNMENT RECEPTION
Legislative Council Committee Room, Parliament House

Day 4 - Thursday, 23 August 1984 - MORNING

SESSION 7

Theme: Work, economic policies and welfare consequences and responsibilities

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Chairperson: Professor Lois Bryson (Board, IFS, Australia)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Professor Orjan Hultaker (Uppsala University, Sweden)
  'Income security policies and the application of marginal or universal approaches' Part 5, pp.91-145
- Professor Margrit Eichler (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada)
  'The familism-individualism flip-flop and its implications for economic and social welfare policies'
  Part 2, pp.431-472
- Dr. Andrew Burbidge (IFS, Australia)
  'Throwing out the baby ... the need to assess unintended outcomes of tax transfer options' Part 2, pp.677-700

DISCUSSANT: Dr. Meredith Edwards (Department of Education and Youth Affairs, Canberra, Australia)
Part 3, pp.777-796

OPEN DISCUSSION

Chairperson: Mr. Rodney Burr (Board, IFS, Australia)

DISCUSSANT: Dr. Peggy Koopman-Boyden (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) Part 3, pp.797-806

DISCUSSANT: Professor Wilfried Dumon (University of Leuven, Belgium) Part 3, pp.763-775

OPEN DISCUSSION

Day 4 - Thursday, 23 August 1984 - AFTERNOON

SESSION 8

Theme:	Intergenerational exchange, ageing trends and the public/private support dimensions

Chairperson: Cliff Picton (Australian Council on Ageing, Australia)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Professor Karen Altergott (University of Missouri, USA)
  'Managing interdependence: family development, policy and the care system in an ageing society' Part 2, pp.475-507
- Dr. Peter d'Abbs (IFS, Australia)
  'Family support networks and public responsibility'
  Part 2, pp.509-535
- Dr. Hal Kendig (Australian National University, Australia)
  'Social change and support of the Australian aged: individual, family and government responsibilities'
  Part 2, pp.537-570

DISCUSSANT: Professor Hiroko Nishimura (Soka University, Japan)
Part 3, pp.809-821

DISCUSSANT: Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy (Institute of Sociology, Hungary)
Open Discussion Part 3, pp.823-838

OPEN DISCUSSION

Day 5 - Friday, 24 August 1984 - MORNING

SESSION 9

Theme: Legal regulation of the family and the effect of changes in family law

---

Chairperson: Justice Elizabeth Evatt (Chief Judge, Family Court of Australia)

KEY SPEAKERS

- Jacques Commaille (Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire de Vaucresson, France)
  'From a socio-legal approach to divorce to a sociology of socio-legal regulation as applied to the family'
  Part 2, pp.573-604
- Margaret Harrison (IFS, Australia)
  'The changing role of law in marital breakdown'
  Part 2, pp.605-638
- Professor John Eekelaar (Pembroke College, Oxford, UK)
  'Legal systems and families' Part 2, pp.639-672

DISCUSSANT: Hon. Mr. Justice John Fogarty (Family Court of Australia) Part 3, pp.841-852

DISCUSSANT: Professor David Hambly (Australian National University and Australian Law Reform Commission)
Part 5, pp.331-344

OPEN DISCUSSION

SUMMARY SESSION - AFTERNOON

FAREWELL ADDRESS Part 5, pp.317-330

Welcome addresses

Justice Austin Asche

A study of humanity means a study of society and indeed the test of a civilised society is the extent to which it is prepared to examine itself. If in Australia we are prepared to examine ourselves frankly and dispassionately and take steps to preserve the good and correct the bad, then no study of society in Australia or elsewhere can be effective without an examination of the family as a subset of society.

We believe that the establishment of the Institute of Family Studies in Australia marks a milestone in Australia's progress as a society prepared to study itself. We believe that it helps to bring together information, encouraging study, stimulating discussion, and gathering unto itself in an accessible and computerised form every strand of research relating to the family in Australia.

It was a very great honour for us to be asked to host this International Seminar, and it was a particular honour to us that we were asked to do so by the Committee on Family Research of the International Sociological Association, a body as its name implies of international eminence. It is with very great pleasure that I welcome here today Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy, president of the Committee on Family Research of the International Sociological Association. Professor, you are indeed very welcome.

Also connected very actively with this seminar is the International Union of Family Organisations. Most unfortunately, and to our great regret, at the last moment the President of the International Union of Family Organisations, Mr. Pran Nath Luthra, found himself unable to come. We are however delighted to welcome on behalf of this organisation, Monsieur Andre Rauget, Secretary of the International Union of Family Organisations, and you sir are also very welcome.

It is therefore with the greatest of pleasure and indeed the greatest of pride on behalf of the Board of the Institute of Family Studies that I welcome you all here. We look forward to several days of hard work but I'm sure rewarding work. We hope that in the end we will all be better informed. We will all know ourselves a little better and know society a little better.

Dr. Don Edgar

Thank you very much Austin. Now on behalf of the Committee on Family Research, I would like Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy to respond.

Professor Cseh-Szombathy

Your Honour, Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Board of the Committee of Family Research of the International Sociological Association, I have the privilege to greet the participants of the International Seminar on Social Change and Family Policies.

This is the XXth International Seminar. The previous nineteen seminars had a very important role in the development of family sociology during the second part of the 20th century. They contributed to a considerable extent to family research all over the world, perhaps starting sociological investigations of the family where it was unknown before and they brought about cooperation among the family sociologists of different countries. Most of the seminars were organised in Western Europe or in North America, but some of them have taken place outside these regions with the aim of extending the cooperation among scholars of family research and to give new interest to family sociology in these regions as well. Until now no seminar was organised in the southern hemisphere and so the XXth Seminar is an important station in the history of ISA-CFR Seminars.

To organise a seminar necessitates large investments of energy, time, and money, to fulfil such a large project in the interests of the organisation. Only the scientific output of such a conference can warrant the investment and sacrifice. In the case of the present seminar, the papers already available in printed form seem to give a positive answer on the question of whether it was worthwhile for the Australian Institute of Family Studies to put so much energy - a year's work - in to the preparation of the seminar. To His Excellency, the Attorney-General of Australia, for giving special attention to the seminar, and finally, to Dr. Don Edgar and his staff for the tremendous work in preparation - thank you.

Dr. Edgar

Thank you very much Laszlo. And on behalf of the International Union of Family Organisations, Monsieur Andre Rauget.

Monsieur Andre Rauget

Thank you Sir, Mr. Chairman, with permission I will speak French. Many of you may not be able to understand French, but I will try to speak slowly and very briefly.

Monsieur President of the International Union of Family Organisations, it is with great pleasure and a great honour that I am received by the Australian Institute of Family Studies.

Since December 1982, when I met Dr. Edgar, we believed that we could develop a collaboration between the International Union of Family Organisations and the Institute. We did not think, however, that the collaboration would develop so rapidly, and for the remarkable way that it has progressed, I would like to thank Dr. Edgar.

I would like to say to Professor Cseh-Szombathy that this is an important occasion for the International Union of Family Organisations in collaboration with the Committee on Family Research and the International Sociological Association; it is indeed indispensable that we establish a permanent dialogue between the associations of families, the researchers in the field and those involved in the politics of families. I think the common action of these bodies has provided a unique opportunity to study the notion of politics in family life and the politics of family, a notion which was far from being introduced a few years ago and which even had those who questioned its legitimacy. And now, on the contrary, like an object of research and a hopeful plan of scientific and political government, such collaborative action is indispensable. I am sure that this seminar in Melbourne will allow us to trace a line of research and a line of action, and will persuade us to follow one another in gaining valuable information that will enable us to develop research on family policies. It is hoped this research will reflect the diversity of social policy and economics in different countries.

Dr. Edgar

Well, we need say no more except that I would want to make two particular thank you's and presentations. The first is to Peter Good on behalf of our staff. Peter has been responsible basically for the administration of this International Seminar from the Institute's point of view and he has worked so hard and so pleasantly with all of the administrative staff of the Institute. I want to thank him very much and to thank the staff very much through Peter. Also I want to thank Jill Atkinson without whom this Seminar could not have happened. We knew from the outset that the Institute would not have the resources and ability to conduct an International Seminar such as this. Jill Atkinson runs a conference servicing agency which has demonstrated its great ability markedly through this Seminar. All of the accommodation, the bus arrangements, the meals, the structures for the presentation, of everything, really comes down to Jill and the women who have so ably helped her and I would like on behalf of the Conference to thank you Jill and your staff on behalf of us all.

Official Opening Address

by the Governor-General of Australia, His Excellency the Rt. Hon. Sir Ninian Stephen

A highlight of the seminar was the opening dinner held on the evening of the first day in the Great Hall of the National Gallery. The dinner was arranged to provide international guests with courses representative of the variety of Australian foods; entertainment was provided by the Schools of Music and Dance of the Victorian College of the Arts.

The official opening address, delivered by the Governor-General, Sir Ninian Stephen, is reproduced here in full.

It is a great pleasure to be here for the opening of this twentieth International Conference of the Committee on Family Research. At least it is once one has mastered the relevant acronyms. Having done so, I find that what I really am pleased about is being asked to open this twentieth International Conference of the CFR, jointly sponsored by the IFS, the ISA-CFR and the IUFO.

One of the conference's main themes is to be the impact of policies on families; perhaps there may be time for brief discussion also of the impact of acronyms on us all. For they do, I think, have a profound and decidedly beneficial effect, at least upon those who use them, if not upon those upon whom they are used and who are unfortunate enough not to know their meaning. Their use is the hallmark of belonging, of being one of a warm and supportive 'in-group', not a rank outsider. To speak with ease of CHOGM, ANZUS, SEATO, NATO, OAU and ROK is nowadays enough to stamp one as an expert in foreign affairs or at least as a reader of *Time* magazine. Lawyers also relish strings of initials and no doubt social scientists have their own acronymic caste marks no less comforting.

But, in all seriousness, what a splendid subject you have chosen upon which to focus attention. One of the fascinating features of our complex modern life is the unexpected and certainly unintended interaction between initiatives in one field and consequences in another. Taxation is an area particularly rich in these fortuitous linkages, the whole pattern of urban development can be accidentally affected by a new capital gains tax, payroll taxes can unintentionally increase unemployment and municipal rating policies can produce shortages of fresh vegetables.

In just the same way, I do not doubt that government policies on a host of subjects apparently remote from the structure, cohesion and integrity of families may nevertheless have a crucial impact upon all aspects of the family. The family is, I suppose, the most responsive of all units in society simply because it is pervasive and extremely sensitive. Legislation on almost any topic, from infant day care centres to rates of pay in the armed services, from funding of Flying Doctor services to labelling of table margarine, affects the family in ways sometimes quite obvious, sometimes indirect and subtle yet no less significant because of that.

Which is, of course, why it is good to find this conference so aware of this fact and dedicated, over the course of the next few days, to some investigation of this phenomenon.

For sociologists, this must be an extraordinarily exciting time in which to live. Great wars and enslavements and great plagues apart, I suppose that at no other time in human history, at least since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, has the institution of the family been subject to such stresses, and responded with such changes, as at the present time.

Surely the most significant fact for our species since we first learned to live together in communities has been the discovery and widespread, overt use of contraceptives. Nothing has so liberated women, so changed patterns of and attitudes towards female employment and, of course, so affected families, their size and composition, even their significance as social units.

Social change is no stranger to sociologists. I know very little of the history of sociology but I wonder if its genesis as a modern discipline does not lie in the social changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Its swing away from an agrarian, relatively unspecialised rural economy to one based on machine production in urban concentrations involved great movements of populations and great stresses on the role of the bucolic extended family. Then followed, after some delay, the tentative and reluctant involvement of the State in matters of social welfare, health and education, forced upon it by the social conditions which were the product of that Revolution. Gradually perceptions of what could be demanded of the State, of what was its role, were changing.

Gradually there emerged the concept of the welfare State. Australia and New Zealand were world leaders in the provision of social welfare at the beginning of this century, and yet what was then provided by the State was a pale shadow of what is provided today. The pensions and benefits of our social security system are very much twentieth century developments. At the Federal level, where responsibility for social security in this country principally lies, a range of measures such as widows' pensions and unemployment and sickness benefits were not introduced until the 1940s, by which time we were no longer world leaders in the field. Now social security expenditure has risen to more than a quarter of the Federal Government's budget — I am speaking about recent budgets, of course, and not providing an injudicious leak about one which is imminent — so obviously the State is now heavily involved in a role which historically is relatively new to it. This financial expenditure is an accurate index of the general extent of involvement by governments in Australian society, an involvement no less complex than society itself. The major fields of social security, health and education apart, families and individuals are now intimately affected by government policies on taxation, housing, transport, indeed by all the other matters on which governments make decisions. It is a far cry indeed from the nineteenth century days of laissez faire, when, wars and taxes apart, government meant little to the life of the individual.

I suspect that almost parallel with this process of increasing government intervention has come the development of sociology as a separate field of study, although the emergence of all the social sciences out of the realm of philosophy owes much, of course, to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and to the belief in a scientific approach to all inquiry.

My impression is that in Australia, sociology has only become firmly established as a discipline in academic institutions since the 1940s. Be that as it may, its development and the recognition of its importance has been very great, matching the changes in our society over those 40 years: vast immigration, economic boom and recession, change from a steady state of full employment to one of chronic unemployment, the sudden advent of high technology, the changed role of women not just in Australia but around the world. We have lived through and are living through one of the great social revolutions of all time and it is for our sociologists to identify its direction and extent and to advise upon its management and control.

Without sociology in all its facets we would feel ourselves at the mercy of these sweeping changes, ignorant of how they are affecting our social institutions, ignorant too of the correct decisions to be made in coping with change and without a proper understanding of the nature of our society and of the relationships of the groups within it.

The Institute of Family Studies, established only four years ago, is helping to fill one large gap in our knowledge, that relating to the fundamental social group — the family. Its research gives government and people a better understanding of how the family has been changing and how it may hereafter change in response to particular social phenomena and to government policies, actual and proposed. The Institute's work will enable better account to be taken of the welfare of the family unit, as important today as always to the welfare of the individual.

I welcome the visitors from overseas who have come to Australia and to this Conference to share with us their knowledge and to enliven discussion. The International Sociological Association is itself less than four decades old but has already greatly served the exchange of ideas across the world in this young and expanding science. I take great pleasure now in formally declaring open the twentieth International Conference of the Committee on Family Research.

KEY PAPERS

SESSION 4

Theme: The administration of family policy — world wide trends

IUFO Session

- Professor Dr Clio Presvelou
- Jacqueline Ancelin
- Pierre Cliche

World survey on availability of family policy guidelines

by CLIO PRESVELOU

Last November, the IUFO Study Group on the Role of Public Authorities and Family Policies in cooperation with the writer of this report have, upon the request of the IUFO Council, set up a research project whose goal was to establish a first inventory, followed by an appraisal on the institutional context within which the representation of families in the various countries, (members of the IUFO) takes place. To this end, a short written questionnaire was mailed in November 1983 to all IUFO members (governmental and NGOs) and to the IUFO National Commissions. From the point of view of the IUFO and the Study Group, this first assessment could contribute to making suggestions regarding the steps that could be taken by the IUFO's Governing Body (i.e. the Council) to assist members in reinforcing the representation of families at the level of Public Authorities. The second application of this survey would be to work out one (or several) model(s) of the kinds of relationships in term of representation (negotiation, influence, etc.) between family organisations on one hand, public administrations, on the other.

Mr. Luthra's opening address has indicated that the IUFO has two kinds of members. These are the NGOs (family movements and associations, for example) and the governmental bodies (representatives from ministries where one or several family-related aspects are dealt with). This diversity in membership is reflected by the differences in perception that these two kinds of members have on the studied topic, as will be shown.

I. General Description of Respondents

On the closing date of the survey (15 May1984), twenty-nine replies were received representing twenty-one countries. About two-thirds of the replies came from non-governmental organisations, a rather adequate proportional representation of the two kinds of IUFO members. The breakdown of replies by membership status (governmental or non-governmental member) and by country is given in Table 1. (See over).

TABLE 1. BREAK-DOWN OF REPLIES BY COUNTRY AND STATUS OF MEMBERSHIP

EUROPE	G.M.	N-G.M.	Total
Austria	1		1
Belgium	1	3	4
Finland		2	2
France		2	2
Germany (F.R.G.)		1	1
Greece		1	1
Hungary		1	1
Italy	1	2	3
Luxembourg (Gr.D)	1		1
Portugal	1		1
Spain	1		1
Switzerland	1		1
United Kingdom		1	1
Sub-total	7	13	20
OUTSIDE EUROPE			
Australia		1	1
Canada (Quebec)		1	1
Canada		1	1
Bahrain	1		1
India		1	1
Iraq		1	1
Israel		1	1
Japan		1	1
Morocco		1	1
Sub-total	1	8	9
Total	8	21	29

As can be seen, replies from European countries are by far the most numerous, with a high representation of governmental members, as well. The higher response from European countries corresponds to expectations. Western European countries have been active for many decades, both at the level of family organisations and of family movements, as well as on that of public authorities in formulating and implementing family policy measures.

Some of the family movements (for example the French) were created as early as 1876 (1). The often harsh negotiations between family movements and public authorities for the allocation of facilities and preferential treatment to the families is part of the historical fabric of Western European countries and are tightly interwoven with the industrial and social upheavals these countries went through. This already suggests the specific meaning that terms like "family rights" take in some countries. Several of these family movements were, on the other hand, among "the founding members" of the IUFO and because of this they have remained involved in the Union. Another reason, and probably the most important one, is that their relative financial prosperity makes it possible for them to closely follow the Unions' activities while proximity with the Paris headquarters makes regular contacts possible.

Outside Europe the replies received were sparse. There were no replies from countries of the South American continent. This is due to the fact that the implementation of the IUFO there is very recent. By contrast, the absence of replies from African countries is particularly disappointing. For one, because this does not reflect the very active role that several of the African countries take in IUFO activities and regional seminars. Also and most importantly, because the institutional contexts within which problems faced by families find solutions are extremely varied between and within African countries. Given the importance of the "African" family as a polyvalent functional unit for the individual and the collectivity in rural communities, it would have been of great interest to have been enabled to analyze replies from African countries.

The same general comment applies to the Asiatic Continent. India, in particular, with its closely-knit family network that permeates all kinds of social and cultural diversities (racial, religious, or the caste composition).

(1) "La représentation des familles : une mosaîque fédérée par l'U.N.A.F.", in Population et Avenir, no 559, juin-juillet, 1982, p.9

and the large autonomy left to individual States of the Indian Union whereby States initiate imaginative solutions to come to grips with renewal (rural and urban) and its impact on the family, would have been a particularly interesting case to examine from the point of view of this survey - had several of the Indian IUFO members, spread as they are over several parts of the country, sent in replies. Obviously, the intention here is not to blame IUFO members for not replying to the questionnaire. In the developing countries, especially, which are afflicted by several problems simultaneously (soil erosion, malnutrition, huge public debts, etc.), member organisations have, understandably, other priorities.

The low number of replies cannot, however, be attributed to the nature of the questions, nor to the length of the questionnaire (see Appendix I). With the exception of Question 4, all other questions are factual and filling them in does not, on the whole, require extensive research on the part of a family organisation or of a ministry cognizant of the requested facts. From the outset it was decided to keep the questionnaire short and to have it deal with current facts.

The low response rate to written questionnaires, especially in a universe as diverse as that used for the survey, is a well-known predicament for international bodies. And the IUFO is no exception to the rule. Perhaps other means of administering questionnaires should be tried in the future to improve the number of replies received.

On the whole, the quality of replies was satisfactory. In several cases legislative or research texts were mailed in support of information given in the questionnaire.

II. Major Features from the Survey

This section provides the most salient features regarding the connexion between aspects of family policy and public authorities.

1. Mention of the family in national Constitutions

The objective of the first two questions was to find out to what extent the family, and family rights, were mentioned explicitly in a country's Constitution. No definition of the family, nor of its rights were provided in the questionnaire to conform with the IUFO's position with respect to the recognition of pluralism in family forms. With the exception of one country which stated that it does not have a Constitution and another where the replies from two organizations were contradictory, in the majority of countries (twelve out of twenty)* mention of the family is made in their respective Constitutions. A more detailed analysis of the positive answers allows the grouping of countries into three categories :

- in a first group, the Constitution mentions the family (and not only the persons) and guarantees its rights. The term "family rights" does not receive, therein, a specific definition ;
- in a second group, the Constitution is expressly mandated to intervene positively to protect the family and guarantee the satisfaction of its needs ;
- in a third group of countries, the Constitution explicitly mentions the family "based on marriage" as the basic unit of society. (This is the case usually among countries with a strong Catholic heritage).

2. Institutionalisation of representation of families

The third question was intended to assess the degree of official recognition of representation of families both at the level of public authorities and at that of national non-governmental bodies. From the survey it becomes clear that in their large majority (12 out of 20), the countries do not have a ministry (or a state secretariat) in charge of family affairs and family policies. On the other hand, only four countries stated total lack of ministerial administrations (departments or services) entrusted with family policy aspects.

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* One questionnaire had to be discarded because it was written in a non-European language and inaccessibility to translation facilities.

A detailed analysis of the replies suggests the following comments. To begin with, the naming and attributions of a Ministry for Family Affairs seems, in the majority of countries, a question particularly sensitive to political climate and governments. Sometimes the creation or, on the contrary, the suppression of such a ministry seems to have been the result of political expediency rather than of deeply-rooted convictions. For example, 5 of 12 countries having stated that the family is explicitly mentioned in the country's Constitution, do not have (or no longer have) a Ministry for Family Affairs. The second comment is that, in several countries, family policy matters seem to be scattered among a multitude of Ministries - a practice which results in overlapping, duplication and inefficiency.

Several countries stated that there are, in addition to, or in the absence of, public administrations, several kinds of intermediate structures (NGOs) set up to represent families officially to public authorities. Only in a minority of countries, however, are there to be found Family Councils (often called Higher Councils) whose role is to stimulate or participate in official family policy formulations or position papers. Very often family councils have a consultative status and are set up by a Ministry. Besides this kind of NGOs, are cited, in addition, associations and movements for families, parents, women, etc. each one representing particular"family"interests (whether these interests are professional, confessional or political). In some cases, such associations are grouped into national federations but usually they are loosely linked at the national level and hence their impact on public authorities is rather weak.

A typical pattern relative to representation of families is, as mentioned earlier, that family matters are scattered among several ministries. This is understandable, for family interests are part of the total fabric of a nation's life and, hence, cover the economic, social and cultural sectors. It is, however, regrettable, from the viewpoint of families and their interests that only in a few rare cases is there to be found an Interministerial Commission whose task is to enhance concertation and cooperation among the concerned ministries, in view of formulating a global vision of family policy followed by concrete texts and implementation - assisted in these various tasks by NGOs. Here and there, especially in large federal countries with a fairly large autonomy of States, interesting initiatives are taken by one State but not by the others, and no federal law makes such initiatives mandatory. (See for example, the system of Family Impact Statement required to accompany all major proposals to the South Australian Government, which is adopted neither by the Commonwealth Government nor by any other State.)

The next question (Question 4) solicited opinions from countries (6 altogether) where there is no institutionally recognized representation of families. Four of these countries are in favour of the creation of a high level public administration (a ministerial department, for example) entrusted with family matters. Suggestions on the form and attributions of such a structure remain vague. With the exception of one country (Japan) where, since 1979 a Commission on Family Matters appointed by the then Prime Minister, with mandate to report directly to him, made concrete recommendations in 1980, but these have not yet been followed by effects.

3. Extent, level and forms of representation of families

Question 5 was aimed at gathering information on the extent to which the representation of families is ensured de jure or de facto (Question 5.1), and the level(s) within the political decision-making administration and within advisory NGOs, this representation occurs (Question 5.2).

With respect to the extent of representation of families in public bodies a general comment is needed here, namely that, with the exception of two countries where this representation is written into the law, everywhere else it is ensured de facto. But the perception informants have regarding the effectiveness of representation is dependent on whether the informant is an NGO or a government agency. The replies of the former (the NGOs) range from reserved to negative; the government agencies, on the other hand, give a very positive reply.

With this observation in mind, the survey yields some interesting information :

- In some replies it is stated that family representation is officially recognized as soon as a National Council of Families has been instituted. Not all informants from countries where such Councils exist share this interpretation.
- Several replies, that furnish detailed lists of bodies showing the levels where families are represented, lead to the observation that this representation is ensured in more than one ministry, or ministerial body with different attributions (See also above, II.2). These include economic aspects (taxation, income security, etc.), housing (public housing,

emergency accommodations, eligibility for housing loans, etc.), health (basic medical care, aid for the disabled, other specific health care services) social services (services for children, premarital and marital counselling, family aides, financial counselling of families, services for the elderly), family law, employment (equal opportunity or anti-discrimination legislation).

From the detailed analysis of replies the following four models of representation of families at the national level could be outlined :

First model : diversity of family movements and associations (active at local, intermediate and national levels) with strong unitary representation at the national level (often also at the intermediate levels). France is a good illustration of this. The representation of families has been termed "a mosaïc federated by the National Union of Family Associations" ("une mosaïque fédérée par l'U.N.A.F.") (2). The NUFA is then referred to as the "Parliament of Families".

Second model : diversity of family movements and associations (active at all levels) with loosely-knit central, federative body but with a representation of families in a large assortment of national institutes and consultative commissions. Belgium best typifies this model. The interests of families are represented in very numerous, and sometimes in, at first unexpected, kinds of commissions such as, for example, Commission on Consumer Prices, Council for Consumer Affairs (both instituted by the Ministry for Economic Affairs), the National Council for Parents, Higher Council for Special Education (Ministry of Education), Commission on Film Control (Ministry of Justice), Army-Youth Commission (Ministry of Defense), etc.

Third model : a diversity of NGOs at the local level, federated or not at a higher level, claiming to speak on behalf of families and being active in policy analysis and advocacy. In countries (or States of a federative nation) where research units exist (instituted either by public authorities or by universities) it seems, from the scarce evidence available from the survey, that these research institutes become the catalyst for disseminating scientific information to both public authorities and NGOs. Australia (or rather the South Australian State) seems to illustrate this model.

(2) See note (1)

Fourth model : large, or, on the contrary, restricted number of NGOs with limited extend of advocacy for families on an ad hoc basis, seemingly acting independently from one another.

Absence of mechanisms of concertation and cooperation with one another resulting in an impression of as yet unexplored ways, within these countries, of establishing efficient contacts among the NGOs (or a federation thereof) and public authorities, on the other.

* * *

This list of models is not exhaustive. It represents a deliberate choice of major types of representations of families from among the situations surveyed.

III. Main aspects of family Policies

This information was gathered from Question 6. The diversity of family policy measures cited by several informants from the same country, and the heterogeneity in inter-country comparisons make a systematic and detailed compilation of concrete measures on the basis of the same classification criteria a very hazardous undertaking.

For this reason we present below, the main aspects of family policies that were mentioned most often and cited in comparable terms. Two broad groups of replies have been constructed according to whether the mentioned family policy measures have, as major component, to correct (or prevent) inequalities, or whether their major component is to promote family welfare and self-reliance. The former have a predominantly corrective and curative attribute; the latter, a promotional attribute. Naturally, both kinds of policy measures are available, either explicitly or implicitly, in some of the countries surveyed.

Among the corrective family measures, the most often cited are related to three basic types of needs, namely income, health and housing.

- measures related to family income : different solutions regarding the taxation system, those of the family allowance system, etc.;
- measures related to services available to families : with respect to

health, to the child , etc.;

- measures related to housing. Here, also, a wide variety of measures, whose objective is to help families have access to decent housing have been cited.

The promotional family measures cited, are of a cultural character and include two main sub-categories :

- consumer information, access of family members to better education related (or not) to career perspectives;
- recent modifications of legislation whereby a larger recognition has been given to family-related matters; these include :
    - enlarging the grounds for granting divorce (mutual consent, irretrievable breakdown of marriage, for example);
    - transformation of father's rights (puissance paternelle) into shared parental rights;
    - equal employment opportunities for men and women (anti-discriminatory legislation);
    - some timid efforts to part-time employment for both partners, especially for mothers of young children.

Comprehensive studies on family policies

From Question 8, aimed at gathering information on this topic, one observes a high contrast between the wealth of publications (reports, scientific articles, research papers, etc.) on specific aspects of family policy and the absence, with a few exceptions, of comprehensive studies. Likewise, only a small fraction of respondents mention some tentative efforts made to assess the impact of any set of family policies on the beneficiaries.

IV. Concluding remarks and discussion points

No written document without verbal explanations can correctly translate the wealth of information contained in the written answers received.

In some cases these answers were often supplemented by voluminous reports and articles. Their analysis enabled the author of this paper to make multifaceted interpretations and formulate hypotheses with respect to the nature, extent and form of representations of families within single countries, between countries with similar historical or cultural backgrounds or both and between countries with contrasting backgrounds. Nor can a written statement faithfully render the meaning of questions raised, and left unanswered, regarding the obvious limitations and/or weaknesses, some systems of representation of families at the level of public authorities, have. Even less can a written document point to the writer's "intuitions" about imaginative mechanisms of concertation and cooperation between families and public authorities found in the analysed documents.

Because of all these reasons the author of this paper will limit herself to making some concluding remarks and will extend these by presenting a set of questions, in the hope that some can lead to fruitful exchange of ideas and to discussions during the Seminar. One recommendation will then be made, in fine, regarding further treatment and use that could be made of this material.

One first group of concluding remarks concerns the character of the survey. This survey does not pretend to be representative or exhaustive on the institutional frameworks within which the representation of families takes place in the IUFO member countries. Even less, is this survey a faithful reflexion of situations the world over. This is the reason for which we cannot speak of "trends", but rather of "availability" of family policy guidelines. Second, with the exception of Question 3.1 ("does your country have a ministry permanently in charge of family policies ?"), questions were well understood and answered in a satisfactory manner. But even the answers to Question 3.1 show that misinterpretation did not occur. Third, the thoroughness with which respondents completed the questionnaire may be interpreted as a sign of their interest on the researched topic. They recognize, undoubtedly, the importance of an efficient representation of families at the highest level in their countries.

With respect to the main thrusts of the survey, these could, in this author's view, be summarized as follows :

- Family policy as an identifiable whole does not derive from a coherent, comprehensive vision of families (which families ?), their needs and welfare. Rather it is the result of sometimes short-term, at other longer-term goals which, within given political, financial and ideological settings, are deemed necessary or desirable, or both. In this sense, family policy (i.e. components of it) is piecemeal in its composition and pragmatic as to its output. This does not preclude that major components (those related to basic needs, like income maintenance, housing and health) trace their origins back to some leading ideological or religious values (for example, catholicism or marxist-inspired socialism). The simultaneous presence then of immaterial as well as pragmatic goals produces a pluralistic family policy (e.g. series of policies formulated to suit the particularistic interests of specific groups of families and/or of specific needs) (3). This configuration applies to countries with mature instruments of family policy measures and of representation of families.

- A second conclusion, and more important from this author's point of view, is that in the majority of answers families seem to be treated as a vulnerable group. (Not that the attribute of "vulnerability" does not apply to certain groups of families. Obviously it does !). But in the eyes of informants families are seen as rightful "recipients" of services, facilities, or of any other sort of help from public administrations. Such components are mainly of the curative (or corrective) kind. They are important and should be maintained. Yet, one gets the impression when one reads some extensive lists of benefits that in the eyes of respondents they all have the same urgency; no criteria of priorities reflecting degrees of urgency are set. Some of these benefits have become "acquired rights" even when they are no longer necessary; but their removal or transformation to something new, more compatible with new needs, is unthinkable. Hence the question : is it not the main goal of family policy, beyond intervention and assistance from public administration, to render families self-reliant and increase their potential for self-help ? It is possible that this "assisted-minded" trend perceived in the discourse of informants is a question of form and terminology, rather than of content and conviction.

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(3) Presvelou, C., "The impact of ideology on family policy. A discussion of holistic and pluralistic approaches", C. Presvelou and P. de Bie (eds.), The scientific bases of family policy, ICOFA : Louvain, 1978, pp. 69-75.

This critical examination suggests that an effort of reconceptualizing the relationships between public administrations and NGOs which advocate family interests could be a fruitful sub-topic for discussions in a Seminar such as this. Similarly fruitful could be the reconceptualisation of families as dynamic entities which, in their daily activities carried out in the home or outside it, aspire to self-reliance and self-help in housing, health and nutrition ; in consumer information ; in life-long learning and in widening their job or leisure perspectives ; in carrying out, decently, their everyday lives (especially the disabled and the aged), and in community involvement.

Discussion points

Three such points are formulated below .

The first discussion point is : "What form of cooperation could be considered as optimal between research institutes on family policy (set up by public authorities and/or universities) and their two kinds of potential "clients", namely, public administrations and NGOs ? ". The question of a fruitful and permanent dialogue between those who formulate family policy components (public administrations) and those who advocate and implement them (the NGOs) on the basis of scientifically established information - be it evaluative or prospective - has for several years preoccupied enlightened specialists and public administrators.

The second discussion point : "What kinds of mechanisms for reinforcing concertation between dissenting NGOs of one country, could be suggested ?". This question is timely if one considers that in the majority of the world's nations (and not only those that are members of the IUFO), NGOs are seized by mounting difficulties to force their presence and prove their usefulness as representatives of families.

The third, and last, discussion point is : "Considering that the large majority of countries, including those which are members of the IUFO, do not dispose of sufficient resources (financial resources, qualified staff, administrative structures) for sustaining the demands from families, what priorities in terms of components of family policy could be set for them and how are these to be attained ?". Family policy benefits are costly.

What are the needed supportive actions for families in less wealthy contries and how can families have access to them ?

Recommendation

The models of institutionalized representation of families which were but roughly outlined earlier in this paper (see II.3) are the basis for working out strategies for efficient concertation between public administrations and NGOs. It is, therefore, recommended here to set up an appropriate research structure (a study group perhaps ?) whose task would be to formulate and carry out a research project on the systematic analysis of these (and other) models with a view of assessing their applicability elsewhere.

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3.11.83.

STUDY GROUP ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

AND FAMILY POLICIES

QUESTIONNAIRE

1 - Does your country's Constitution make any reference to the Family ?

2 - Does this Constitution make any reference to any "Family Rights", i.e. Rights which are proper to the Family ?

3.1 Does your country have a Ministry permanently in charge of Family Policies ?

3.2 If your country has no Ministry in charge of the Family, is there another solution on a Governmental level ?

e.g. a Service responsible for the Family within a Ministry having wider attributions, or an Institute or specific Bureau in close relation with a Ministry or permanent Council etc...

3.3 Another solution other than a Governmental body, e.g. a permanent or episodical Consultative Council, a Non-Governmental Institute, a Group of Family Associations, etc...

3.4 Another solution

4.1 Should all the replies to the above questions be negative, do you consider the founding of such a Department useful ?

4.2 If so, in what way ?

5.1 Is the representation of Families ensured in your country ?

- in a recognized manner by an official text (as, for example, in France
- in another manner, which ?

5.2 Does the representation of Families intervene

- in Public Authorities ?
- at which levels ?
- in Organisations responsible for giving opinions ?
- in economic, social, educational, cultural Institutions ? (give brief details on these organisations)

6 - Could you give a summary of the main aspects of Family Policies in your country.

For example :

- Services for Families
- Housing
- Provision of Equipment for the Family
- Other forms of support, which ones

Are these policies any different from Demographical Policies ?

7 - Could you provide some information on the way in which the phenomenon of the development of couples living together without being married is taken into account in your country.

- Have any statistics or surveys been made on the extent of this phenomenon ?
- Are there any concrete legal, fiscal etc. measures ?
- Child Status

8 - Has an overall study on Family Policies been made in your country ?

Has a Report been deposed ?

Where can one obtain it ?

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Family policy and social changes in France

by JACQUELINE ANCELIN

Family policy in France, nowadays strongly imbricated in the national policy of solidarity, is characterized by :

- a broad field of interventions : there are few actions in social policy which do not concern the family ;
- a long story of family allowances going from voluntary initiative to Social Security ;
- a family allowances system which is still nowadays the main and original axis

I. FAMILY POLICY IN FRANCE : A BROAD FIELD OF INTERVENTIONS

There are few interventions in social policy which do not concern the family (2). Consequently, it is difficult to estimate the whole financial effort of the "comprehensive family policy".

The five main actors are : the State, Social Security, Local Authorities, Work's Councils, Associations.

(1) Paper - Seminar organised by the International Sociological Association (Committee on Family Research), The Australian Institute of Family Studies and the International Union of Family Organisations - Melbourne - 19-24 August 1984.

(2) Social assistance to children concerns orphans, but it also provides financial allowances for families in difficulty : it is a broad and complex policy which will not be presented in this paper.

1 - The State

It acts in reducing taxes through the fiscal system, taking into account the consumption unit.

Moreover, it offers-free-of-charge services, namely that of national education, from pre-elementary school to University included : free-of-charge training, books and transport, maintenance grants. (The budget of the Ministry of National Education was, in 1981, 140 billion francs, that is, 4,7 % of the national wealth).

2 - Social Security

Most of the financial allowances distributed to families come from the "Family Allowances" Branch (100 billion francs in 1983, that is, 3% of the national wealth).

The "Illness Insurance" Branch covers the almost free-of-charge care. Medical expenses reimbursed to families for the treatment of their children came to about 55 billion francs in 1983, whereas the contribution is the same for all insured persons, even single ones.

The "Aged" Branch takes into account the particular status of mothers when they retire. In fact, it is they who bear the burden of conciliating professional activities with those of the family. Therefore, the retirement age is advanced (usually by 5 years) and the amount of pension is revised, namely in order to take into account the number of children.

3 - Local Authorities

They contribute mainly in creating and managing neighbourhood services linked to the daily life of children and families : complementary school services (restaurants and day nurseries) and social services (kindergartens, stop-off nurseries, leisure activities, community centres, social work services, holiday camps, etc...).

These social services are often created and run with the financial contribution of the Family Allowances Agencies (their social and family welfare program).

4 - Associations

Besides public and semi-public organizations, they offer an extremely diversified network. A great number of them run mutual aid services or sanitary, social, leisure or cultural services. Some of them - the Family Associations - have a special mission : to defend the status and the rights of the family.

5 - Work's Councils

They run sanitary and social services, clinics, rest homes, day nurseries, holiday camps, etc... - and may give cash benefits (for nurseries, holidays), bearing in mind the family status of the employee.

II. A LONG STORY OF FAMILY ALLOWANCES

2.1. The family supplementary wage created before the First World War

It is created by some employers for employees in trade and industry.

Its objective is related to social justice : the salary must be sufficient to cover the needs of the employee and his family.

The old principle "for equal work, equal salary" is replaced by "for equal social and family charges, equal resources".

2.2. The 1930's : a national family policy

In the 1930's there was a strong decline in the birth-rate.

A "mothers at home" benefit is created.

New categories of employees claim for the benefit of family allowances : between 1936 and 1938, these allowances are extended to agricultural workers, then to their employers and to ~~rural~~ craftsmen.

In 1939 the Code of the Family grants the right to allowances to both non wage-earners and to wage-earners during periods of non-chosen unemployment.

Then the right is extended to the unemployed, to sick people, to invalids, to retired persons and to widows of beneficiaries. The "mothers at home benefit" becomes the "single salary allowance".

The Family Allowances are no longer a family supplementary salary, and become one of the main tools of a national family policy, aiming at reducing inequalities between families, according to the number of children.

The Family Allowances are then served by the Compensation Offices.

2.3. 1946 : Integration in the Social Security Scheme and generalization

In 1946, Family Allowances are integrated into the whole of the Social Security system. But the Family Allowances Agencies, following the Compensation Offices, remain autonomous.

New benefits are created : besides Family Allowances per se which are predominent, we have prenatal allowances, maternity and single salary allowances.

Whereas for the other risks - illness, old-age- the professional characteristic prevails, solidarity for Family Allowances becomes, during this time, almost national : all those families whose head is active or pensioned are concerned.

In 1948 a housing allowance is created, given with a means-test ; it is only for families with low incomes.

Over this period of time, Family Allowances are characterized by a strong modulation according to the age of the child - increased allowances for age are created in 1955 - the amount of the single salary allowance is quite high.

The extension to all families is progressive. It will be achieved in 1978 : the requirement of professional activity is suppressed by law .

At the end of the 1960's the idea emerges that family allowances could contribute to a vertical redistribution of incomes.

The VI Plan (1971-1975) recommends a stronger redeployment of transfers in favour of the most underprivileged.

2.4. 1970- 1981 : the selectivity of allowances

Many new allowances are created between 1970 and 1972, but with a means-test : orphan allowance, allowance for both minor and adult handicapped persons, housing allowance, day-care of young children allowance, old-age pension contribution for mothers, loans to young couples, increase of single-salary allowances and mothers-at-home allowances. (The means-test for allowances to orphans and to handicapped minors will be suppressed in 1973).

This policy will be maintained : all the allowances created between 1974 and 1981 will be submitted to a means-test : allowance for school equipment, for single parents, individualized grant for housing, family supplement.

The share of modulated allowances within family allowances expenses continues to increase, reaching 50% in 1981.

The demographic situation, which has been causing great concern to the State for many years, will lead to the giving of priority to young families and to large ones, mainly those with 3 children. In other respects, one is trying to remain neutral towards female work.

In 1977 and 1979, several measures are taken in favour of these families (rate of allowances - lengthening of maternity leave - old-age insurance for mothers - supplement to family income - etc...).

In parallel, the Budget Law for 1981 gives half a part more to those who have 3 children under care.

2.5. 1981-1984 : Restart and Rigour

First, the Government makes great increases in the amount of the various allowances and tries to harmonize rights so that the big differences according, namely, to the size of the family and the level of resources are reduced.

The aim is both social and economic : consumption must be restarted.

Family allowances are greatly increased, as are housing allowances - for which the number of beneficiaries rose highly.

Benefits for families of various sizes are re-balanced : one does not want to privilege any family type, but to give each child the same allowance amount. Priority to the 3rd child is re-opened.

But the rigorous imperatives will provoke a re-orientation in 1982. Prices and salaries are frozen. We must once again control social expenditure and, consequently, focus on some families in particular.

The Family Branch must make large savings : the increases in family allowances are lower than those of price increases, and the rate of several other allowances is either frozen or reduced.

The law project aimed at increasing family allowances is postponed.

Two measures are studied which are aimed at helping the family while it is being started : an allowance for the young child - a paid parental leave.

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So, Family Allowances in France, created on a voluntary basis by employers, were integrated into the whole of the Social Security System.

In the beginning they aimed at more social justice for employees with children under their care.

Then, as years went by, the Family Allowances policy integrated demographic considerations (rising birth-rate), solidarity objectives (taking into account resources or handicaps) and economic pressures (to control the increase of Social Security expenses - economic crisis).

Nowadays, Family Allowances are an integrated part of the comprehensive solidarity policy of the country.

III. THE FAMILY ALLOWANCES SYSTEM

It relies on arbitrates and decisions of Government and Parliament. It is managed by organizations with private status : the Family Allowances Offices - and by a public one : the National Family Allowances ~~Office~~ Funds. It is completed by a family social welfare program, decentralized and relatively autonomous.

3.1. Government, Parliament, Partners, Plan

Medium or long-term studies and estimates about the future of social protection are carried out on a permanent basis in the National Planning Office, which is linked to the Prime Minister's Secretariat. It is a useful place for confrontation between various partners, and also research and field workers.

Because of their history and financial sources, the main partners in Family Allowances are : employers' organizations, trade unions and family associations.

These have a privileged status : their National Union receives grants from the National Family Allowances Fund.

The Government and the Parliament decide the conditions and the amount of the benefits, and, consequently, the total financial effort.

3.2. The Family Allowances Scheme

It is universal.

Since 1978, all those families living in France - French or immigrant (if the child resides in France), whether the parents work or not - receive the same benefits (1).

It is no longer a supplementary salary, but a benefit linked to the right of the child.

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(1) Family Allowances are paid in the native country for immigrant workers when the family does not reside in France.

- Financing

It is provided by contributions paid by enterprises (nowadays 9% of salaries paid) up to a Social Security ceiling.

- Management of Family Allowances

They are run by Family Allowances Offices (for 95% of the beneficiaries) and Agricultural Mutual Aid Offices (for 5%).

Beneficiaries are tied to a Family Allowances Office in the area where they live (115 Offices in metropolitan France and 4 in the Overseas Departments).

The Family Allowances Offices are run by Boards of Directors composed, on the one hand, of trade union representatives (elected by insured persons on a list presented by these trade unions) - and, on the other hand, of employers' organizations and family associations. Other qualified persons are also on these Boards.

- Family and Social Welfare Program of the Family Allowances Offices

It exists since the beginning of these Offices.

Financed also by contributions paid by enterprises, it represents a much smaller part (5 billion francs in 1982) in comparison with Family Allowances (100 billion francs in 1982).

But it is an important part of family policy due to the financial support it provides for the creation and management of neighbourhood institutions and services for families and their children, i.e. day nurseries, stop-off nurseries, leisure activities, community centres, social workers' services, holiday camps. It also supplies financial grants to those families which are in difficulty.

The broad objectives of this Social Welfare Program are decided by the National Family Allowances ~~Office~~ Fund, approved by the Government. It is, however, decentralized and adapted to local situations, in relation with partners : local authorities, associations, state offices.

3.3. The present time

The Family Allowances System is nowadays characterized by benefits varying according to :

- the number of children ; they increase more than proportionately with the family size ;
- the age of the family (and of the children) : a particular effort is made for parents at the beginning of their family life ;
- the resources - either the benefit is cut off when it goes over a certain amount (family supplementary), or it is reduced with the resources (housing allowance). Nevertheless, the main part of the benefits (family, orphan allowances) hardly varies with the resources :
- some particularly vulnerable situations : single mother, or a family with a handicapped child.

3.4. The future

The 9th Plan - 1984-1988 - devotes one of its 12 priority programs to family policy :

"Secure a positive environment to the family and to the birth-rate"

"A better help to families, and to encourage birth is a national priority for the development of France, both economic, social, cultural as well as demographic.

Three objectives are aimed at in this Program :

- to make the system of benefits to families more efficient. This system must be more incitive for births, and more coherent - the existing system must be simplified ;
- to favour conciliation between professional life and family life ;
- to deal a more active policy in favour of young children.

"The main means of this Program are :

- to re-orient grants to families so as to establish specific measures in favour of young children and large families ;

- to give more flexibility to parental leave, to diversify the day-care services for early childhood and to extend them ;

- to gather together the conditions of a positive environment for birth and children : neighbourhood services, daily leisure activities, parental education, better care for parents and children in difficulty, complementary school welcome, accident prevention, housing program - by developing contracts at a local level with the local authorities".

The fulfilment of these objectives at a time of economic crisis gives rise to the difficult problem of financing social protection and balances in the framework of a national solidarity policy, between the benefits to the sick and the handicapped, to the unemployed, to the aged and to families.

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Family policy in France - based mainly on Family Allowances - is currently aimed at reducing their income-tax and at increasing the direct resources of families with benefits, and at supplying families with institutions and services necessary for the health, education, care and leisure of their children.

During the last decade this comprehensive policy had to take into consideration :

. a certain number of social changes, both on the level of cash benefits and on that of services and institutions ;

. the aspiration towards more equal chances, especially between children ;

. the evolution of female work, in constant progression, and towards which official family policy takes a neutral stand. One has to find a balance between interventions in favour of women who work (day care of children) and those who stay at home to take care of their children (compensation for loss in salary) and to facilitate intermediary measures : part-time work, paid parental leave ;

. the increase in the number of divorces and one-parent families.

So, the comprehensive policy of the country offers a wide field to political and ideological debates, where the various ideas of family types, women's rights, rights of children and relations between family and society all come face to face.

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Quebec's family policy; social policy or demographic policy?

by PIERRE CLICHE

Over the past two years, the gouvernement du Québec's efforts concerning the demographic situation of, and its social policies towards, children and the family have proceeded along two parallel tracks. These efforts originally sprang from quite different concerns. The government was pressed, on one side, by planners, demographers and economists to look into a perilous demographic situation which, if allowed to continue, could threaten Québec's future in the long-term. At the same time, though, the multitude and the complexity of social policies concerning children and the family were the object of longstanding criticism from families and their associations as well as from certain groups of professionals directly involved in family services. As work was carried out in both these areas, the close links which were possible between the two fields became increasingly apparent.

In fact, the links are so close that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two. Thus, for example, some experts, when speaking about family policy, urged that such a policy be prepared, to be used as a tool for raising the birthrate, and as a means of improving the services which ought to be available to such a major social institution. And indeed, it appears that family policy could play a significant role in the realms of both demographic policies and social policies. The danger in such a strategic posture is that, in attempting to reconcile two such widely differing objectives, neither of them is achieved. A choice must be made. The gouvernement du Québec's position is that family policy is, before anything else, a social policy. It is designed to meet certain social objectives, such as raising the quality of life of the family and recognizing the family's social role. If, along the way, it also contributes to certain demographic goals, so much the better, but reconciling the two objectives is not the top priority. In family policy development, demographics yields to social concerns.

That having been said, we will be examining, in what follows, how family policy, from the point of view of the gouvernement du Québec, is an integral part of social policy, as well as the needs which are met by family policy, and the particular perspective from which it addresses these needs. Finally, we will isolate the specific role which, nonetheless, it can play within demographic policy.

A- Family policy: an integral part of social policy

Obviously, the fact that the gouvernement du Québec is undertaking the preparation of a policy on the family does not mean that the family had been neglected beforehand. Far from it: the array of programs dealing with the family either directly or indirectly testify to the government's continuing concern. However, because a common approach to the family was lacking, the government's action was fragmented. There are almost as many family policies as there are government family service agencies.

Nonetheless, the prominence of family policy within social policy as a whole stems from more than a simple concern for integration and coherence, though that is certainly present. There is also the concern that the family be perceived as more than a client requiring services, that it be approached as the necessary support for a range of services to individuals. In this context, family policy has a primary role to play in relation to other social policies.

1- The family as the subject of social policy

Although the gouvernement du Québec did not have an official policy towards the family, its concern in that area was apparent in an array of laws, policies, programs and services, which can be grouped into five categories:

- measures which recognize and set out the rights of family members, as well as their mutual obligations (Charter of Rights, Civil Code, Youth Protection Act, etc.)

- measures which act directly or indirectly to protect the economic well-being of families such as tax deductions, tax credits, family allowances, availability allowances, social aid, income support or supplement, social insurance, etc.

- measures aimed at reconciling employment with family responsibilities (subsidized day care, child care allowances, statutory maternity or paternity leave, unemployment insurance during the period of childbirth, the elimination of the years spent looking after a young child from the contribution period under the public pension plan, etc.)

- social, health and education services (universal free access to education, social, medical and hospital services, etc.)

- measures designed to promote a favourable climate for the development of families and of family life (protection of the environment, provision of green spaces and playgrounds in cities, development of community recreation, public housing construction, home ownership assistance, etc.)

It could be maintained that this range of initiatives does, in fact, constitute an implicit family policy if only because of its scope and diversity. Nonetheless, our position is that it is not enough to gather up all the government measures which deal either directly or indirectly with the family. In doing so, we are really dealing with family-oriented policies rather than with a family policy. Of course, all this indicates the extent of the needs of families, as well as the scale of the means the government has mobilized in order to meet them. However, a careful examination will also reveal that each department has its own specific conception of the family and of its needs, and that its approach in dealing with these needs is based on concerns characteristic of its own sector rather than on an overall perspective. The net result of these extensive but insufficiently coordinated and poorly integrated efforts is hardly surprising: contradiction, wasted effort, overlapping, improvisation, etc.

The incoherence of the measures, programs and government activities designed for the family is such that an effort must be made to put things in order and build a frame of reference common to the various government agencies.

If the only contribution of family policy were to ensure the rational harmonization of a wide variety of government services and programs, that in itself would be a major step forward on behalf of Québec families, and the first tangible result of this policy. This coherence of government initiatives should be operative at three levels:

a) services targeted directly at families. In this case, it is basically a matter of ensuring that the various government programs and services which affect the family directly, in whatever sector, adopt common definitions and a common direction in their approaches. The current jumble is such that, despite a vast array of programs, coordinated action is next to impossible to attain. In fact, it often happens that the benefit a family derives from one program is nullified by actions designed for other goals, however worthwhile they may be. And one cannot help but notice that some programs still endure, though they are no longer in tune with existing family structures and life-styles. In this sense, family policy must be considered as the outward sign of the government's will to introduce a measure of coherence into its actions.

b) the development of government policy, whether social, economic or cultural. Family issues are by nature far-reaching, and raise fundamental questions touching every domain of human endeavour. Just as family policy implies coherence with the broad thrust of government policy as a whole, so that same policy must take the aims of family policy into consideration. Basically, we are talking about creating a new field of action.

c) the division between concerns affecting the individual, and those affecting his living environment. Viewed from the perspective of the family, there is a significant phenomenon which characterizes the recent history of social reform in Québec, as undertaken by successive governments since the 1960s. Social policy for individuals was often implemented as family policy, whether official or unofficial, without necessarily having been designed in relation to the family unit. Without setting the family against the

> individual, it is important to note that though actions undertaken to improve the quality of life of the individual can have positive effects on the family group within which they live, these actions as such do not constitute a family policy.

Each family is a centre of social as well as personal life. Each family is the sum of the persons who belong to it, the relationships that develop among them, the group - were it only two people - they make up, the values they share or which come between them, their relations with other families, other individuals, other living environments, the roof over their heads, their livelihood, their leisure, etc. In each family, it is, above all, through this network of experiences and learning situations that children become persons and citizens. Family policy thus constitutes, in the first place, the State's acknowledgement of this human and social fact.

This also explains why family policy is quite distinct from social policy for individuals. And even though families are made up of young people, men and women, elderly persons, still, this does not mean that family policy is a policy for youth, the elderly or women, no more than any of these policies could be considered as a type of family policy. The distinction is of fundamental importance. The family must be seen as a unit of community life, and not as a simple juxtaposition of individuals.

2- The family: a support for social policies

Obviously, family policy is not designed exclusively to make government action with respect to families more coherent, far from it. Among other objectives, it also seeks to promote the recognition of the family as a vehicle for the development of Québec society. In the western industrialized societies, the State has gradually replaced the family in assuming some of its responsibilities, especially in the social security sector. There may have been a temporary decrease in the importance of the family's role, but that did not last, and today we are rediscovering how much support the individual derives from the family. Thus, with respect to health and social services, there have recently arisen new concerns which, when given full effect, will involve substantial changes in the administration and the shape of services to the family and to children. As a result of these concerns, there is a tendancy to entrust an increasingly active role to families with respect to services offered to individuals.

Until recently, government had concentrated its efforts primarily in the development of services in the corrective category. In both the health and social service fields, the physical and human resources which could meet the needs of persons in distress had to be brought on stream. Hospitals were built or expanded, their equipment was improved, hostels and nursing homes of different types were built. Today, we can say that the corrective infrastructure, which assumes responsibility for people in physical or mental distress, is largely complete.

This corrective infrastructure has greatly increased the quality and the availability of services, and so has contributed to a significant improvement in the population's well-being. It is an important gain. There is, of course, still room for improvement, but it appears likely that advances will be made especially in the development of prevention programs. Compared with the urgency of corrective measures in the fields of health and social services, prevention has developed less rapidly, but is assuming an increasing priority in government policies. Moreover, this is in agreement with a consensus which is forming in many sectors, as we move towards a deeper understanding of the causes which lie at the root of certain illnesses and social problems, and as our capacity to assess the consequences of these problems, both for the family and for society as a whole, improves.

Prevention assumes that the root causes of a sickness or deficiency can be known, and countered so as to prevent the problem from arising. Some of these causes, or the interaction of factors which can give rise to them, are now known well enough that large-scale preventive information campaigns can be mounted. For example, the information campaigns which the ministère des Affaires sociales undertook with respect to nutrition or harmful living habits have had a significant impact on the population. It may be true that prevention is achieved with information on the risk factors. Nonetheless, prevention is not the concern of individuals alone; their degree of control with respect to prevention is limited even allowing that they understood the message perfectly and accepted it, and that they are taking the "preventive medicine" in the exact doses, by adopting healthier habits and becoming more careful and more conscious of preserving their health. The family, as the framework of the individual's daily life, provides the context within which these habits are acquired. For this reason, the family is given top priority as a target for government information.

A further aspect of prevention is the early detection of sickness, deficinecies and psychosocial difficulties. Early detection makes it possible to take action to arrest the advance of an illness or to control it to a greater degree; in the same way that early identification of a mental or physical deficiency in a child allows reeducation and readaptation programs to be undertaken at an early stage, so that the child may develop to his full potential (as shown by early stimulation of infants suffering from mental deficiency). Greater speed in identifying problems related to vitamin deficiency or malnutrition can forestall problems which could ensue at a later stage, some of which could lead to chronic conditions. Once again, parents and the family have an important role to play.

One of the reasons for setting up a significant corrective infrastructure is that when patients with similar problems are brought together in specialized institutions, the quality of the care they receive is improved, and that care can be delivered more efficiently. Moreover, there has been a change in thinking: it is now accepted, if not actively promoted, that the State should take responsibility for certain individuals.

Nevertheless, our experience has taught us that, despite the benefits, institutionalization is not the only answer to the needs of individuals trying to deal with health or psychosocial problems. Living in an institution isolates individuals, tends to make them dependent, or increases their dependence and, in so doing, makes it more difficult for them to resume a normal life. The ministère des Affaires sociales is aware of the dangers inherent in prolonged institutionalization and, through its policies, is attempting to restore, maintain or develop the independence of the person being treated in an institution in order to encourage their readaptation to their normal environment. It goes without saying that, at the same time, efforts are made to limit the length of stay, and to restrict admission to an institution to those cases which clearly require such treatment.

It was precisely in order to support this new approach that the ministère des Affaires sociales has decided to become active in the area of home care and home services, through its local community service centres, social service centres and community health departments.

These services are geared towards families experiencing problems (psychosocial difficulties or the care of elderly persons, persons who are handicapped or chonically ill, whatever their age), elderly persons and handicapped adults living alone. Home services can include, according to the particular need, nursing care, personal services (personal hygiene, housekeeping, etc.), domestic help which may or may not include meal preparation, physiotherapy and ergotherapy, and psychosocial support initiatives. These services, which are less costly than care in institutions, it should be noted, are part of the existing prevention program.

Despite the many reasons which support the further extension of home services, there are still a number of obstacles to be overcome. To begin with, there are the budget constraints facing the government, and the rigid provisions of collective agreements, especially with respect to work schedules. One major obstacle against which very little can be done in the short term is that of attitudes. In every case where one or more individuals living within a family could continue to do so, providing they receive home services, the family involved must agree, and frequently, because of the inconvenience, lack of availability or other reasons, that agreement is not forthcoming so that, unless these persons can live alone, they must be placed in the appropriate institution. If a policy of providing care in the home is to become truly established, not only must families be receptive, but they must also be convinced that there is no satisfactory substitute for a family environment.

In many cases, home care requires that the family agree and cooperate; that is also the case in the treatment of many physical or psychosocial problems. In fact, it happens more and more often that the family, whether immediate or extended, is involved in the treatment administered to individuals because it can contribute, through its moral support and the gestures it can make on a daily basis, to the effective treatment of the individual and his reintegration into his environment.

As health and social services continue to develop in the areas of prevention, social reintegration and resumption of a normal life, they will increasingly have recourse to the participation of the individual and of his family in fields where, for the moment, they are still, for the most part, consumers of services. This change will certainly contribute to the further "humanization" of relations between the citizen and the machinery of government.

To sum up, improvements in health and social services can only be achieved with the increased involvement and participation of the population. The family thus has a significant role to play, not only because most individuals within the population belong to a family, but also because it is the primary vehicle of solidarity and support among individuals.

3- Family policy and the limits to State social intervention

The changes which society has undergone have had an impact on the State. The role of government has been significantly altered. Its field of action, as well as the nature and variety of its interventions, have all expanded. We have moved from the protective State, which administers justice and ensures the security of its citizens, to the entrepreneurial State, which looks after all those activities which would never be undertaken if left to the initiative of individuals alone (highways, railroads, etc.). The State became increasingly involved as successive crises demonstrated the deficiencies in the free enterprise system. Thus, the right to the necessities of survival was grafted to the rights of the individual, and the welfare State was born. The growing presence of the State was accompanied by the movement towards a more secular society; religious providence (and all its associated forms of charity) gave way to a belief in a kind of governmental providence.

In the same way, the collective sharing of risk has replaced the system of family and community interdependence. Social insurance is society's way of protecting the individual against the most common risks: sickness, unemployment, accident, and the hardship which can accompany old age and retirement.

The role of the State has developed in other directions as well. It promotes economic growth, stable prices and the level of employment with the appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. It encourages social cooperation and consultation and acts as arbitrator in the conflicts among the various sectors of society (business, labour, and other interest groups).

Today, however, the role of the State within society is being called into question more and more. Generally, the criticism is levelled at the scope and the methods of government intervention rather than at the principle itself. The State is accused of taking too much control over the lives of individuals, of contributing to dependence, and of impeding the growth of ties of solidarity among various groups in society.

This is the backdrop against which the appearance of family policy must be analysed. The family is not viewed as another client experiencing problems which call for government intervention, but as a social partner, an indispensable intermediary in the government's relations with the individual. Family policy is quite distinctive in not limiting itself to proposing improvements in family services: it calls upon families to become more aware of their responsibilities, and lays the foundations for their responsible participation in a great number of sectors.

The family is not a client in the ordinary sense, competing with other categories of citizens to obtain services from the State. Instead, it is a unique associate,a partner with the State. The government, in recognizing the family's fundamental role in society and in delegating to it certain responsibilities with respect to services to individuals, is not seeking to cut down on its obligations towards its citizens, nor is it trying to reduce its expenditures by transferring part of the burden to families. Rather, the government is acknowledging that, despite the extent of its resources, it is not a substitute for the family, which alone is capable of fulfilling its own particular role vis-à-vis its members. To do so, the family must have the necessary means and in that respect, the support of the State still appears, in many cases, indispensable.

B- Family policy within demographic policy

Although the gouvernement du Québec's family policy was not designed primarily to address Québec's serious demographic problems, there is no doubt that it will have an impact on these problems. However, its effect will be felt primarily in the creation of a favourable climate and a responsible attitude towards the birthrate, rather than in a direct incentive to have more children.

1- Demographic objectives and government intervention

Three different phenomena distinguish Québec's current demographic situation: first, a reduced birthrate; second, a negative net migration; third, lower mortality. These three independent phenomena have had a profound impact on the growth and on the makeup of the population. If the major parameters of the existing demographic situation are projected into the future, we realize that the population of Québec will continue to increase very slowly until the year 2001, reaching a figure of 6 790 000. It will then begin to decrease as a result of the combined effect of negative net migration and reproduction which is beneath the replacement threshold. For about the next twenty years, the relatively young age structure of the population, resulting from the high birthrate of previous years, will favour a natural increase in population by maintaining the number of births while limiting the number of deaths.

Unless there is a strong increase in the birthrate, which does not appear likely under current conditions, we can thus expect the population of Québec to peak at the beginning of the next century and then to begin to decline slowly. To the extent that the reduced number of births is related to the interaction of several economic, social and cultural changes, it is difficult to arrive at a course of action which could alter the trend. It even remains difficult to specify the nature of these actions. Although we cannot ignore the demographic situation, there is good reason to adopt a multi-faceted policy which does not restrict itself to objectives characterized by an increased birthrate.

The Québec government plans to deal with the whole demographic issue by way of three separate initiatives: first, make the population aware of the situation; then, prepare to deal with the consequences of the evolving demographic situation; finally, take steps to attempt to alter the long-term course of events.

a) Make the population aware

Although it believes that the correct objective is to ensure that the generations replace themselves, the gouvernement du Québec is convinced that for any public initiative in this area to be effective, it must have the widest possible support from Quebecers and be sanctioned by a consensus within Québec society. As a first step, it has therefore chosen to inform the population of the facts relative to the changing demographic situation and of the consequences which can be expected in different areas. In March 1984, the government published a study entitled L'évolution de la population du Québec et ses conséquences which generated much interest both because of the media coverage it received and because of the discussion it inspired within various groups. The certainty of our own demographic good health is so ingrained, that many Quebecers were surprised by the numbers and the analysis contained in the report.

This is no more than a first step, but it emphasizes the government's belief that, in this area, no public initiative can be taken without informing the population beforehand. If the population shares the government's concern, then it is possible to attempt to correct the situation. Government action will not be effective without broad popular support; at the same time, the population itself has a major role to play. The implementation of a population policy requires resources. Such a policy must not be limited to objectives and intentions, but must also deal with the actual means. How is the government to find the resources needed to provide better services and better financial support for the family, to increase immigration and help immigrants adapt to their new environment, or to increase transfers to the elderly if it does not have the support of the people? Similarly, if the population remains passive, and does not assume its share of responsibility, the effectiveness of the government's interventions will be rather limited. For example, to create a climate which is favourable to a higher birthrate, government initiatives are necessary, but not sufficient. The community must take the well-being of families to heart, support them in countless ways, and be warm and welcoming towards children. If the steps taken to increase immigration are to be successful, the population must be open-minded and see cultural diversity as enriching rather than as a threat.

Information is therefore an essential part of the gouvernement du Québec's strategy.

b) Adaptation to demographic changes

Because of their inertia, demographic phenomena make themselves felt slowly. This implies that any group of measures designed to influence these phenomena will also take time to attain its objectives, assuming it is successful. Since we are unlikely to witness a dramatic reversal in short-term tendencies,we will have to adjust ourselves to them, since they will become part of Québec's reality. Especially since some demographic phenomena are here to stay, for instance, the relative increase in the elderly in the population even if the birthrate should climb or if net migration should improve. The same holds true for the general ageing of the age structure of the population, at least until a new demographic equilibrium is reached.

No sector will be spared from the effects of stagnation in the growth of the population, its overall ageing and the increase in the number of elderly persons. Québec's economic, political, social and cultural life will all be changed.

As far as culture is concerned, Québec's demographic development raises the fundamental point of a culture's permanence, since population is the vehicle which carries and transmits the culture of a collectivity. After having insisted on the French character of their society, francophones, paradoxically, could help to weaken it with their birthrate which is below the replacement threshold.

Politically, Québec's demographic weight within Canada will continue to decline. Whereas the population of Québec made up 28% of Canada's population in 1971, that proportion dropped to 26.4% in 1981, and could be as low as 24% in the year 2000.

With respect to economics, a slowdown, and even a decline in population growth cannot, of itself, bring a halt to economic growth, but it can help to dampen it. The stagnation of its domestic market means that Québec will have to put additional emphasis on exports, as its active population shrinks and grows older. Furthermore, some sectors of economic activity will be severely affected, construction being a notable example.

There is some question as to whether the existing demographic distribution among the regions will change. If it does, given that the geographical distribution of the population is already very uneven, the government will have some difficult choices to make, and will be forced to maintain and improve services in regions of declining population.

Significant adjustments will have to be made in government programs. The slowdown in demographic growth and the ageing of the population will have a major impact not only on the provision of services and on the government's budget, but also on spending in the areas of education, health and income security. These phenomena will make it necessary to reallocate resources within a context of much tighter spending restraints than what we are currently experiencing. If the average cost of public programs for a young person or for an elderly person increases at the same rate as real per capita income, the ageing of the population will have a direct impact on costs, and will increase the burden which the active population must support. Real economic growth will have to be very strong indeed, if it is to match the combined effects of ageing and the increase in the per capita cost of public programs aimed at young people and the elderly.

In order to deal with the demographic changes, the government intends to implement, over the coming years, a whole range of measures in various fields. However, the best way to deal with these changes is to become aware of them and to prepare ourselves for them gradually. The government intends to review its policies in the fields of services for the elderly, pension reform, adult education and manpower training, to name but a few.

c) Altering the long-term course of events

If long-term population stability is to be achieved, steps must be taken to ensure that births outnumber deaths, and that losses through migration are brought to a halt.

With respect to population movement, Québec will be announcing, within the next few months, a policy dealing simultaneously with international and interprovincial population movements. There is agreement that the immigration policy whose broad outlines were drawn in the late 1960s is in need of improvement. Several questions need to be answered: how many immigrants can Québec admit each year, and in relation to which objectives?

What place should be given to immigration on humanitarian grounds? Can improvements be made in the programs of services designed to help immigrants adapt to their new society? Answers are needed to all these questions.

While reaffirming its openness to the world, Québec cannot remain indifferent to the, at times quite heavy, net migration losses it suffers vis-à-vis the various provinces of Canada. The reasons for this phenomenon must be exhaustively studied and adequate solutions put into effect. It is clear, however, that the new policy on population movements will not, on its own, be sufficient to eliminate the net emigration from Québec. There must be further improvement in Québec's economic situation so that every Quebecer who wants to can make his living here and not be forced to move elsewhere to find a livelihood.

The gouvernement du Québec does not intend to adopt a "high birthrate" policy to stimulate population growth, that is, it does not intend to implement a series of measures encouraging couples to have more children simply because society needs them. We believe that a higher birthrate should be approached from the broader perspective of the family, that it would be illusory to implement a policy aimed at increasing the number of births unless it is grounded in the quality of family life. Measures designed to improve the demographic situation by increasing the number of births should, in this sense, be an integral part of a family policy which focuses on the personal development of both children and parents. Such a policy, which would begin from an acceptance of the family as the basic social unit, would have to respect the couple's right to choose whether or not to have children. In the same way, it would have to take broad social objectives into consideration even though it is frequently the case, rightly or wrongly, that these are associated with a low birthrate, as is the case with better education, and equal employment opportunities for men and women, etc.

The family policy which Québec is preparing to submit to families for their comments will be based on the recognition of the fundamental role of the family within society and on the necessity of providing the family with a support framework which is compatible with its functions.

It will be concerned with improving the quality of family life, and with the development of the persons who belong to it. Where it may have an influence of the fertility of couples, the family policy has two specific objectives: remove or lessen the immediate obstacles to fertility, and create a climate favourable to a higher birthrate.

Many couples would like to have children, but decide to wait because of difficulties they are experiencing. It can then happen that the postponement becomes a refusal or an inability to have a child. For other couples, their desires are modified when they consider the obstacles they are encountering at the moment or which they believe they will encounter in the future.

A recent study found that one third of Québec women would like to have one child more than they plan to have, but will not have the child because of the problems or inconveniences which would ensue. Is it possible to remove the obstacles for those "whose desires have not been fulfilled" or for those "who might like to have more children if..."? The major obstacles mentioned in the study were: the fear that the standard of living would not be high enough (the most common obstacle), poor health, constraints related to education and the labour market, and, finally, the concern to maintain personal freedom. Eliminating these obstacles completely would certainly be impossible. They do, however, indicate the paths along which interventions would be most effective: financial assistance, support provided to parents for education and child care, and more flexibility in the mechanisms of the labour market.

By providing families with reasonable financial support, within existing budget constraints, by delivering the services they need, and by removing certain obstacles from their environment, the government is not attempting to induce families to have children if they do not wish to, or if they do not wish to have any more. It simply wishes to give parents the opportunity to have the children they want, under the best possible circumstances.

The fact that couples do not want enough children to ensure generation replacement cannot be explained solely in terms of current economic problems. A couple's desire to have children is not based exclusively on arbitrary choices, taken individually, in relation to economic conditions. It is also intimately linked to the values shared by society as a whole. If a climate which is favourable to a higher birthrate is to be created, the family and the role of parents must be restored to a place of honour. Government policies and programs can make a significant contribution in this direction, but the major effort must come from families and the organizations which represent them. Informal support networks for parents should be encouraged, as well as those organizations dedicated to promoting the family, defending the rights of parents, and the development of the child.

2- What can be expected from family policy in a demographic sense?

There are certain risks involved in linking demographic objectives to the implementation of a family policy, as we have just done. The most obvious is to allow the perception to take hold that family policy and demographic policy are one and the same thing. Such a simplification may be inevitable, but it reduces the scope of both policies to such an extent that it is really a dead end. A demographic policy, both with respect to its methods and to its objectives, could not be reduced to a family policy, just as a family policy could not be restricted to a purely demographic dimension.

As it is conceived within family policy, the family is not only the prime setting for procreation; it is also a group of parent(s) and child(ren) linked by multiple and various bonds, for mutual support throughout life, and to encourage, at their source, the development of the person and of society. In this sense, family policy goes far beyond demographic concerns and deals with the family as an environment for growth and development.

Similarly, if demographic policy concerns itself with everything which affects the birthrate, it will then deal with mortality, the ageing of the population, population movements, the labour market, economic and regional development, etc. Its implementation involves both the adaptation of government and society to demographic changes, and measures to attempt to correct the situation.

Of course, there are some common elements to demographic and family policy, the birthrate being the most obvious. However, care should be taken not to view family policy as the "higher birthrate" arm of demographic policy. If the gouvernement du Québec sees family policy as a particularly suitable vehicle for dealing with the birthrate, the reason is that family policy's approach to the problem is global, integrated, and respectful of the parents. Moreover, looking beyond the various means, financial or otherwise, which are recommeded for providing support to families, the goal is always the quality of family life rather than reaching a particular birthrate. Of course, the opportunity should be given to those parents who want to to have the children they want, but above all, we must ensure that families live in an environment which recognizes their worth, which is compatible with the exercise of family functions, and which allows for the development of the members of the family.

A successful family policy will inevitably have an impact on the birthrate, but that will not be the major goal of such a policy. It will be a policy based on making families aware of themselves and of their responsibilities, as basic units of life and social entities, and relying on support from the State and the community. For what remains, "So much the better if family policy tends to bolster or increase our population".

Conclusion

The family policy which the gouvernement du Québec is preparing to release to the public for discussion is more concerned with defining the terms of the relations between the State, the individual and the family, as well as setting out the framework which would provide for a better structure for government intervention with respect to families, than with analysing or assessing the relevance of existing programs. This operation will be undertaken at a later stage. At any rate, it cannot be effectively undertaken until the basic orientations have been thought out.

There is a danger, in developing a policy with as broad a scope as family policy, of trying to do too much, of wanting to get involved in the least details of the various programs. Policy-makers should be careful lest, in trying to grasp all, they end up falling short, both as to coverage and the objectives family policy is designed to achieve. A realistic approach will avoid much ambiguity. Family policy is the centre piece in the gouvernement du Québec's range of social policies. In addition to being a master policy which demonstrates a concern to respond more adequately to the needs of families and to rationalize government intervention, it is also an important step in the search for a larger sense of individual and collective responsibility.

Although family policy was not primarily as a solution to Québec's demographic problems, it will inevitably be analysed from the perspective of its impact on the birthrate. By encouraging an improvement in the quality of life and the recognition of the family's social role, its demographic contribution is focused essentially on promoting a favourable climate for children and the family. It is up to couples to design their own plans for family life and realize them as they see fit. However, it is our hope that they do so within a society in which the family, however large (or small) it is, will be taken at its true value.

KEY PAPERS

SESSION 7

Theme: Work, economic policies & welfare consequences and responsibilities

- Orjan Hultaker

Income security policies and the application of 'marginal' and 'universal' approaches

by ORJAN HULTAKER

The Family Structure and the Socialized Transfer System

The family is an essential part of the social structure, where citizens are born, socialized, controlled by and integrated into larger social collectivities through processes which can only take place in primary groups with their dense social interaction and strong sentiments (Durkheim, 1897; Cooley, 1909; Mead, 1934; Parsons and Bales, 1955). Concepts such as role-making, family decision-making and social innovations are sometimes used as if various living arrangements were optional to the discretion of each family, but neither a single family group nor the family members are independent social actors. Family living is a social institution and there are prescribed and proscribed behaviours which must be performed by the social actors be they entire families or family members. Family behaviour has always been controlled by informal or formal norms, usually by both.

Families are defined and identified by their common residence and the economic co-operation among the family members although the structure of the former and the particular form of the latter have changed all through the history of human society. Changes in structure have often been concomitant with economic changes, and the importance of economic factors as determinants of the family institution has not only been understood by people supportive of the dominating contemporary family formation, but also critics have emphasized the influence of economic factors be they marxists (Engels, 1942/1884) or conflict theorists (Chambliss, 1977). The critics of the family institution often seem to have given more attention to the importance of economic determinants of family functioning than have the supporters.

Until fairly recently the family was one of very few social structures which European societies could employ for social control of their citizens and for integrating people into the more encompassing social structure. The family was a prerequisite for social order, and the society needed intact families for the fulfilment of several important functions. The norms told people to marry and to remain married for life; they also defined the group of people among whom a man was supposed to search for his bride and a woman to look for her groom. Customs, rules and mores advised people on how to pursue their family living, and they presented the standards for family functioning. The social control of the families was reinforced by the very few additional social structures then in existence, in particular by the church.

The economic cooperation between the married spouses, the support of children and the succession of inheritance from parents to children were the dominant incidents of the transfer system where charity supplemented the support given within families and kin groups. The political structure did not act as a distributive agent, and charity was generally provided by churches and local communities or given directly from one family to another.

Nevertheless, the functioning of families and the provision of a minimum standard of living were essential to the society, and the state demanded the families to act as transfer agents. The transfer roles were defined by the norms which told parents to marry, to cooperate and support each other economically throughout life, to provide for minor children, and to hand over estate and other inheritance to their children. The standard of living was often very bad for people who depended on charity from the church or the local community. Family life was the preference of the state which depended on the families for the fulfilment of functions essential to the social order. The existence of strong long-lasting families was a prerequisite for a stable society, where the disincentives from not living in a family were experienced by many people among whom were old people without means, unmarried mothers, orphans and fatherless children.

New social structures have later developed through the process of differentiation (Spencer, 1925-29/1876-96), and the society does no longer need to control the families to the same extent as during earlier periods. Nowadays young people are given the freedom to choose their marriage partner without asking their family and kin for permission, and the rules about the succession of inheritance are less restrictive than before. Many important functions can be fulfilled at least partially by social structures other than the family, and integration is made certain by a multitude of formal organizations and primary groups, and citizens are controlled by many collectivities; e.g., business corporations, factories, offices, trade unions, hospitals, social service agents, schools, sports clubs, and housing complexes.

The contemporary state does not exclusively rely upon the family for the integration of mothers and small children into society-at-large as was the case during earlier periods. The emancipation of women has awarded them the right to belong to many different social collectivities which were earlier closed to them, albeit not with statuses equal to those of men. Furthermore, the increasing differentiation of the social structure has brought many new institutions which take part in the socialization of children. Therefore the society is no longer threatened by the lack of stability of the family units; mass divorce has become accepted in all industrialized countries irregardless of their political system or dominant religious belief (Hultåker, 1982).

The coming of unmarried cohabitation is another indicator of the same phenomenon. People and behaviour can be controlled by many agents other than the family, and there is thus less of a need to register the citizens as family members. The families still exist as very important institutions and groups within the social structure, but the families of unmarried couples are not publicly registered.[1]

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[1] A reason for official registration of couples who cohabit without marriage may arise within the public transfer system. Single parents and married couples are often treated differently by the welfare state; they do not receive the same kind of services nor the same amount of transfer payments, and they do not have to pay the same taxes and fees for various

The changing family structure has been accompanied by the socialization of the transfer system; families and charity organizations have become unable or unwilling to guarantee a minimum standard of living to all citizens which is instead provided by national and local governments who redistribute revenue raised through taxation.[2]

The socialization of the transfer system is a parallel to other socialization processes which have happened during the last centuries (Weber, 1924). The private armies of the landlords have been socialized by national states as has also the right to taxation which during earlier periods was leased to vassals. Moreover, a large segment of the educational system is socialized in many countries; the same is the case with the caring for senior citizens and hospitals.

The socialization of the transfer system has taken place through a dialectic process since it relieves people from paying private support, which further lessens the need for the society to control the interaction between present and former members of a family. The state had to control the interaction between exspouses when the courts ordered one of them to pay alimony to the other person; it was also necessary to keep a record of the present family of the recipients when remarriage meant the loss of the right to alimony. When very few are ordered to pay, the need for social control is much smaller.[3]

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services, *ceteris paribus*. Increasing *per capita* welfare costs and an increasing incident of unmarried cohabitiation among couples with minor children will result in a demand for the registration of those parents who are not married, to make sure equal treatment of married and unmarried cohabiting parents. It will become necessary to separate the true single parents from unmarried cohabiting parents in order to stop the latter from missusing the public transfer system, or the welfare state can no longer give single parents a preferential status.

[2] In Sweden of today very few divorced women are awarded alimony from their former husbands and only for a limited period of time. Moreover, the state guarantees a minimum child support to be paid to all children of divorced parents and sigle mothers (fathers) if the non custodian does not pay.

[3] It should not be inferred, however, that there always is a very close control of the interaction between exspouses in countries where the payment

Moreover, the socialization of the transfer system increases the tax burden levied on citizens and deprives people of the means with which they would otherwise be able, but perhaps not willing, privately to support other persons. In Sweden many full-time employed men are freed from the duty to pay child support to children with whom they do not reside; the government considers the fathers unable to pay because of their low after tax income.

The process has come full circle: It starts with the increased differentiation of the social structure which makes society less dependent on the family for the socialization, integration and control of the citizens; families are given more freedom resulting in more variation in the family structure and less stable families; part of the transfer system is socialized which further diminishes the need for society to control the interaction between people; taxes are increased to pay for the socialized transfer system which makes it more difficult for people to support each other with private transfer payments; additional parts of the transfer system have to be socialized and people are freed from some of their remaining obligations.

Nevertheless, the almost entirely socialized transfer system of some

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of alimony is commonly ordered. On the contrary, it is often reported from the United States and other countries that many exhousbands do not pay the alimony ordered; i.e., there is a mismatch in the normative system of a society when, on the one hand, people are allowed the freedom of divorce almost at their own will without their interaction being controlled and, on the other hand, the practice of the courts to order the payment of alimony. Moreover, many fathers refuse to pay the child support they are ordered to pay to their children of whom they do not have custody, but they do not meet any effective or severe sanctions because of their neglect. It seems as if the state did not bother to interfere with the interaction between exspouses and non-cohabiting parents in countries where a refusal to pay does not result in burdens to be carried by the tax payers. The state does not interfere with the interaction between exspouses in countries where the welfare payments to single parents and poor people are not very expensive; the society does no longer need to be involved in the interaction for the sake of the children's integration into society-at-large, which is accomplished through processes taking place in other social structures, and there is no public expenditure to be avoided by the interference.

western countries, e.g., that of Sweden, is not a necessary consequence of the changing family structure, and plural causes must be looked for elsewhere. The size of the transfer system--the total amount of money transferred by governments and other agents--depends on many separate changes in the social structure and in the economy, and it is also influenced by changing social values.

The changing family structure and the decreased stability of the family have increased the population of people dependent on extra-family transfers, but their number also depends on the roles and living arrangements prevalent in in-tact families. Suffice to mention the many divorces involving couples with minor children whose mothers were not gainfully employed prior to the divorce. These women are not likely to be able to earn enough money to support themselves after the divorce since they lack proper training and work experience; they thus need financial help through a transfer system. Moreover, the added effects of marginal taxes and the withdrawal rate for welfare benefits often discourage divorced women from seeking employment.

Australia is one example. In 1978/79 among married mothers with their youngest child under the age of six, only a minority (47 per cent) were gainfully employed, and the employment rate was even lower among female sole parents (31 per cent) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982:25 and 31). Similar differences exist between married and sole mothers of older children.[4] Thus, it is not only difficult for women without employment to find a job after divorce, but female sole parents have a lower propensity to work than have married mothers. The lower employment rate among female sole parents can be explained by the added marginal taxes and the withdrawal rates for benefits and pensions. Most married women can improve their standard of living when they take on a job, but many single mothers cannot.[5]

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[4] In 1978/79 36 per cent of married mothers and 50 per cent of sole mothers were not employed when their youngest child was between six and fourteen years old. The percentages were 35 and 46, respectively, when the youngest child was between the age of fifteen and twenty.

Many countries order exhusbands to pay alimony to their divorced exwives and maintenance for their children in order to minimize the socialization of the costs of divorce; the higher the private transfer payments, the smaller the need for public transfer. But men often escape from paying the support ordered, and the costs of divorce are socialized into the public transfer system; the more effective the enforcement of men's paying alimony and child maintenance, the less dependent are women on public support through the socialized transfer system.

Other countries, among them is Sweden, almost never grant divorced women the right to alimony even when their exhusbands can afford to pay. Nowadays marriage in Sweden is not defined as an insurance to provide for life-long support, but women are supposed to be able to earn their own living. Divorced women can no longer rely on private transfers from their exhusbands as was earlier the case nor can all of them support themselves, a change which results in the socialization of additional parts of the transfer system and makes women more dependent on public

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5 The mean female earned income for full-year and full-time work was A$ 8,650 in 1978/79 and A$ 4,290 for full-year and part-time work. Five per cent of women working full-year and full-time earned less than A$ 3,420 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982). The table below presents the increase in disposable family income when mothers of two dependent children enter the labour market.

Female Earned Income	Increase in Disposable Family Income Married Mothers[a]	 Sole Mothers
3,420	2,823	2,230
4,290	3,560	2,665
8,650	6,459	2,732

a when husband's total income exceeds A$ 5,675 per year.

A sole parent working full-year and full-time on average earnings faces a total marginal tax and withdrawal rate of 68 per cent, and she will only keep A$ 2,732 of her earnings after taxes and withdrawal of benefits. From this net income is deducted her costs for child care, travel expenses and other cost increments due to her employment.

transfers. The tendency towards public dependence, however, is counterbalanced by other factors among which is the increased propensity for married women to be gainfully employed also during their child-rearing years; the more women who are gainfully employed all through their marital career, the less the need for transfer payments after divorce since women are used to and able to earn their own living. The availability of good child care and the introduction of non sexist pay schemes are other factors decreasing the need for public transfer payments.

To summarize: The changing family structure, and in particular the coming of mass divorce has increased the number of people dependent on extra family transfer payments. Their needs have to be met by the socialized transfer system in countries where husbands are not forced to pay to their former wives and where parents are not prepared to support their grown up children. Nevertheless, the forces at work to increase the need for transfer payments are offset by other social developments concomitant to the changes in the family structure, in particular the emancipation of women; daughters, wives, and exwives with full-time employment do not depend on transfer payments neither from within nor outside the family structure. Marginal taxes and the rate of withdrawal of welfare benefits might, however, constitute poverty traps and make more people dependent on the socialized transfer system.

The distribution of transfers has changed from a decentralized system when governments only decided about the rules to a more centralized welfare state when governments are directly involved as distributive agents. They collect taxes and distribute benefits and pensions, which often are given to the very same citizens from whom the taxes are collected.

The socialization of the transfer system has occurred during a period when there has also been an increase in the proportion of the gross national income distributed as welfare payments, but there is no necessary association between the degree of socialization and the amount of money transferred. The proportion of people with difficulties to provide for themselves may increase when society lessens the control over the families, but it will probably decrease once more when people have adjusted themselves to the new situation, e.g., when the propensity to gainful employment has increased among married women.

Nevertheless, the actual amount of money distributed through the transfer system is more dependent on other factors. The USA have more divorces and more minor children affected by divorce than has Sweden, but the proportion of the gross national income distributed through the socialized transfer system is higher in Sweden albeit the fact that more women are gainfully employed in Sweden. Furthermore, American men can rather easily escape from paying alimony and child maintenance even when so ordered by court; the societies do not simply choose between a socialized and a private transfer system, but some transfer payments are never made.

Purpose

This paper presents a study of the Swedish socialized transfer system, the added and cumulative effects of earnings, taxation, cash transfer payments and welfare given in kind.

The impact is mainly analysed as differences in total and *per capita* family income and as the marginal change in disposable income from a wage and salary increase of 100 Swedish crowns (SEK).[6] Additional income measures are intermediate between the gross earnings and the disposable income like the "net income after income taxes but before transfer payments." Total and *per capita* family income are indicators of the family's standard of living; the marginal change in disposable income presents the family's ability to improve their standard of living through their own efforts; i.e., their control over the family's destiny.

The paper analyses the efficiency of the socialized transfer system and the amount of power and control vested in the state through the transfer processes. It does not directly address the issue of work incentives, and

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6 In April 1984 one U.S. dollar is equivalent to about eight Swedish crowns (SEK).

it does not analyse the impact of various welfare programs on people's inclination to work nor on the Swedish economy.

The analysis has its focus on differences between families with two minor children:

- sole parents with two minor children,
- couples with two minor children and one earner, and
- couples with two minor children and two earners.

Unemployment, sick leave and parental leave benefits and superannuation schemes are excluded from the analysis since in Sweden these are income maintenance programs. The beneficiary's total income will thus not be very different from his income when he employed. Also students are excluded from the analysis, and the focus is on families with heads who have finished their training but not retired.

A Typology of Welfare Programs

Most socialized public transfer systems operate according to general rules which are all designed to meet specific demands or to achieve particular purposes, but they are not always relevant to the needs, interests or wishes of the recipients. Payments can be distributed in order to promote equality between women and men, to fight unemployment among producers of goods which are supposed to be purchased for transfer money, to win general elections, etc. Moreover, the welfare programs are administrated by public bureaucracies, where public servants may make use of the programs to improve their own rank and the status of their bureau. Nevertheless, all transfer programs affect consumption patters and/or the distribution of disposable income.[7]

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[7] The present analysis does not concern the continued revenue used for public consumption like the defense, the police, the infra structure, etc. The continued revenue is disregarded in the analysis, but on the political arena transfer payments always have to compete for money with the expenditure on public consumption.

Most welfare is probably intended to benefit the receivers also when the payments have additional goals, but most countries have a large number of very different transfer programs and it is sometimes difficult to assess their added effects. Furthermore, also taxes have to be taken into account since they are often paid by the very group of citizens who are the beneficiaries of the welfare programs; the total effect of taxes and welfare transfers can be quite different from the outcome intended by the legislator and approved by the electorate.

Some transfers are paid in cash but others are given in kind including subsidized consumption. There are transfers which are available to all citizens, and there are programs aiming at particular populations among whom are senior citizens, students, sole parents and families with minor children. Transfers can be universal, i.e., given to all citizens or to everyone in a target population, but they can also depend on the income from other sources than the socialized transfer system. Eligibility can be limited to people on a low private income and with few assets, but transfers can also fulfil the function of helping earners on a high private income to retain their standard of living when they are temporarily unable to work, e.g., due to unemployment or illness. Income and assets tests limit the eligibility to people on a low or no income and with few assets, whereas income maintenance programs help people on a high income to retain their standard of living; the latter provide little to the people who have always been poor.

The redistributive outcome of a transfer program, its impact on the distribution of disposable income and on the standard of living, can never be assessed without taking into account both the requirements for eligibility and the target population at whom the program aims.[8] Figure 1 presents some Swedish programs for cash transfers defined by their target population and the eligibility requirements. Figure 2 does the same for transfers in kind including subsidized consumption.

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[8] Most of the Swedish programs for income maintenance are not introduced in order to achieve a vertical redistribution of income, but they are supposed to reallocate people's income over the life cycle; compulsory savings to be used during periods of parental leave, sick leave, unemployment, in the late years of life, etc. This would be achieved if the costs for the income maintenance programs were paid for by taxes and duties carried

In Sweden sick leave benefits are income maintenance transfer payments available to all citizens and the same is the case with unemployment benefits. Most unemployed people and all those who are sick during a limited period of time retain a percentage of their wages and salaries, but a rather small amount is paid also to unemployed and sick people without regular earned income. There are ceilings for the maximum benefits.

Paid parental leave is an example of an income maintenance program aiming at a particular target group, parents of small children. The amounts paid are the same as those given to people on sick leave.

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by the very same group of people who are the beneficiaries; the insurance model. At the outset the Swedish national insurance scheme was at least partially designed to transfer incomes over the life cycle but not from one group of people to another; i.e., each group of income earners had collectively to pay most of the costs for their own benefits.

In recent years, however, many of the income maintenance programs have been redesigned and they now differ considerably from the insurance model. They agree more with the model of transfer payments financed out of taxes and other kinds of general revenue. The national superannuation program is one example of the present trend. Senior citizens are entitled to a pension which amounts to 60 per cent of their preretirement earnings minus SEK 20,300 in 1984. There is ceiling for pensions such that earnings larger than SEK 152,250 (in 1984) do not provide any right to pensions. Thus, people with earnings less than SEK 20,300 will not receive any earnings related superannuation, and people with incomes larger than SEK 152,250 will not get any superannuation for incomes above that level.

The earnings related superannuation is financed by a pay roll tax paid by all employers. Until 1983 they had to contribute a certain percentage of the wages and salaries in the range between SEK 20,300 and 152,250. The pay roll tax was changed in 1983, however, and employers now must contribute a flat pay roll tax on all income paid. The result is a transfer from the upper part of the income distribution to people in the middle but also from the small earners in the lower part of the distribution (below SEK 20,300) to people in the middle.

Another example is unemployment benefits which also are earnings related. They are partly paid for by employees who pay an unemployment insurance fee. Nevertheless, in 1981 more than 50 per cent of the earnings related unemployment benefits were paid out of general government revenue which meant a transfer to unemployed people not according to their needs but according to their earnings prior to unemployment; i.e., unemployed persons with high earnings received more benefits than did people with low earnings.

Figure 1: Some Swedish Cash Transfers by Target Group and Eligibility.

Eligibility	Availability to Particular Target Groups Only	All Citizens
Income Maintenance	Parental leave benefits	Sick leave benefits Unemployment benefits
Universal	Child allowances Advancement of child maintenance	
Income (Assets) Tested	Allowances paid to university students	Social assistance

Figure 2: Some Swedish In Kind Welfare Tranfers by Target Group and Eligibility

Eligibility	Availability to Particular Target Groups Only	All Citizens
Income maintenance		
Universal	Children's health care	Food subsidies
Income (Assets) Tested	Subsidized child care	Housing subsidies

There are no universal benefits or pensions given to all citizens in Sweden, but such programs have been suggested in other countries. In Australia the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975) advocated the introduction of social dividends, a guranteed minimum income to be received by all citizens irregardless of their other incomes.

Some Swedish cash transfers are universally available to all people in a target group. An example is child allowances which are paid to all people with minor children in their custody. Another program helps sole parents when the non-custodian parent does not pay a minimum amount of child maintenance; the government forwards the minimum child maintenance to all sole parents whether they are rich or poor. There is no income test for the recipients of the advanced maintenance, but the government wants reimbursement from the non-custodian if he can afford to pay, which is one kind of income test.

Most important among Swedish income and assets tested benefits is social assistance which provide a minimum standard of living to people who cannot fully support themselves and who are not eligible under other transfer programs.

University students receive a small cash pension if they have a low income and lack assets, and they can also borrow money from the government.

In kind welfare transfers are not to my knowledge used for income maintenance. They are usually given to the people who are not very well off but they have to accept whatever aid they are offered, whereas help to maintain an earlier income is often given in cash. The most important Swedish welfare programs are in the form of income maintenance (e.g., sick leave, parental leave and unemployment benefits and earnings related senior citizens' pensions). Other transfer payments are universally given to everyone in a target group (e.g., child allowances and the advancement of child maintenance).

Sweden does not employ the traditional forms of in kind transfers like food stamps and soup kitchens, but there are a number of fairly important in kind transfers. They are usually given i the form of subsidized prices and their in kind character is less visible than in the case of soup kitchens and food stamps. Nevertheless, the welfare beneficiaries are not allowed to decide by themselves how they are to dispose of the resources transferred to them; they have to consume the subsidized goods and services or the transfer is forgone.

Some items of food are subsidized by the Swedish government who transfer money directly to the producers. The program is universally available to the citizens of whom all face the same prices in the shops; the prices in the market are affected by the subsidies. All families buy food although some of them spend a larger proportion of their income on food, in particular families with many children who benefit more than other groups from the low prices.

Other forms of in kind transfers are paid to the consumers and not to the producers; the help can be directed to people who meet the requirement of income and assets tests. This is the case with housing subsidies paid to low and medium income tenants and home owners, whose housing costs are partially reimbursed by the government. These reimbursements are available to all citizens if they do not have too high a private income, but number of children affects the percentage of the housing costs that is reimbursed. Large low income families benefit most from the program. The in kind character of the housing subsidies is not directly visible since the subsidies are paid cash to the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the benefits received are offered as reimbursement for housing costs and will not be received unless the families consume expensive housing; large low income families in cheap flats and houses will receive very little.

Children's health care is a free service given to all children, and it is thus a universal in kind transfer available to families with small children.

Many of the in kind transfers are difficult to classify according to their rules of eligibility since there are often two components in the programs, especially so for many of subsidized services. Public child care is an example of this. The day care centres are in principle open to all families regardless of their private income even though there are too few centres to meet demand; there is no income test before the children are admitted.

In many cities, however, the amount of subsidies depends on the income of the parents when high income families pay higher a fee than do low income families. Nevertheless, no family pays even half of the total costs for their public child care, the larger part of which is paid out of general revenue. The availability of child care is thus, in principle, universally available to all parents, but part of the subsidies is income and assets tested and only received by low and medium income families.

Efficiency

The right of all citizens to a minimum standard of living is the very essence of the welfare state, and the socialized transfer system is by many conceived of as a means to achieve this end, albeit many critics have questioned the efficiency of the socialized transfer system. The present section only addresses one aspect of efficiency: the relative private income of people who receive transfer payments compared to the income of people from whom taxes are collected. This is a crucial issue since it is often assumed that not only do all citizens have a right to a minimum standard of living but workers also have a right to retain a substantial part of their earnings after they have paid their taxes.

A transfer system is efficient to the extent that it transfers money from people with high private incomes to people with lower incomes.[9] The system is said to be inefficient when transfer payments are made which do not affect the relative distribution of income.[10] All transfer programs need to be evaluated for their distributive efficiency, and it should not be taken for granted that extensive programs with large target groups are more efficient than are smaller programs.

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[9] A transfer system is efficient also when money is transferred from poor to rich people, but such distributive efficiency is disregarded as a goal in the present paper since it is not part of a welfare policy.

[10] There are also other problems of efficiency that need to be attended to by responsible politicians among which is the cost for the administration of the transfer system; the smaller the bureaucratic cost, the more efficient is the transfer system. Nevertheless, the present section is devoted only to the redistributive efficiency.

People can be rank ordered according to their private income; see figure 3. The lower end of the distribution consists of the 25 per cent with incomes below the first quartile (q_1), and the upper end holds the 25 per cent above the third quartile (q_3). The area in between the first and the third quartiles contains the 50 per cent with middle private incomes.

Figure 3: A Theoretical Distribution of rank ordered private incomes.



The eligibility rules differ in their effect on the allocation of benefits and pensions to the various private income groups. People with high incomes, the segment to the right of the third quartile, benefit more than other groups from income maintenance transfers since their *raison d'être* is to help people with a high income to retain their standard of living. Universal allowances transfer the same amount of money to everybody regardless of their private income. Income and assets tested benefits and pensions are distributed to people with low incomes; i.e., most payments are made to people whose private incomes are to the left of the first quartile in figure 3.

Also taxes differ in their impact on various income groups in the rank ordered distribution. Flat taxes have the same effect on all income groups, whereas progresive taxes collect more money from the high income earners in the right end of the distribution.[11]

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[11] Some transfer payments redistribute income from small to large

Given the acceptance of the right of all citizens to a minimum standard of living and the right of the workers to retain a substantial part of their earnings after taxes, a transfer system has distributive efficiency when the families in the left end of the income distribution receive benefits and pensions through revenue raised from taxing the families in the right end of the distribution.

The outcome of the redistribution is affected by the shape of the income distribution. An efficient transfer is fairly easily accomplished when there are many high private incomes relative to the number of low incomes, but it is very difficult to achieve when there are many low private incomes relative to the number of high incomes available.

Income and assets tested transfers are thus *ceteris paribus* more efficient than are transfers following other principles of eligibility, and income maintenance transfers are the least efficient. Universal benefits and pensions are in between since they redistribute the same amount to everybody regardless of his position in the distribution of private incomes.[12]

The redistribution of income will occur both with flat proportional taxes and with progressive taxes, but the amount redistributed is larger when the transfers are financed by progressive taxes. With flat taxes the recipients of benefits and pensions will have themselves to pay for part of their transfer income. Strong regressive taxes mean that they must themselves pay for all their transfer incomes. It is thus not possible to assess the total effect of benefits and pensions without also taking into account the taxes.

There is a ceiling for the proportion of the gross national income that

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families. They can be analysed in terms of *per capita* income, the distribution of which also has to be efficient.

[12] The above analysis cannot be used as an argument against all universal benefits directed at particular target groups since such transfer payments are not given indiscriminately to everyone. Child allowances are transfers aimed at increasing the standard of living of families with children. Nevertheless, the larger the proportion of the child allowances paid out of revenue raised by taxing families with minor children, the less efficient is the transfer system.

can be efficiently redistributed, the exact level of which depends on the shape of the private income distribution. There is a limit to the amount of revenue that can be raised from earners of high incomes, from whom it is not possible to tax more than 100 per cent of their private incomes. The political acceptance is much lower and even Swedes are reluctant to pay all their income in taxes.

Total public transfer payments in access of the amount of money that can be raised from people with high incomes will always result in an inefficient socialized transfer system, and universal transfers are, *ceteris paribus*, particularly vulnerable to loss in efficiency. Families in the middle of the distribution of private incomes are very likely to end up themselves paying the revenue needed for the universal benefits and pensions they receive. They must also pay when income tested benefits are given to a large proportion of the population; i.e., when they are paid to everyone except to the very rich.

The inefficiency of the transfer system is a matter of degree, and it is affected by many factors additional to the amount om money transferred. The more money spent on public consumption (no-transfer public expenditure) the lower is, *ceteris paribus*, the efficiency of the transfer system. With a large public consumption the middle classes must pay a larg proportion of the transfers; they are likely to be taxed for their own pensions and benefits when much of taxes paid by rich people is used for public consumption.

The higher the proportion of universal transfer payments relative to income tested ones, the lower is, *ceteris paribus*, the efficiency of the transfer system. The amount of money transferred cannot be increased without loss of efficiency when much of government revenue is redistributed to people other than those in the lower end of the private income distribution. Thus, universal transfers always compete with income tested programs for the amount of transfer money available given the level of efficiency.[13]

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[13] Transfer systems can of course be evaluated according to other criteria

The difference between an efficient and an inefficient transfer system is illustrated by figures 4a and 4b. The former shows an efficient system where income is redistributed from high to low earners (income measured as *per capita* or total private income). Figure 4b depicts an inefficient transfer system where the same group of people both pay taxes and receive benefits and pensions.

Figure 4: An Efficient and an Inefficient Transfer System.


4a Efficient

4b Inefficient

An inefficient socialized transfer system has a tendency to grow over time when various interest groups ask for transfer payments to be made to them. Each particular transfer program is paid partly by taxes carried by people outside of the target group of beneficiaries, but the effect of each transfer scheme can not be assessed in isolation. A large number of transfer programs aimed at different target groups within the middle classes result in an inefficient transfer system because the revenue has to be raised through taxes from the same middle classes. The total added effect of the various transfer programs is different from the effect of each single program.

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than their efficiency; an inefficient transfer system can fulfil other functions besides changing the income distribution. It is said that an inefficient system removes the stigma otherwise felt by the beneficiaries of welfare since under the inefficient system everyone receives the same benefits and pensions. Another argument tells that inefficient systems make all citizens dependent on the welfare state, and that also the middle classes will defend the welfare payments from which they recieve a large proportion of their income. An inefficient system may thus be politically accepted because of its very inefficiency.

The growth in the socialized transfer system tends to be extra rapid in times when the middle classes find themselves faced with high taxes which they find it difficult to pay; they need further increases in benefits and pensions to compensate them for the taxes; a vicious circle.

Control

All transfer systems affect the distribution of power in the society; regardless of their degree of efficiency transfer arrangements always enhance or diminish the amount of control that various groups of people can exercise over their present and future situations.

Many sociologists have defined power as an interpersonal relationship, as the ability of one person or group to have things done his or their way even when others object to it (Weber, 1947:152). The total amount of power is distributed among people, and one man's power implies another person's lack of power. An example is the power of parents over their children who can be forced to do things also when they object to them. With increasing age however, the power is transferred away from the parents to the children who become more powerful at the expense of their parents. Power is thus not only the ability to control the behaviour of other people, but it can also be used to stop those other people from interfering.

Nevertheless, the control that people can exercise over their own lives can not be inferred only from their power relative to that of others, but it is also the outcome of social macro arrangements. Money is one of the means by which people can control their situation, and the transfer of money from the tax payers to the recipients of benefits and pensions affects both the relative power of people and the ability of people to control their future; there are more options open to rich people than to poor.

The transfer of money from people with high private incomes to those with lower private incomes always means that the former lose some of their control, but it should not be taken for granted that the recipients of welfare will gain in control. The latter certainly benefit economically from the transfer payments they receive, but it is not for sure that they will also increase their control and independence; the contrary may be the case even when the transfer system is highly efficient.

The distribution of power may be conceived of as a zero-sum game, but the distribution of control is certainly not. Much control may get lost during the distributive process when tax payers give up the control over part of their income without the control being distributed to the recipients of welfare. Two things are simultaneously collected through the process of taxation: money and control. The latter, however, is not always redistributed to the recipients of welfare, who only recieve the money without the control. The control is confiscated by politicians and the bureaucracy. The public is quite often aware of the economic misuse occuring in bureaucracies, but the confiscation of control is more often neglected.

In kind transfers always result in the bureaucratic appropriation of control because the beneficiaries are not allowed to consume according to their own preferences. People who have earned their disposable income can decide by themselves how they want to spend it, but those who receive benefits in kind must consume the goods and services offered or the benefits are forgone. Food and housing subsidies are examples of transfers which bring less control and welfare to the beneficiaries than would result from cash payments.

The above analysis can be illustrated by indifference curves and budget restraints. Income earners and welfare beneficiaries derive satisfaction from the goods and services they consume; they have a limited amount of money to spend and some combinations of goods and services are more satisfactory than are others. Economists assume that there is a whole set of indifference curves for each pair of goods and services; the curvilinear functions A to D in figure 5. A particular consumer is indifferent to the various combinations of food and housing as long as they are located on the same indifference curve. His satisfaction is greater, the higher and the further to the right he is removed from the origo.

Figure 5: Indifference Curves for Food and Housing.



Figure 6: Budget Restraints and Indifference Curves for Food and Housing.



The straight lines in figure 6 represent alternative budget restraints; each line depicts the various combinations of food and housing that a family can buy given the relative prices and the total amount of money at the family's disposal.

Assume that the family income allows them to spend a given amount of money on food and housing as shown by the budget restraint line M-M, which is their consumption possibility line. The tangent between the budget restraint line M-M and the indifference curve C indicates the combination of food and housing that the family will buy. They cannot reach any higher indifference curve with their present income (the restraint M-M), and no other combination of food and housing can reach the same indifference curve. The family will buy quantities q_f and q_h of food and housing, respectively.

An income increase paid in cash can be depicted as a shift in the budget restraint from M-M to N-N in figure 7. The new budget restraint line has its tangent with the indifference curve B. The family will buy more of both housing and food, and they will become more satisfied than before which is shown by the fact that they are on an indifference curve further removed from the origo. Also an increase in taxes can be illustrated as a shift of the budget restraint line from M-M to O-O. The family would be able to buy less of both food and housing after a tax increase, and they would be less satisfied than before. This is illustrated by the tangent between the new budget restraint line O-O and the indiference curve D.

The straight expansion line in figure 7 shows the combinations of food and housing that a family will buy given various combinations of taxes and cash transfer payments. The expansion line is straight because the taxes and transfer payments do not affect the relative prices of food and housing.

Transfers in kind will increase the satisfaction of the beneficiaries less than cash transfers. Assume that a family has the budget restraint line M-M and consumes q_h of housing and q_f of food; figure 8. The government then decide to increase the support to families by subsidizing

Figure 7: Combinations of Taxes and Cash Transfer Payments.


Quantity of Food
N
O
M
A
B
C
D
O
M
N
Quantity of Housing

Figure 8: In kind transfers.


Quantity of Food
N
M
q_{fs}
q_f
A
B
C
D
q_h
M
Quantity of Housing

the prices of food, which is depicted as a shift in the budget restraint from line M-M to line N-M. Food has become cheaper, but the prices of housing has not changed.

The family will change their consumption pattern because of the change in the relative prices of food and housing. The new tangent is between the budget restraint line M-N and the indifference curve C. The family will consume more food, q_{f_s}, than earlier but the same amount of housing; their satisfaction has increased because of the subsidized food prices which is sen as a shift from indifference curve D to C. The family might thank the government.

Nevertheless, they would be even more thankful had the government instead given the family a cash benefit which is shown by the budget restraint N-N in figure 9. Such an increase in disposable income had moved the family to indifference curve B and they would have bought more housing and less food compared to the situation when the government subsidized the food prices. Curve C is certainly better than curve D, but the same amount of government outlay could result in curve B; i.e., the family's satisfaction will increase more from cash benefits than from in kind transfers. The difference between the indifference curves B and C is the family's loss of potential welfare, and a rational family should vote for the opposition in the next election.

In an inefficient welfare system in kind transfers bring potential but also real losses to the families who have to pay increased taxes in return for in kind transfers. Their situation before the taxes and in kind transfers is illustrated by the budget restraint line N-N tangent to the indifference curve B; figure 9. An increase in taxation presents the family with a new budget restraint line M-M and brings them to the indifference curve D. They have lost B minus D in satisfaction, i.e., the difference between the indifference curves B and D. The revenue raised through increased taxation may be spent on food subsidies, the family faces a new budget restraint line N-M and they are brought to the indifference curve C, a gain in satisfaction of C minus D. Nevertheless, the loss from taxation (B minus D) is greater than the gain from food subsidies, and the family will incur a net loss of B minus C.

Figure 9: Comparisions Between Cash and In Kind Transfers Both Payed for by Increased Taxes.



The net loss from the added effects of increased taxation and in kind transfers is an example of the middle class squeeze which is likely to occur in an inefficient transfer system. Distributive efficiency and the lack of control are two analytically different concepts, although they are correlated; a decrease in the distributive efficiency of the socialized transfer system results in a decrease of the citizens' control over their situation.

The loss of control is especially likely to follow from transfer systems where in kind benefits are employed, and people with low private incomes are more severely affected than are richer people. Nevertheless, an increase in the proportion of the gross national income distributed through the socialized transfer system will decrease the control also of the middle classes.

The Swedish Socialized Transfer System

In 1981 the Swedish socialized transfer system redistributed almost one third (32.8 per cent) of the gross national product (GNP) at market prices. The total cost of the socialized social welfare services was SEK 181,737 million (about U.S.$ 22,717 million), equal to a *per capita* cost of SEK 21,835 (U.S.$ 2,729) (Statistiska meddelanden S 1983:7).

A presentation will follow which describes the income structure in Sweden. The disposable income of the families is defined as their earnings plus transfer payments received from the national and local governments minus direct taxes and fees paid for public child care; table 1. An attempt will also be made to assess how the subsidized prices of goods and services and indirect taxes affect various family types.

Table 1: The Definition of Disposable Income.

+ Earnings
./. Direct taxes
= Net earnings after direct taxes

+ Advancement of child maintenance
+ Child allowances
= Income after of universal pensions

+ Housing subsidies
+ Social assistance
= Income after universal and income (assets) tested benefits and pensions

./. Public child care fees
= Disposable income

The socialized transfer payments are the larger part of the Swedish transfers, and other transfer payments will be disregarded in the present analysis. Neither will any attention be given to transfer payments of the income maintenance kind--unemployment, sick leave and parental leave benefits--which provide an income to people temporarily not employed; the income maintenance benefits are intended to help employees keep almost the same standard of living during shorter periods of absence from work. Senior citizens also have earnings related superannuation (Hultåker, 1984b).

Housing subsidies are included in the disposable income whereas other subsidies are not. The reason is that housing subsidies are paid to the families to reimburse them for expensive housing costs while other subsidies are paid to producers or salesmen in order to lower the market prices. Housing subsidies must be included in the disposable income if comparisons are to be made between families with such subsidies and families without.

The Distribution of Earnings

Earnings constitute the larger part of the private income received by the Swedish citizens; more than 98 per cent of all taxable income received by employees is earned income (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:7.2). To disregard other sources of private income--e.g., the income of farmers and other self employed people, interest, rents, dividends, capital gains, etc.--may result in bad estimates of the income of some few people, but it does not severely affect the distribution of Swedish private incomes. More than 92 per cent of all private income is earned by employed people (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:7.2).

Most Swedish men in their active years work full-time (90 per cent), whereas only one of three (34 per cent) of women work full-time (Hultåker, 1984a). Also a majority of mothers with pre-school children are employed away from home (60 per cent) most of whom work part-time (000 per cent).

Table 2 presents the distribution of earnings among full-time employed men and women, respectively, and among women employed part-time. The latest statistics available are from 1981, but 1984 estimates have been derived by multiplying the 1981 earnings with 1.261 to compensate for inflation.[14]

Men with full-time employment have median earnings amounting to

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[14] Some Swedish transfer payments are automatically augmented every year to compensate for inflation. The increase was 26.1 per cent between 1981 and 1984.

Table 2: Estimates of the Distribution of Earnings in 1984. SEK 1,000.

	Decile group										Median	Maximum Equalization Percentage
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Full-time men	69.0	85.6	91.7	97.1	102.8	109.2	116.1	126.7	146.3	218.0	105.9	11.6
Full-time women	56.2	73.5	80.2	84.7	88.1	92.1	96.3	101.1	109.5	143.9	90.2	8.7
Part-time women	27.1	36.9	42.5	45.9	49.8	55.0	60.3	66.2	73.9	102.3	52.5	13.9
Added Family Earnings [a]	96.1	122.6	134.2	143.0	152.6	164.2	176.4	192.9	220.2	320.3	158.4	

[a] The added earnings of men employed full-time and women employed part-time, given that they belong to the same group.

SEK 105,900 (U.S.$ 13,200). The difference between the first and the third quartile is SEK 35,000 (U.S.$ 4,400), and the maximum equalization percentage is 11.6.[15] For full-time employed women the median earnings are SEK 90,200 (U.S.$ 11,275); the difference bwetween the first and third quartile is SEK 20,900 (U.S.$ 2,600), and the maximum equalization percentage is 8.7.

Women employed part-time have median earnings of SEK 52,500 (U.S.$ 6,600). The difference between the first and the third quartile is SEK 23,700 (U.S.$ 3,000), and the maximum equalization percentage is 13.9.

The distribution of female earnings is thus relatively less equalitarian than is the distribution of male earnings, but the maximum equalization percentages are rather small compared to many other countries. The average full-time employed woman earns less than does the average man.

In a typical Swedish family the husband works full-time and his wife part-time. The last row of table 2 presents their added earnings given that they belong to the same decile group. In the remaining part of the present section it will be assumed that two thirds of a family's income is earned by the husband and one third by his wife when both are gainfully employed.

Comparisons will be made between four family forms:
sole mothers with two minor children; the mother works full-time,
sole mothers with two minor children; the mother works part-time,
couples with two minor children; the father works full-time, the mother is not gainfully employed, and
couples with two minor children; the father works full-time, the mother part-time.

The earnings statistics are not specific to the different family forms. Instead the tables that follow should be interpreted as showing the standard of living of families when the mother and father earn various combinations of income; i.e., have earnings equal to the first quartile, the median or the third quartile given their sex and hours of work.

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[15] The maximum equalization percentage is the proportion of the sum of earnings that must be redistributed in order to provide everyone with the same income.

Table 3 presents the total earnings before taxes, which are compared with the minimum disposable income needed by a family according to the standards for social asistance in Stockholm city, the Swedish capital.[16]

Table 3: Total Earnings Before Direct Income Taxes. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Absolute Family Earnings			
	Sole mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	80,200	42,500	91700	134,200
Median	90,200	52,500	105,900	158,400
q3	101,100	66,200	126,700	192,900
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

Most Swedish families would be able to support themselves if they did not have to pay direct income taxes; their total family earnings are high enough to pay for a minimum standard of living. With the exception of sole mothers working part-time, all families with earnings higher than the first quartile would be able to support themselves. As a matter of fact, even many families with lower relative incomes would earn enough money; cf. table 2.

One income would suffice, and also families with the mother not gainfully employed would manage the family economy. However, full- and part-time work makes all the difference for sole mothers; those who work full-time would be able to support themselves and their children if taxes did not exist, but nobody on part-time work would manage to do this; also sole mothers with incomes at the third quartile would need some financial assistance.

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[16] The minimum disposable income estimated by the local government in Stockholm City includes the cost for housing. It is calculated for families with two children who are younger than nine yerars and between ten and fifteen, respectively. Older children are supposed to cost more than young, and families are accordingly in need of more money.

Direct Taxes

Swedes are heavily taxed by the national and local governments. In 1982 the direct income taxes were SEK 172,592 million (U.S.$ 21,574 million), 32.9 per cent of the gross national production at market prices.[17] Furthermore, the consumers also paid value added and other sales taxes and the employers paid a pay roll tax of SEK 101,479 million (U.S.$ 12,685 million).[18] In 1982 the Swedes paid more than 52 per cent of the gross domestic production in taxes to the national and local governments.

Table 4 presents the effects of the direct income taxes on the family income. Sole mothers on part-time work would not earn enough money to support themselves and their children even if they did not have to pay taxes, and their situation is of course even worse after taxes. Also sole mothers with full-time jobs are unable to support their families on their earnings after taxes; even sole mothers with high earnings equal to the third quartile (q_3) have too low net earnings. The same is true of married couples with only one earned income; it is in Sweden of today almost impossible for a family to afford to have the mother stay home with her children. It is of course even more difficult for a woman to earn enough money for her husband to stay home because female earnings are lower than male.

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[17] The direct income taxes include taxes on earnings, capital gains taxes, assets taxes, and taxes on business profits. For the fiscal year 1981-07-01 to 1982-06-30 the national direct income taxes amounted to SEK 38,992 million (U.S.$ 4,874 million) (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:6). In 1982 the local direct taxes were more than three times larger, SEK 133,600 million (U.S.$ 16,700 million) (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:8). The gross domestic production at market value was SEK 524,480 million (U.S.$ 65,560 million) (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:2.5).

[18] For the fiscal year 1982-07-01 to 1982-06-30 the taxes on goods and services were SEK 70,229 million (U.S.$ 8,779 million) and the pay roll taxes SEK 31,250 million (U.S.$ 3,906 million) (Statistiska meddelanden N 1983:6).

Over the last decade the Swedish taxes have become less progressive than before, which is the result not of lower taxes for the rich but of increased taxes for people with low and average incomes.[19] The tax scales have not been adjusted fully to compensate for the inflation with the result that all Swedes with a permanent employment have a marginal tax of at least 33 per cent; most people with a full time job pay a marginal tax of more than 50 per cent; table 5.

The present distribution of marginal taxes can not be very different with the present level of taxation when the sum of taxes exceeds 50 per cent of the gross domestic production; very little can be achieved by reallocating the taxes among citizens since not even marginal taxes of 100 per cent among the top level earnings would significantly decrease the tax burdens of people with low and average earnings.

Many people cannot support their families on their net earnings after taxes; the only exception is couples who both are gainfully employed. Moreover, few families can improve their situation very much by working longer hours, and they lack control over their present and future situation. Almost everyone with a full-time job faces a marginal tax of more than 50 per cent, and the fiscal bureaucracy would gain more than the workers themselves if the latter decided to work longer hours.

People with part-time jobs are those most favoured by the remaining progressivity of the tax system, but even they lack control over their situation; they too will face very high marginal taxes if they try to increase their salaries and wages more than marginally.

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[19] All tax rates are nominal. Labour sold on the black market is not taken into account, nor is the dispositions that fairly well-to-do people can use to diminish their taxable income.

Table 4: Net Earnings After Direct Taxes. SEK

Relative Family Earnings	Net Earnings After Taxes			
	Sole mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	57,200	34,000	61,700	92,000
Median	62,000	40,600	68,200	105,200
q3	67,100	49,400	77,100	122,800
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,1000

Table 5: Marginal Taxes. Per cent.

Family Earnings Decile Groups	Marginal Taxes				
	Sole mothers		Couples		
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners	
				Male	Female
1	36	33	47	47	33
2	47	34	52	52	34
3	52	34	53	53	34
4	52	34	53	53	34
5	52	34	55	55	34
6	52	34	56	56	34
7	53	36	58	58	36
8	53	37	62	62	37
9	56	47	70	70	47
10	66	55	77	77	55

In Sweden earners with low and average incomes have to await a decrease of the total taxes before they can imporve their net earnings. No Swedish government have tried very hard to accomplish such a change, but all political parties, whether in the government or in opposition, have tried to compensate the citizens for the high taxes with transfer payments. They might perhaps imporve people's standard of living but certainly not their control.

It has been suggested that the family unit should be the basis for taxation in order to improve the situation for one earner families at the expense of those with two earned incomes. Such a policy, however, would heavily increase the marginal taxes for married women who in most families earn less than their husbands, a sexist policy which would drive women out of the labour market and back home. In particular women on low paid part-time jobs would not earn enough to compensate them for child care costs and other costs that can be avoided if they stay at home.

The conflict between the political ambition to favour families with only one earner, including sole parents, and the wish not to drive married women out of the labour market is a dilemma which cannot be solved within a progressive tax system given the present level of taxation in Sweden. The only solution is the introduction of less progressive taxes, may be flat income taxes.

Universal Cash Transfers

Sole mothers are not supposed to pay all the costs for their children but also the fathers shall pay their share; fathers who do not live with their minor children are ordered by court to pay child maintenance to the mother.[20] Swedish sole mothers do not, however, depend on the willingness or ability of fathers to pay, but the government advances the legal minimum of maintenance when fathers do not pay; the advancements are not income or assets tested, and the recipients do not need to pay taxes on that kind of income. In 1984 the minimum child maintenance is SEK 694 per month and child, and a sole mother with two minor children receives at least SEK 16,656 from the father or the government.

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[20] There are sole fathers who are awarded the custody of their children and mothers who pay child maintenance, but sole mothers are much more common than are sole fathers. The law is not sexist in this respect, but the custom is to give custody to mothers whether the issue is settled in court or through private negotiation; thus, the practice has a sexist bias.
The economic situation of sole fathers is not analysed in the present paper; their aggregate income is much smaller than that of sole mothers, and

Sole mothers with full-time employment earn enough money to support their families although their net earnings after taxes are insufficient. Nevertheless, those with at least median earnings are once more raised to above the level of the minimum disposable income after their receipt of child maintenance; table 6.

Table 6: Net Income After Sole Mothers' Receipt of the Minimum Child Maintenance. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Income After Receipt of Minimum Child Maintenance			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q_1	73,900	50,700	61,700	92,000
Median	78,700	57,300	68,200	105,200
q_3	83,800	66,100	77,100	122,800
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

Since the advancement of the child maintenance is neither income nor assets tested, sole mothers with full-time and fairly well paid (at the third quartile) jobs receive the same amount as sole mothers who work part-time and earn much less. The former have an income above the

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their situation is of less importance for a macro analysis of the economy.

The economic situation of the men who pay child maintenance is more significant. The standard of living of their families is lower than it would otherwise be, and the aggregate income of their families is of greater importance to a macro analysis of the economy. Nevertheless, they are not included in the present analysis because of lack of space.

minimum disposable income, whereas not even well paid part-time female workers can reach that level.

Moreover, the income after the advancement of child maintenance is higher for sole mothers with full-time employment than is the income of couples with one earner, even though the latter families have one additional adult person to support.

All families with minor children receive child allowances which are neither income nor assets tested; SEK 3,300 per child and year in the begining of 1984. Table 7 presents family incomes after the receipt of the minimum child maintenance and the general child allowances.

Table 7: Net Income After Universal Pensions (Advancement of Child Maintenance and Child Allowances). SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Net Income			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	80,500	57,300	68,300	98,600
Median	85,300	63,900	74,800	111,800
q3	90,400	72,700	83,700	129,400
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

The distributive efficiency of the general child allowances is almost as bad as that of the advancement of child maintenance. Child allowances are paid out of general revenue and given to all families regardless of their incomes or needs. Nevertheless, the advancement of child maintenance is somewhat worse since poor couples have to pay taxes in order to support rich sole mothers.

The universal pensions raise the income of couples with low earnings (equal to the first quartile) above the level of the minimum disposable income; also sole mothers on full-time jobs with low (first quartile) and median earnings are raised above that level. Sole mothers on part-time jobs do not reach the minimum disposable income, and the same is the case with one earner couples. As will be seen later in this section, however, the families below the level of the minimum disposable income will neither starve nor freeze since they can apply for income and assets tested benefits. Nevertheless, those families certainly lack in control over their present situation.

The economic situation is somewhat different, however, between sole mothers with part-time jobs and couples with one earner. The former group benefit from the transfer system since the universal transfer payments they receive are higher than the direct taxes they pay; their net incomes after universal pensions are thus higher than their gross earnings; table 8. The contrary is the case for families with one earner; their taxes are higher than their universal pensions.

Table 8: Difference Between Gross Family Earnings and Family Income After Universal Pensions. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Difference			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	+ 300	+ 14,800	- 23,400	- 35,600
Median	- 4,900	+ 11,400	- 31,100	- 46,600
q3	- 10,700	+ 6,500	- 43,300	- 63,500

+ the families receive more money than they pay in direct taxes
- the families receive less money than they pay in direct taxes.

Sole mothers are the only group of people who receive more money from unversal transfer payments than they pay in taxes--four out of six income groups.

Income and Assets Tested Benefits

Low and average income families can receive housing subsidies, part of which are proportional to their cost of housing. The recipients must apply for the subsidies, and in 1984 the maximum amount is SEK 17,280 for families with two minor children. The withdrawal of the housing subsidies begins at a private income of SEK 33,000 for sole mothers and SEK 41,000 for couples. No subsidies are paid to sole mothers who earn more than SEK 119,000, and the ceiling for couples is SEK 125,000 (Bostadsstyrelsen, 1984). The withdrawal rate is the same for couples with one and two incomes, which means that the group of one earner families are worse off than are two earner families since the former pay higher taxes in a system which is progressive with the individual as the unit of taxation. Table 9 presents maximum per year housing subsidies.[21]

Table 9: Maximum Housing Subsidies. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Housing Subsidies Sole Mothers Full-time	 Part-time	 Couples One Earner	 Two Earners
q1	8,900	15,900	7,600	—
Median	6,600	14,400	4,500	—
q3	4,300	11,900	—	--

All six groups of sole mothers receive housing subsidies, also fulltime employed women whose private incomes are above the minimum level of disposable income after the receipt of universal pensions. The couples with one earner also receive housing subsidies when the earnings are lower than the third quartile; table 10.

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[21] Most recipients receive housing subsidies a little higher than the estimates in table 9 since the subisidies do not depend on the present private income but on the income that the families had two years earlier. Thus, families with a past increase in nominal earnings are somewhat better off than indicated in table 9. Nevertheless, income increases of more than SEK 20,000 will lessen the amount of money paid in subsidies, and the families will receive subsidies based on their present private income when their earnings have decreased during the last two years.

Table 10: Net Income After Maximum Housing Subsidies. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Housing Subsidies			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	89,400	73,200	75,900	98,600
Median	91,900	78,300	79,300	111,800
q3	94,700	84,600	83,700	129,400
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

The net income after maximum housing subsidies is higher than the minimum disposable income for all groups except for couples with only one earned income, among whom one earner cannot support his family with his income after housing subsidies even when his earnings are equal to the third quartile. The housing subsidies are more efficient in helping sole mothers among whom only low paid part-time employees are below the level of the minimum disposable income.

Nevertheless, the Swedish housing subsidies lack redistributive efficiency since the transfer payments are given also to families well above the minimum disposable income, and some people receive housing subsidies even though their direct taxes are higher than the transfer payments they receive--sole mothers with full-time employment and earnings equal to the third quartile. Moreover, nothing is given to some of the families below the level of the minimum disposable income--one earner families with earnings equal to the third quartile--and others are given too little to bring them above the level--sole mothers on part-time jobs with earnings equal to the median or lower.

The withdrawal rate for the housing subsidies is added to the marginal taxes, and their effect can be seen in table 11. It is hard for all earners to increase their standard of living by working more hours since they face added marginal taxes and withdrawal rates of about 50 per cent or more. Only married women on part-time jobs have low marginal effects; the added net earnings of the couple are above the ceiling for housing subsidies, and employees on part-time jobs are almost the only persons to benefit from the progressivity of the tax system. Sole mothers with part-time jobs do not, however, benefit very much from the progressive taxes since their low marginal taxes are offset by the withdrawal rates for housing subsidies. Families with housing subsidies have little control over their net incomes.

Table 11: The Added Effects of Marginal Taxes and the Withdrawal Rate for Housing Subsidies. Per cent.

Family Earnings Decile Groups	Marginal Effects				
	Sole mothers		Couples		
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners	
				Male	Female
1	51	33	69	69	55
2	69	49	74	74	56
3	74	49	75	53	34
4	74	49	75	53	34
5	74	49	77	55	34
6	74	49	78	56	34
7	75	52	80	58	36
8	75	59	62	62	37
9	78	69	70	70	47
10	66	77	77	77	55

The families not only lack control over their future net incomes because of high marginal effects, and the recipients of housing subsidies cannot even decide by themselve how to spend the transfer money they receive. Couples with two earned incomes have more control over their spending not only because of higher net incomes but also since they are free to spend their money on whatever goods and services they want. The recipients of housing subsidies, however, must consume expensive housing or the transfer is forgone. They can not gain anything from renting a low cost flat or house since they are not allowed to keep the money they save; the housing subsidies are proportional to the rent. As with all in kind transfer benefits, the recipients would be better off had they instead received cash benefits.

To summarize: Housing subsidies lack distributive efficiency; the rate of witdrawal added to the marginal taxes makes it very difficult for the recipients to control their future incomes when most of an increase in earnings will be confiscated; the recipients also lack control over their present family economy since they are not allowed themselves to decide about their consumption pattern but have to choose between expensive housing or noting.

Families with low private incomes but also some families with median and even higher incomes must turn to the public welfare agencies for social assistance, the last resort for people who cannot support their families. Almost all families with one sole earner must do so in order to reach the level of of the minimum disposable income; the universal pensions given to all families with minor children and the housing subsidies do not suffice for them.

Table 12 presents the net income after universal and income (assets) tested pensions and benefits including social assistance. All three groups of one earner families have an income equal to the minimum disposable income, and so have sole mothers with part-time jobs and low earnings (equal to the first quartile).

The social assistance is withdrawn at a rate of 100 per cent of the marginal net earnings after direct taxes; i.e., the recipients of social assistance cannot improve their standard of living unless they can reach the level of a net income after housing subsidies which is higher than the minimum disposable income. Table 13 presents the withdrawal rate for social assistance added to the marginal direct taxes and the withdrawal rate for housing subsidies. Social assistance is the only transfer payment which is withdrawn with a rate of 100 per cent, and the recipients of assistance have great difficulties to control their future standard of living

Table 12: Net Income After Universal and Income (Assets) Tested Pensions and Benefits. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Net Income After Pensions and Benefits			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	89,400	76,600	91,200	98,600
Median	91,900	78,300	91,200	111,800
q3	94,700	84,600	91,200	129,400
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

Table 13: Added Marginal Direct Taxes and Witdrawal Rates for Income (Assets) Tested Benefits. Per cent.

Family Earnings Decile Groups	Marginal Effects				
	Sole mothers		Couples		
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners	
				Male	Female
1	51	100	100	100	100
2	69	100	100	100	100
3	74	100	100	53	34
4	74	100	100	53	34
5	74	49	100	55	34
6	74	49	100	56	34
7	75	52	100	58	36
8	75	59	100	62	37
9	78	69	100	70	47
10	66	77	77	77	55

which they cannot improve until they reach the level of the minimum disposable income without social assistance. Many of the families with social assistance have to rely on political decisions for an improvement since they lack control within the present system of taxes and transfers.

Nevertheless, the social assistance gives the beneficiaries better control over their present economic situation than do housing subsidies since the recipients of social assistance can themselves decide how to spend their income. Housing subsidies are thus superior to social welfare on one of the control issues (the future standard of living) but inferior on the other one(the present allocation of family income).

The redistributive efficiency of social assistance is high given the income after housing subsidies; assistance is only given to people with an income prior to assistance below the minimum disposable income; all families are brought to this level by the program for social assistance. Nevertheless, many of the recipients of social assistance pay more money in direct taxes than the transfer payments they receive --most of the families with one income earner; table 14.

Table 14: Difference Between Gross Family Earnings and Family Income After Universal and Income (Assets) Tested Pensions and Benefits. SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Net Income After Pensions and Benefits			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	+ 9,200	+ 34,100	- 7,500	- 35,600
Median	+ 1,700	+ 25,800	- 14,700	- 46,600
q3	- 6,400	+ 18,400	- 35,500	- 63,500

To summarize: The social assistance has distributive efficiency given the inefficiency of other transfer programs, but many families are only compensated for the direct taxes they pay; the rate of withdrawal makes it impossible for many recipients to control their future incomes; the recipients, however, have control over their present economy since they can use the money according to their own preferences.

Public Child Care Fees

Some costs arise because of people's work and they are avoided by those who obtain from gainful employment away from home. One such cost item has already been indirectly included in the analysis since tax payers can deduct part of their costs for travelling to and from their jobs. Moreover, the minimum disposable income include the cost that people incur when they have lunch away from home which is very common in the big cities; the difference in minimum disposable income between families with one and two earned incomes depend on the fact that in the latter families two persons have lunch away from home.

The most important cost item, however, is the costs for child care which is avoided when the mother stays home to care herself for her small sons and daughters. Couples with one sole earner thus have a higher disposable income than other families given the level of income after universal and income (assets) tested benefits and pensions. The cost for child care is not the same in all families, but the present analysis will use the fees for public child care recommended by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities (Sveriges kommunförbund, 1978). It is assumed that the families have one child in need of care while his older sibling is old enough to take care of himself after school.[22] Table 15 presents the disposable income after child care fees.

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[22]

Relative Family Earnings	Recommended Public Child Care Fees			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
q1	6,500	3,800	--	8,900
Median	7,200	4,600	--	10,600
q3	7,900	5,500	--	11,000

Table 15: Disposable Income (After Fees Paid for Child Care). SEK.

Relative Family Earnings	Disposable Income			
	Sole Mothers		Couples	
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners
Q1	82,900	76,600	91,200	96,100
Median	84,700	76,600	91,200	101,200
Q3	86,800	79,100	91,200	118,400
Minimum Disposable Income	76,600	76,600	91,200	96,100

People in need of social assistance will be compensated for their child care costs, and some additional groups of families will become dependent on social assistance when their child care costs are added to the direct taxes--couples with earned incomes equal to the first quartile and sole mothers with part-time jobs and median incomes. The child care fees lack distributive efficience since some families cannot afford to pay them without help from the social assistance programs; thus, one program takes money from the parents who are reimbursed for their costs from another welfare program.

The public child care fees are progressive and has the same effect as an additional marginal tax of between seven and ten per cent except for families with gross incomes higher than the ceiling above which the fees do not rise. Table 16 presents the marginal child care fees added to the marginal direct taxes and the withdrawal of pensions and benefits. Below the ceiling the progressive child care fees diminish the control of the families who cannot control their future income since they will keep so little of an increase in earnings. Almost all families face very high total marginal effects, and most of them will keep about one third or less of an increase in earnings. The only exception are some two earner familes; the wife can improve the family's standard of living by longer hours of work. Moreover, in many families the disposable income will be pushed down to the level of the minimum standard of living where they depend on social welfare which is withdrawn at a rate of 100 per cent.[23]

Table 16: Added Marginal Taxes, the Withdrawal of Pensions and Benefits and Marginal Child Care Fees. Per cent.

Family Earnings Decile Groups	Marginal Effects				
	Sole mothers		Couples		
	Full-time	Part-time	One Earner	Two Earners	
				Male	Female
1	58	100	100	100	100
2	76	100	100	100	100
3	81	100	100	100	100
4	81	100	100	100	100
5	81	100	100	69	48
6	81	100	100	70	48
7	82	59	100	58	36
8	82	66	100	62	37
9	85	76	100	70	47
10	73	84	77	77	55

There are of course cheaper child care available for some families who are helped by the grandparents and other relatives, and there is an informal black market for child care where the workers do not pay any direct income taxes and the employers no pay roll taxes. Public child care is only available to a minority of children--38 per cent of all pre school children in 1983 (Statistiska meddelanden S 1983:12). In spite of the high total and marginal cost, the demand for public child care is much higher than the supply since public child care is subsidized to a very high extent; no families pay more than a very small fraction of the total cost for running a child care centre (Sveriges kommunförbund, 1982).

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[23] Some city councils consider the marginal child care fees to be too high when added to other marginal effects, and they charge lower fees for people with median and high earnings.

Subsidized Goods and Services

In addition to the housing subsidies paid directly to the housholds, the national government also subsidize the rate of interest on borrowed money invested in houses and buildings. The housing subsidies lower the prices for housing compared to other goods and services, and the families will buy more housing than they would otherwise do. It is not possible in the present paper, however, to estimate how the subsidized interest rates affect different family types.

Also the market price of other goods and services are manipulated by political decisions. There are food subsidies which are said to benefit the families with children, but the subsidies on particular items vary with the political pressure that different groups of producers can put on the government. The subsidies also vary with the market supply. The subsidized food prices lack distributive efficience since the prices are the same for everyone, they all pay the same prices. It is estimated that an average family of four people spend SEK 1,860 less on food per year because of the subsidies (Budgetdepartementet, DS B 1982:7)

The subsidized child care has a greater impact on the welfare of the families. In 1984 the total cost for running a day care centre was cirka SEK 46,000 per child and year.[24] Very few families can afford to pay the total cost for public child care and the Association of Swedish Local Authorities recommend the cities to charge progressive fees with a ceiling of about SEK 11,000 per year and child. All families thus receive a subsidy of at least SEK 35,000. As is always the case with in kind transfers, the families who do not want to buy public child care will receive nothing. Some families with low private incomes pay taxes which are used to provide subsidized child care to families with higher incomes.

Moreover, the local governments can not meet the demand for public child care since there is a shortage of day care centres; some families do not receive any of the subsidies even though they want to have their children in the day care centres. The families without public child care have to pay all the costs for their private child care; the costs are not tax deductable.

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[24] In 1980 the Association of Swedish Local Authorities estimated the cost to SEK 34,600 (Sveriges kommunförbund, 1982). The consumer price index raised by 33 per cent between 1980 and 1984.

Subsidized child care lack distributive efficiency as long as the demand is higher than the supply. The families are low in control over their spending on child care when they cannot themselves decide on how they want to use the subsidies. They have to accept the public day care, or the transfer is forgone.

To summarize: subsidized public child care lack redistributive efficiency when the demand cannot be met. It does not help that the fees are progressive. Moreover, the recipients lack control over their present economy since they cannot themselves decide on how to spend the transfers offered.

Summary and Conclusions

Three changes have occurred concomitantly in modern societies: The social structure has become increasingly more differentiated, many social functions have been socialized by the state, and families are given more freedom when they are no longer the dominating collectivity in the social structure. The result is more variation in family structure and less stable families.

During earlier periods people depended on their family and kin for economic support and transfers, and the society needed in-tact families to guarantee an minimum standard of living at least to the established classes. The families distributed welfare to the family members in conformity with the rules set by society-at-large.

The socialization of the transfer system has changed the basic structure of the system: People no longer need their families for economic support,and heavy taxes has made private welfare too expensive. Furthermore, many families cannot afford to guaranatee a good standard of living to all their members.

The Swedish socialized transfer system has been described in the present paper. Its distributive efficiency has been studied together with the control that citizens can exercise over their future and present economic situation. One instance of distributive inefficiency is when high taxes are collected from the very same group of people to whom transfer payments are given. Another case is when money is given without discrimination also to people less in need than are other persons. The transfer system has distributive efficiency to the extent that it transfers money from people with high private incomes to people with lower incomes. The efficiency is influenced by many factors among which are the size of the transfer system relative to the GNP and the continuing revenue spent on public consumption.

The concept of control does not connote a direct interpersonal relation like the concept of power, but control is a measure of the extent to which a person can decide about and change his future and present economic situation. People have a better control over their present earnings than over transfer payments, in particular when the latter are given in kind; they cannot spend the transfer money acording to their preferences but have to accept the transfers offered or they are foregone. The loss of welfare resulting from the lack of control is illustrated by indifference curves and budget restraints. People's control over their future incomes are described by means of marginal taxes and fees and witdrawal rates for pensions and benefits.

It is not enough to assess the distributive efficiency of single transfer programs, but the added effects of the transfer and tax systems ought to be analysed. For instance, social assistance was found to be fairly efficient since the program only provides money to families below the minimum standard of living, i.e., to people with net incomes lower than the minimum disposable income. Nevertheless, the program can only be regarded as efficient given the lack of distributive efficiency of other programs.

Many people have fairly good gross earnings, and they would be able to support their families if they did not have to pay very high taxes. The net earnings after direct taxes, however, do not suffice for the family, and also the universal child allowances are insufficient. Couples with one earned income need social assistance to reach the level of the minimum disposable income. The social assistance has distributive efficiency, but only given the inefficiency of the other components of the transfer system; the totality of the transfer system is bad in regard to couples with only one earned income. Many of these families both pay high taxes and need income (assets) tested social assistance--one income families with earnings equal to the third quartile pay marginal taxes of 62 per cent but cannot support their families on their net earnings added to universal child allowances.

Moreover, the demand for public child care exceeds the supply, and the parents who succeed to get their children into a public day care centre receive subsidies of more than SEK 30,000 per year even though the fees are progressive with a marginal rate of seven per cent. Some parents cannot afford to pay the fees for public child care,but they are reimbursed with social assistance from the same local authority to whom they pay the child care fees.

The transfer system also lack distributive efficiency when the child care subsidies are given to all families who have their children in a day care centre. It does not matter whether they are rich or poor, but some low income families receive no subsidies when their children are not accepted in public childcare because of too high a demand.

The lack of control over the families future economic situation is described by the added marginal taxes and the withdrawal rates for income (assets) tested benefits and the progressiv public child care fees. The withdrawal rate for social assistance is 100 per cent, and families who receive this kind of transfer will keep nothing of a future increase in earnings. Most family types face total marginal effects of more than 80 per cent.

Moreover, the lack of distributive efficiency decreases the control of the citizens since they become dependent on the welfare agencies, bureaucrats and politicians who can change the rules from time to time. The recipients of welfare can never be sure that they will receive the same kind and amount of transfer payments during the following year.

The recipients of in kind transfers--including subsidized consumption--lack control over how they shall spend the transfer money they receive. The bureaucrats and the politicians make the decisions. The recipients cannnot themselves decide about what they shall consume but they have to accept the goods and services that they are offered, or the transfer is forgone.

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DISCUSSANT PAPERS

SESSION 1

Theme: Is the family worth supporting? Pressures, conflicts and expectations of family life

- Bettina Cass comments on Collins, Glezer & Lewis
- Thomas Lasswell comments on Glezer

Politics, Marriage and The Family:
The Pro-Family Lobby and the Women's Movement;
Traditionalists and Liberal Progessives;
Issues of Theory, Research and Policy

A Discussion Paper to be Presented at xxth International Committee on Family Research, International Sociological Association.

"Social Change and Family Policies."
Melbourne, Australia, 20th August, 1984.

Session : Pressures, Conflicts and Expectations of Family Life

Papers commented on : (i) R. Collins, "Social Conflict and the Place of the Family: Towards a Theory of Moral Politics"

(ii) H. Glezer, "Antecedents and Correlates of Marriage and Family Attitudes in Young Australian Men and Women."

(iii) R. Lewis, " Some Changes in Men's Values, Meanings, Roles and Attitudes Towards Marriage and the Family in U.S.A.."

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Introduction

I have the task of discussing three papers whose content and theoretical approach are so different that we might believe that their authors and the families about which they write inhabit different worlds. Randall Collins ("Social Conflict and the Place of the Family: Towards a theory of Moral Politics") places his families in an arena of power, military force and politico-legal regulation; Helen Glezer ("Antecedents and Correlates of Marriage and Family Attitudes in Young Australian Men and Women") locates her couples in a class and sex differentiated society where unequally distributed resources shape individuals' adherence to traditional or non-traditional family values; Robert Lewis ("Some Changes in Men's Values, Meanings, Roles and Attitudes Towards Marriage and the Family in the U.S.A.") observes men at domestic role-play, in a society where men's propensity to participate in the nurturance of their children appears to depend on individual volition.

My further task is to ask you to consider the pressures, conflicts and expectations of family life, which I take to mean: what are the key economic and political issues currently intervening in domestic life, and how are individuals in families currently shaping continuity or change in the construction of their "private" lives? I therefore intend to address only those theoretical issues, empirical findings and problems of methodology and interpretation raised in the three papers which shed some light on the current issues before us.

Politics and the Family

Randall Collins argues that biological, social/psychological and functionalist theories of the family are unable to explain changes in family structures and relationships. Economic theories are a little more useful in situating the family in the structures of production, distribution and consumption and Marxian theories more useful still in locating the family within the dynamics of class structure and class domination. When Marxian and feminist theories meet they go a step further in tying male domination within the family to class domination in the sphere of production. But there are still problems because Marxian theories give feminism no sphere of autonomous explanation of family change and no possibility of independent intervention in family politics, because ultimately the dynamics of capitalism itself are seen as the only lever of change in domestic forms and relationships.

While rightly disputing such reductionism, it is not to feminist theories that Collins turns for his favoured explanation of family change, but to the historical writings of Max Weber, arguing that the family is determined basically by political regulation. His paper attempts to carve out an independent and autonomous sphere for politics, for state domination, for mobilised groups wielding, challenging and resisting authority and force in determining the structure of the family, the relationships within it and the involvement of families in the political process. He uses the term "moral politics" which is never defined, but which I take to mean the way in which dominant elites construct and legitimate definitions of morality at public and personal levels, constituting certain family forms and relationships as the nub of morality and in turn, using the symbols of family morality to legitimate their own power. The thrust of Collins' reworking of Weber is that family forms, internal relationships, relationships with other institutions are constituted by political struggles. Moral politics is usually of a conservative bent, this being particularly the case in the contemporary period. Where there are contenders for power, conceptions of even more traditional family moralities will be utilised to attack ruling ideas considered liberal and corrupt, just as the New Right, pro-family organisations in U.S.A. and Australia invoke the moral strength and "naturalness" of the patriarchal family to attack emergent policies of anti-discrimination legislation, women's control of their fertility and government income support for mother-headed families (Eisenstein;1982; Poole, 1983).

In his trip through the history of politics and the family from Rome under Augustus to U.S.A. under Reagan, Collins uses case after case to demonstrate ways in which family practices as fundamental as age at marriage; inheritance, ownership and control of family property; the status of wives; the domestic division of labour; relationships with kin; the status of children are fashioned not by biology, sentiment, psychology or even by the mode of production, but by the military strength, legal regulations, economic incentives and ideological machinery of governing elites. And this was and is done not merely as a contingent addition to other more significant policies, but as a crucial element of them because the control of family relationships is central to the control of the distribution of wealth and political influence and, in certain periods, central to military interests.

The common thread running through all of these political interventions, according to Collins, is the perpetuation of family relationships which dominate women. Even in instances where the rule of the pater familias appeared to be challenged, Collins finds that there were political interests at stake in which certain men would benefit from any political changes which were introduced. He is at pains to dispute the idea that either the small family/household or the kin grouping (the "clan") was primordial in human history, or that any evolutionary development can be traced from "matriarchal horde" to patriarchal nuclear family with the rise of private property and the bureaucratic state. Rather, following Weber's rigorous historical analyses, he claims that there is no unilinear development, no evolutionary path, but that in each period configurations of economic, political and military power structured family forms. But if there was any "iron law", then it was that women were subordinate.

The Rise of the Family/Household; the Rise of Capitalism

According to Weber, the household usually became the centre of the economy in advanced agrarian societies where military and political organisations destroyed the power of the clans. These were patriarchal households characterised by a despotism of the male head, but the households differed fundamentally in size and economic function according to their class location; the large households of the aristocracy containing servants, retainers, apprentices as well as family; the smaller households of town artisans and burghers also containing family and others related to the processes of production and enterprise; the very small households of rural workers whose children at an early age went into richer households as apprentices and servants. The crucial factor in the size and composition of these households is that they were economic organisations of production and consumption, labour pools for the local productive enterprise and small organisations for controlling consumption, based ultimately on property ownership, or the lack of it. When large and powerful enough, certain households were also organisations of political control, particularly in the local region, but extending more widely.

Such historical analyses make the debate about the primordial nature of the nuclear family, or its more recent arrival as the handmaiden of capitalism, irrelevant. What is relevant is the way in which centralised state institutions, and the organisation of production in the transition to capitalism regulated family/production relationships through the laws of property, the laws of labour ("employment" to use a more modern term), finally separating, legally and spatially, family enterprise from market enterprise, family finance from business finance, domestic labour from gainful employment, the work of reproduction and consumption from the work of production. This was not a uni-directional development - state and economy shaping family form and composition - the rise of family/households breaking the power of the clan also provided the individualist ideology which legitimated the rise of a market economy.

The separation of "work" (as Collins calls it) from the household, which is one of the characteristics of the rise of capitalism, happened first in the political sphere. The rise of the bureaucratic state limited or removed entirely the military and political power of the large patrimonial households, which had themselves usurped the power of kin groupings. The establishment of state controlled standing armies, the state monopoly of the organisation of force by the disarming of the households and the increasing centralisation of political control were necessary pre-conditions for the rise of the market economy. Households were no longer armies.

The next stage was the separation of household from business enterprise in tax and accounting systems. Collins (p. 39) quoting Weber (The General Economic History) asserts that the separation of household accounts and business accounts for legal purposes was the crucial difference between modern Western commercial law and that of classical antiquity. In making these points from Weber, Collins moves away from the arid technological determinist claim that the rise of the modern family is related to the imperatives of industrialisation, ie, of a mechanised labour process. He also shifts emphasis to the households of the bourgeoisie where the business enterprise was located. However, whereas Collins takes pains in the earlier part of his paper on the family in antiquity and in the medieval period to stress that political regulations enforced the power of men, he does not mention the consequences of capitalist changes in the sphere of business enterprise on the status of women, as does, for example, Lenore Davidoff (1976) also writing within the Weberian tradition.

Weber emphasises the separation of household accounting and commercial accounting as the prototypical split in the bourgeois household in the period of commercial capitalism. With the separation of the bourgeois household from the commercial enterprise (a gradual process beginning in Europe in the medieval period and not complete until the nineteenth century) emerged the modern prototype of the gender differentiation of spheres of life-activities. Men became the protagonists of finance and commerce; women the guardians of the household, bearing children, managing household production and consumption, safeguarding emotion and moral tradition from the incursion of market forces (Davidoff, 1976). Collins does not take up any of the points raised by recent feminist scholarship investigating the "domestication" of women in the period of commercial and industrial capitalism (eg. Tilly and Scott, 1978), even though Weberian insights would lead to the conclusion that the development of the moral politics of the family in recent times must be traced to the spatial, physical and symbolic gender divisions of domestic labour and gainful employment forged since the seventeenth century.

Politics and the Family in the 1980's

Collins points out, rightly, that it is wrong to claim that the rise of the bureaucratic state, in excluding the family from direct political participation, actually constituted the family as a private institution, subject only to economic forces. The family continues to be the subject of politics, particularly moral politics, which has a major impact on its structure and relationships. Laws relating to the control of fertility, women's property rights, women's opportunities for gainful employment and earned income (not, I must note, women's right to "work", which no politics has ever disputed - what is disputed is the reward for women's work), have fashioned a modern family characterised by delayed marriage, delayed child-bearing, smaller families, labour force participation for married women as well as men. At the same time, the lack of public policies supporting fully the paid work of women (e.g. the provision of adequate childcare) restricts women's full economic participation.

At this stage Collins becomes cautious and loses the thrust of Weberian theory. It may well be, he argues, that economic forces determine such processes as women's labour force participation and fertility patterns and that legislation is merely reactive. Here he brings in again the analogy of politics as a game of billiards:

> But it would be wiser to view the modern world as a complex field of forces, with politics, economics, and status issues or social movements all affecting each other. If politics is like billiards, in which coalitions and oppositions result in ricocheting patterns of causality, the addition of these other billiard-balls to the table makes for even more indirect results (p 46).

This is a wholly inadequate analogy of modern politics, suggesting that randomness is the key to the explanation of alliances and oppositions. We can go much further in tracing the connections between economic and political interests. In the field of family politics, for example, clear connections have been made between the New Right attacks on anti-discrimination legislation, abortion law reform and public expenditure support for mother-headed families made by the "pro-family" lobby and the economic policies of the market libertarians, stressing contraction in government social expenditures and de-regulation of the market (Sawer, 1983; Cass, 1983; Eisenstein, 1982; Poole, 1983). Collins notes that the pro-family backlash in the United States is an attack on the gains of feminism, a conservative political mobilisation against the program of the women's movement. But he does not make the further connection, as Eisenstein (1982) does, to point out that conservative economic rhetoric uses the moral symbol of the patriarchal family as the nub of the pre-recessionary economic and social order.

The paper does note that the contemporary family is used by the state as a hidden form of education and welfare service; particularly for unemployed adolescents. However, what is not noted is the point well documented in the feminist literature: the really covert nature of the current economics and politics of the family is the hidden, unpaid work of women. It is the domestic labour and caring work of women which the "pro-family" lobby is encouraging - continuing the long tradition documented by Collins: the use of moral politics to perpetuate the subordination of women through the regulation of the family.

The pro-family lobby, as Collins points out, uses the moral rhetoric of appeal to the "collective good" to rationalise its anti-feminist policies. Never is it stated outright that the beneficiaries of pro-family policies are ultimately family men, in particular middle and upper class family men who can support financially their wives' unpaid domestic labour. What is never recognised is that wives are more likely to be in the labour force, and to be employed full-time, when their husbands are low paid workers (O'Loughlin and Cass 1984), an issue which might validly create concern about low pay, rather than concern about the supposed erosion of the traditional family.

The pro-family rhetoric has a moral cutting edge, according to Collins, because the claims of feminism articulate the rights of individual women, individual rights never quite having the same persuasive emotional power as "the collective good". The irony is, as Eisenstein (1982) points out, that the concept of individual citizenship rights is the ideological basis of Western liberal capitalism. The feminists' continuing claim to the same economic and social, as well as political rights as those of men is inherent in the demands for non-discriminatory employment and non-discriminatory pay, childcare provision and control of fertility. Does the New Right fear that the extension of liberal capitalist rights to women will erode the traditional family?

My fundamental point of departure from Collins is my dissatisfaction with the analogy of the "billiard game": the outcome of current family politics cannot be predicted, he claims. Both explanation and prediction would be stronger if political alliances were understood in relation to economic interests and their interconnections identified (as Weber certainly understood). Ultimately class politics and the politics of gender must be included in the analysis, not only the politics of contending elites and oppositional social movements.

Traditional/non-traditional family values. Who are the traditionalist? Who are the liberal progressives?

Helen Glezer's paper uses data from interviews with 293 married men and 495 married women (aged 18-34 years) living in metropolitan Australia (part of the Australian Family Formation Study 1981-82) to construct a scale which measures traditional and non-traditional attitudes to marriage and family. Following Macklin (1980), the traditional family is defined as the:

> legal, lifelong, sexually exclusive marriage between one man and one woman, with children, where the male is the primary provider and ultimate authority.

The scale is composed of items tapping attitudes to:

- the institution of marriage, expected to be valued by traditionalists much more highly than defacto cohabitation or remaining single; expected to involve life-long commitment, fidelity and child-rearing.
- submergence of individual interests within the interests of the family as a whole; turning to the family as the most important set of relationships.
- divorce, towards which traditionalists have little tolerance, particularly in relation to their own marriages.

- children, whom traditionalists believe should be born only within marriage, and brought up by two parents.

- sex-roles and the division of labour within marriage. The traditional position is that the husband remains the primary breadwinner, protector, and the source of ultimate authority. The wife may be employed only in the case of financial necessity but her ultimate obligation and fulfilment should lie in motherhood, and the husband's job should determine the residence of the family.

- conservatism in relation to child-rearing and general acceptance of traditional behaviour and beliefs.

The paper gives the results of regression analyses tracing the antecedents and correlates of traditional and non-traditional family attitudes. The respondents showed a less traditional attitude to marriage and family where their own family-of-origin was perceived as tense (as between parents and children); where their parents were perceived as encouraging independent and autonomous behaviour; where the family was English-speaking; where (in the case of women but not men) the father had a higher education. Older respondents were less traditional than younger, as were those without religious affiliation and low levels of religious observance. Respondents with higher levels of education and wives who were in the workforce showed less traditional attitudes, while those with a strong sense of power and control over their lives, and those who did not admit to ambition in their jobs also appeared to be less traditional.

Before pushing these findings further, three significant omissions from the list of family background variables and social status characteristics must be noted. All the respondents appear to have had only one parent, the father: no information is presented or analysed in respect of the mother's educational level, her labour force participation or her occupation. Given the literature on the importance of the mother in influencing the future educational and occupational paths of her daughters (Cass, Dawson, Temple, Winkler, Wills, 1983) it would seem necessary that such variables be discussed and investigated. A study of family attitudes which has nothing to say specifically about the mothers of respondents would appear incomplete.

In addition, the measurement of socio-economic status of respondents is based solely on the husband's occupation. Where the respondent is a woman who is, or who has been in the workforce, the socio-economic status of the couple appears, in this study, not to be affected in any way by her participation or her income. The possibility that the socio-economic status of the wife may not be congruent with that of her husband is not even raised (Cf Oakley, 19/4; Acker, 1973). The findings show that labour force participation is a significant correlate of a woman's non-traditional orientation, but it would be even more interesting to know the significance of part-time or full-time employment, her occupational status, the ratio of wife's income to husband's income. Such variables would provide some indication of the relative economic power of husbands and wives within their marriage, which may in fact be of considerable significance in influencing traditional or non-traditional family orientation. Furthermore, the presence of young children in the marriage is not identified or tested as a significant variable, even though Glezer notes that egalitarian sex-role practices are likely to become traditional when children are born (p.41).

I must express my disquiet about the construction of the scale, in which a number of different issues have been combined. These items may have statistical coherence, but do they cohere theoretically, and in the experience of husbands and wives? It would be quite possible, even highly likely, that liberal progressive attitudes to sex-roles in marriage are accompanied by a high level of commitment to marriage; indeed the quotations on pages 29-30 show that both traditionalists and liberals express views of marriage as a "haven in a heartless world". It may be that the construction of the scale precludes identification and discussion of the complexities of marriage and family attitudes, in which traditional orientation to the salience of the marriage relationship may coexist with liberal views on sex roles. It may even be that the liberal/traditional dichotomy is unhelpful in predicting sex-role orientation. Two quotations from this paper are sufficient to illustrate this point, and to show the complexity of responses:

> I think a woman's income should be a source of extra money.... a while back we were having a bit of a problem about finances, instead of my wife's earnings being the source of extra income it was a necessity, and then of course you get used to the money. Now she doesn't have to work but she wants to. God didn't say bloody women have got to work. There were a few years when she didn't work and that was great when I was coming home from work to find someone there (moderate male).
>
> Moderate?
>
> She misses work, working. She gets a bit bored at times staying home and that. I reckon she misses her work and having a life of her own. She's tied down more than me (traditional male).
>
> Traditional?

The author is critical of her own methodology, taking up the argument that the categorisation of individuals on the traditional/non-traditional dichotomy may be too simplistic and foster an undesirable and unrealistic polarity, and the concept of a continuum may be more helpful in locating family values (p46). I would go further to sugget that neither a dichotomy nor a continuum does justice to the coexistent contradictions of traditional and liberal orientations to different aspects of marriage and family life. It may be that only actual practices provide an indication of family values.

Traditional or liberal orientation to Sex-Roles: the disparity between Rhetoric and Practice

The general conclusion of the paper is that the notion of domestic role sharing is accepted but the gap between attitudes and behaviour is often great. When both husband and wife are in the work force prior to having children, couples share domestic responsibilities, but on the birth of children when the husband becomes the sole breadwinner, traditional practices reappear. At the same time however, 77% of men but only 54% of women agreed that "you should put the interests of your spouse and children above yor own". Corresponding figures for 1975 show a shift in the views of young women towards self-assertion, towards decreasing acceptance of the traditional submergence of wives' interests and needs. The author attributes this shift to the influence of the women's movement and expanded educational and occupational opportunities for women. She accepts without scepticism that the findings suggest that "men are becoming more family centred and women are asserting their own personal individual needs versus the traditional woman's role" (p43).

How can this be reconciled with the previous conclusion that while sex-role attitudes may be changing, men's domestic participation has hardly begun to challenge women's monopoly of childcare and housework? Perhaps men have acquired the appropriate rhetoric of family-centred values and more women are expressing the view that marriage and motherhood should not entail the submergence of women's individual interests. But these verbal acknowledgements tell us very little about the actual division of unpaid work.

Class, Gender and Family Values

If a class analysis and a gender analysis are applied to the findings of this paper the following very important issues emerge:

- working class husbands and wives, in particular those of non-English speaking backgound, and in particular wives who are not employed, who have fewer educational and occupational resources than their middle class counterparts, and less sense of power and control over their lives, express traditional views on the importance of marriage, family and the sex-based division of labour in their lives.

It makes perfectly good sense for them to express such an orientation: why not cling to islands of certainty and emotional security in the midst of an economic recession of 10 years duration? As Berger and Kellner (1964) noted twenty years ago: marriage may provide the major source of personal reality and identity particularly for individuals who are marginal to economic and political arenas over which they have little, if any, control. But the pity of it is, as a host of feminist writers have observed in the post-war period, men appear to gain more from marriage then do women, because of the persistence of the division of labour in domestic life and men's greater access to the rewards of paid work.

The respondents to the Australian Family Formation Study appear to be telling students of the family that traditional marriage and family values are retained by people with few chances to acquire control in other arenas, that middle class men and women with higher education qualifications (and where the women are employed) can question some aspects of traditional family values precisely because they have the resources to fashion other sources of identity, satisfaction and control. Furthermore, traditionalists and liberal progessives are both in the minority: it is the large category in the middle ground, the "moderates", who constitute the majority.

The significant issue then is the extent to which the interests of the "middle ground" may be mobilised by traditional or liberal progressive arguments in the current politics of the family. What does this study reveal about the changes most likely to affect moderate opinion?

(1) Women are less traditional than men in areas which have the effect of increasing their autonomy and equality, consistent with changes in workforce participation and the ideas of the women's movement.

(2) Women are more traditional than men in areas which affect their emotional and economic security.

(3) There is greater readiness on the part of men to condone women sharing breadwinning responsibilities, but less readiness by men to share domestic responsibilities.

(4) Overall - there is strong support for marriage as developing maturity, responsibility and commitment.

This is hardly a recipe for the collapse of marriage and family commitments, it is much more likely to represent a set of social changes in which liberal progressive views win some of the middle ground and the interdependence and reciprocity of men and women in intimate relationships takes over incrementally from the profoundly damaging inequalities associated with the traditional breadwinner/dependant relationship. But in the climate of economic insecurity which confronts working class families in a recession, the vocal protagonists of traditional values are likely to win more adherents.

Liberal progessives in the arena of family politics might have to forge alliances with the minority of neo-Keynesian expansionists in the arena of economic policies if they are to see the establishment of the material conditions for male/female reciprocity and egalitarianism.

The Question of Men's Participation in the Family

Robert Lewis's paper begins by asking: why should men support marriage and the family? He takes as his point of departure the recent work of Barbara Ehrenreich (The Hearts of Men, American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment (1983) and argues that the rise of the feminist movement has challenged the unquestioned dominance of men in marriage, and the increase in wives' labour force participation has eroded the male breadwinner ethic. Men lose status and the devoted care of wives when they are no longer the sole breadwinner. Lewis claims that the family is an intrinsically unstable institution since it rests on the "volition of individual men", whose breadwinning power and continuing goodwill are essential if marriage and the family are to survive.

In the first instance, it is marriage not the family which is at stake if men's volition falters, since there is ample evidence in the advanced industrial world of families constituted by women and their children (as Lewis's paper goes on to note). Secondly, Lewis attributes men's possible flight from commitment to a backlash to the women's movement, the flight from "liberated women creating men who are impotent, anxious instead of secure, who must do their own laundry" (p.1). The thesis of Ehrenreich's book however is that the collapse of the male breadwinner ethic in North America predated the revival of feminism in the mid 1960s and was based on a deep-seated revolt against the social and economic regulation of middle class masculine identity.

What neither Lewis nor Ehrenreich point out is that male commitment to marriage and family requires an economic base : it was and continues to be the poor who have the least resources to earn the "family wage", or to earn sufficiently to maintain the role of principal breadwinner. Lewis's paper like Ehrenreich's book has no sense of social class differentiation and inequalities; we hear only of the ideas and values of men, and nothing of the economic resources available to them to implement their ideas.

Men's evaluations of marriage and family are placed by Lewis into three possible categories:

(1) Men value marriage and family highly because they are provided with considerable emotional and physical advantages, the best indicators of which are the data on married men's sound mental and physical health in comparison with single, divorced and widowed men (Bernard, 1972).

(2) Men do not value marriage and family highly because they derive little benefit from it. Following Liljestrom (Carlsson, 1983), Lewis puts forward the hypothesis that the dominant family type is becoming the mother-child dyad,

with impermanently attached males - a projection based on trends in the Caribbean, Latin America and parts of Scandinavia. The further point is not made that evidence from Central America, the Caribbean and from family studies in the advanced industrial countries show that even where the prevalence of mother-headed families is high, formal marriage and two-parent families remain the socially dominant family form (Cass, 1977). Class inequalities affect the differential resources available to men and women in their intimate lives, and are at issue here.

By taking the ideas of Ehrenreich and Liljestrom on men's flight from commitment and women's self sufficiency and attributing these processes to feminist developments, Lewis is conflating the gender relations typical of poverty (where choices are limited) with the rhetoric of middle class choices: men's to remove themselves from commitment, women to provide for their children alone. It is highly likely that what appears to be a unified development in family change - the increased prevalence of divorce, cohabitation and single parent families may have different antecedents in different class locations, a very important issue which cannot be left unexplored.

(3) Some men are receiving more from marriage and family life currently than in the past several decades. On the basis of his own research lewis concludes that certain men, of all ages are "finding more fulfilment in the nurturing of

> their own children, wives and others" (p.4). Research on new fathers shows that they make good care-givers; young babies don't discriminate between father and mother; when fathers spend "quality time" with their babies the infants benefit significantly.

Lewis concludes that the demographic data on the continuing popularity of marriage and remarriage indicate that most men receive enough from marriage and family to marry at least once, even twice, having one, or even two sets of children. A minority may be receiving little from marriage, another minority participating more in nurturance. But the interesting questions for the purposes of this discussion are not posed in this paper. The paucity of data delay their answer, but it is essential to ask the questions in the first instance.

Firstly; what are the socio-economic determinants of men's participation in nurturance?

Secondly; what is the extent of men's participation in nurturance? Are they employed full-time, part-time, outside of the labour force? Are the men sharing the care of pre-school children? What does "quality time " mean in men's nurturance: the exuberant half-hour before bed-time? If men's greater participation in nurturance is to be seen as a movement towards egalitarian sharing of childcare and household tasks, then such questions must be addressed.

While giving some data on men's increasing involvement with children in certain parts of the United States since the 1920's, the paper does not actually summarise the findings related to the substance of men's domestic participation. Instead, some tid-bits of information are provided which are said to show that:

> "More and more men in the United States are experimenting with as well as seriously playing roles day to day which a few decades ago only females would have played" (p. 12)

The vocabulary of "role-play" serves to trivialise and remove the significance of such developments in gender relations and parent/child relationships. The literature on family and gender in the United Kingdom, Australia and in the United States has long criticised and in some instances abandoned role theory, and in particular "playing roles" as a fruitful mode of theoretical analysis (Connell, 1979; Eisenstein, 1983). Of much greater explanatory power in this field of inquiry are theories of the sex-based division of labour, the distribution of unpaid domestic work, the social construction of motherhood, the relationship between childcare responsibilities and both parents' labour force participation (Chodorow, 1978; Hartmann 1981; Cass, 1978; Bryson, 1984).

In understanding the determinants of men's participation in nurturance it is necessary to know the place of the family in the income distribution; the opportunities for men's and women's labour force participation; the wages which they can each command; the availability of childcare; the combinations of paid and unpaid work which men and women negotiate in their families. While men are "playing roles which a few decades ago only females would have played", where are the women? Playing roles of breadwinner, playing roles in politics, playing roles in scholarship?

The data presented by Lewis on male and female differences in attitudes to egalitarian marriage show almost 70% of young women but only 49% of young men professing a preference for an egalitarian marriage. Expressed preference for an egalitarian marriage bears little relationship to actual family practices, particularly when children are born, as Helen Glezer's paper states. Even so, Lewis is right to be concerned that a significant proportion of young women may be doomed to have their expectations remain unfulfilled. Such an observation might have lead to the conclusion that changes in men's participation in domestic life is a matter not of role play but of gender politics.

Lewis points out some of the reported problems associated with egalitarian marriages. Some men believe that they have achieved less success at work compared with more traditional men whose wives do not work outside the home, and the most troubled group are egalitarian childless husbands who do not have the compensations of nurturance. Some men report that the dual roles of job and family are reducing the time available for their male friends. Some men are even suffering from the "super-dad" syndrome!

Do we conclude that women's gain is men's loss - that not only are roles being played but a zero-sum game as well? If we move away from the constricting confines of role theory we can ask interesting questions like:

- under what economic and political conditions may egalitarian gender and parenting relationships be constructed?
- under what social class circumstances?
- What are the educational qualifications, occupations, hours of paid work and incomes of men and women who share domestic and childcare responsibilities?
- What are the gains for women and children, and the gains for men of egalitarian gender relationships and men's domestic participation?
- On whose side of the family politics contest are intending and current egalitarians situated?

Will the policies of the pro-family New Right or of feminists assist them to realise their egalitarian objectives?

Conclusion

It is clear that explanations based on individual volition cannot answer these questions, cannot even frame them; that explanations based on a theory of moral politics can usefully comprehend the political contest over the regulation of the gender distribution of paid and unpaid work and its rewards, (which is, ultimately what family politics is about), but that class issues and the politics of gender relations must also have autonomous places in the analysis. Further, studies of family attitudes, located in a class context, may help to identify the field of interests in which public and private politics operate. Ultimately, however, investigations of actual family practices and of the politics of social movements concerned either with further entrenchment of the breadwinner/dependant relationship or with emancipation of gender relations will provide the most fruitful indication of family changes.

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Discussion of Helen Glezer's Antecedents of Correlates of Marriage and Family Attitudes in Young Australian Men and Women.

by T. E. Lasswell

Ms. Glezer is to be congratulated on her empirical investigation of an area in which so many prophets, reformers, and activists speak with sonorous authority of doom, heresy, and revolution! She has, in effect, validated the model of cultural variability in Australian society, at least as far as values and norms related to marriage are concerned. There is promise, too, in the Australian Family Formation Study, of the possibility of observing the extent of value-behavior discrepancies and congruencies and their effects in that large-scale longitudinal study.

The impressive percentages of the variance in stated family values that are accounted for by stratification variables supports a more general theme in stratification research findings over the past few decades--that upward mobility aspirations are positively related to adherence to traditional opinions about values. Whether behavior is congruous with these values is not so clearly established; for example, even though there is an inverse relationship of social class and the percentage of persons agreeing with the statement "marriage is for life," the divorce rate may indeed be higher for the lower classes, as it is in the United States.

Glezer's three objectives (p. 84) are commendable and sociologically important. The first--to develop a scale distinguishing between traditional and non-traditional family values--appears to be met competently, well designed, well analyzed, and satisfactorily validated.

Glezer's second objective, to contrast the population who share non-traditional values with those who share traditional values is also well worked out. Her findings are congruous with and supportive of both social psychological and stratification theories that have been developing over the past four decades. I believe that we are on the brink of new and exciting understandings about the nature of cultural variability, and Glezer's findings strengthen this belief.

The association of values (and therefore probably also sentiments) with stratification variables is consonant with the concept of social class microcultures (using Leighton's definition of culture). It would be expected, then, that as persons perceive their social statuses as threatened or insecure in a given social system, they would either reject the system or affirm the values of the system as they perceive them. Thus migrants and persons with upward occupational mobility would be expected to express traditional social values when interviewed.

The third objective of Glezer's research--to examine the family values of young married Australians has also been done well, but there are some issues about the population being studied that may be worth examining. Unfortunately, I do not have at hand the current vital statistics or demographic data on Australia necessary to analyze the situation precisely, but if it is at all comparable to the figures on dissolution in the United States, a cross-section of the currently married persons aged 18-34 years would be somewhat different from the population of ever-marrieds between those same ages.

Half of all the women who ever get divorced in the United States do so before they are 27 years old; 2/3 before they are 30. I suspect that the situation in Australia is not grossly different. If that is true, then the population aged 18-34 will contain a number of persons who have been married but who are not currently married. Thus, the more stable marriages are probably overrepresented in the opinion survey reported. The sample was selected from couples living in private dwellings, so this effect was probably intensified. There is reason to suspect that their family values may differ to some degree from those who are not currently married; at least it is risky to assume that they are identical.

If it should be the case that persons with traditional values are more likely to be divorced as age increases (and hence less likely to be in a "currently married," population), that might account in part for the finding that the younger "young marrieds" are more traditional in their reported values. Still another alternative hypothesis is that the more traditional position may be characteristic of "youthful idealism."

It is important to remember that Glezer's study is essentially an opinion survey and not an observation of behaviors. She apparently has called attention to this in reporting that opinions about the division of domestic duties are not congruous with actual behaviors in an earlier study. Incongruities between opinions and behaviors are found in abundance in family studies; the application of one to the other does not always appear to be logical. It is difficult to reconcile the assertion (on page 1 of Glezer's manuscript) that the increased participation of married women in the workforce makes women less economically dependent on marriage with the American census report that the women with the highest personal incomes receive the most spousal support upon dissolution of their marriages--suggesting that at least the courts believe that they are still dependent on their ex-husbands, regardless of their participation in the workforce.

This is not to devalue opinion research, and certainly not to minimize the importance of Ms. Glezer's research. She is to be congratulated on a substantial contribution to family studies.

DISCUSSANT PAPERS

SESSION 2

Theme: Major demographic trends affecting family policy

- Orjan Hultaker comments on Thornton and McDonald
- Wei Zhangling comments on McDonald

COMMENTS ON DR. PETER MCDONALD'S PAPER "IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILIES OF THIRD WORLD FERTILITY TRENDS."

Wei Zhangling

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

In general, this paper has aroused my interest. That's because, it has summarized some implications for families of third world fertility trends, it has raised some questions for further discussion, and besides, as a Chinese sociologist, I am very interested with what the author has said about China.

At the beginning Dr. Peter Mcdonald has put forward a key problem saying that "Most of the world's developing countries particularly those with large populations have had active central government policies to curb the rate of population growth." I think this is an very important factor to influence the third world fertility trends. And from this, a lot of changes have occurred in the families of the third world in order to accord with the changing government policies.

In the developing countries, just as Dr. peter Mcdonald said, individual couples are not free to make their own decisions about child-bearing as portrayed in the government posters. In China the Constitution and the Marriage Law stipulate that both the husband and wife in a family must take family planning into practice. The Chinese governments in varied levels have been providing benefits as well as punishing measures to different families according to their performance in the birth control programs. At the same time,the spiritual pressure of the society is very powerful, and the consistent propaganda of all institutions uses its influence on individuals as to push forward the policies. under the prevailing circumstances, "fertility decline to the level of the two-or-one-child family implied the rise to dominance of the nation-state and a labour market economy."

In "Concluding Remark" of the paper, Dr. Mcdonald said: "low family size implies the Westernization of family structure, values and relationships." I think this conclusion should be discussed further. So far as I am concerned, from the very beginning up to now the human families whether in West or East, North or South have had similarities as well as differences in structure, values and relationships. At present the general natural tendency from large sized families to small ones, from extended families to nuclear ones is a world-wide tendency. And the government family planning programs of the third world could only do a contribution to speed up this process. As regards to family values, if we compare China with the United States, the fundamental ideas on family are quite different. For thousands of years Chinese philosophers and authorities have mainly advocated for collectivism instead of individualism, but in the United States, for three hundred years, American philosophers and authorities have mainly advocated for individualism instead of collectivism. And I think this difference between the two society and family values will exist in a long period.

The other viewpoint I want to emphasize is, in spite of some negative effects of the family planning programs in the developing countries on families and individuals, among the positive effects, the women's liberation movement will certainly benefit from the family planning programs and low family size. And this is also a world-wide tendency not in the sense of Westernization or Easternization but out of its own accord.

Thank you.

A Comment on Arland Thornton's paper "Modernization and Family Change" and Peter McDonald's paper "Implications for Families of Third World Fertility Trends"

Many scholars have studied the impact of social macro change on family life, and, as Arland Thornton says, the influence has become the accepted wisdom of the general public even though research has shown the popular views to be misleading or simplistic at best. Many people have attitudes and opinions about the modal family type of their times, not to mention their assessment of the behaviour of contemporary youth; it is easy to blame or praise modernization for the present situation.

The two papers of this afternoon both address the impact of modernization on family structure and family relationships. Peter McDonnald starts with the population policies and describes the impact of a decline of fertility for family living. The lesson to be learnt is that the population policy and the macro structure must be in agreement with the family structure and functioning. A mismatch leads to a failure of the polulation policy or a to change in the family structure and functioning, in particular in the economic functioning of the families. It seems as if the acceptance of the few children policy must lead to the Westernization of marriage and the family. Arland Thornton analyses the process of modernization, its consequences for family structure and relationships. I shall devote most of my time to the methodology for the study of macro-changes, which as also discussed in the introduction of Arland Thornton's paper.

It is necessary first to describe the change occurring on the level of society-at-large before an analysis can be made of the specific processes by means of which the social change affects the family structure and family relationships. Traditional societies are not static and they are not uniform, but they change and are all different because of environment, tradition, etc. The same is true of modern societies, Australia is not like the U.S.A. which is different from Sweden. An important lesson of the Thornton paper is that the process of modernization cannot be analyzed in terms of cross-sectional differences between currently developping and developped countries. Such cross-sectional comparisons cannot differentiate between modernization and other change processes, nor do they take into account the differences that existed prior to modernization. Instead, the better methodology is to study the process of change happening in a developping society, but even that is not enough; the process of change must be compared between societies if we want to learn what is common to modernization and what is particular to a specific society. Arland Thornton compares the modernization in Taiwan with that in western Europe and the U.S.A. Also Peter McDonald uses this strategy--to compare changes occurring in several developping countries--and he compares the potential outcomes of family policy with the family structure in modern Europe and America.

Arland Thornton defines "modernization" as the complex process of industrialization, urbanization, demographic change and long term economic growth. These processes are interrelated and partly simultanoeus although the overall process of modernization does not always start with the same kind of change. It certainly makes a difference whether the economic growth takes place already at the start of modernization or if people have to wait for the growth till later periods.

It is somewhat difficult to compare modernization presently occurring in the twentieth century with that of the eighteenth century. Not even the concept of "modern society" is the same but it has changed all through the history since the enlightment and the start of the industrial revolution. There are important differences between mechanics and electronics, between the steam engine and the nuclear power plant, between the spinning of wool with spinning jenny and the assembly line for chips, to sell products on a local market and to produce for an integrated world market. Modern society is not the same today as it was a century ago, and it is necessary to be fairly specific about the concept of modernization not to include all possible forms of social change.

Arland Thornton identifies four dimensions of the modernization process which are of importance to changes in family structure and family relationships (intergenerational relationships, the involvement of children in the family economy and entrance into marriage). The forces dimensions of modernization are:

- shifts in the structure of production,
- expansion of education,
- increase in income, and
- urbanization.

Nevertheless, these forces have not remained unchanged since the start of the industrial revolution, but in particular the educational institutions and the structure of modern production have changed enormously. Furthermore, the sequence of their appearance in the process of modernization has not remained the same. The sons and the daughters of the nineteenth century farmers left agriculture and went to work in the factories of the big cities without much education, and they did not earn enough money to buy the products of a non existing affluent society. The situation is different for many of the youth taking part in the modernization process of today. They often have received both education and training and they earn an income used to buy many of the new items in the market places.

There is a tendency in modern sociology to search for unidimensional variables, i.e., to prefer concepts which only include one single aspect of a phenomenon. An example is to define modernization in terms of unidimensional concepts like expansion of education or growth of income, which are analyzed one at a time. This is Arland Thornton's strategy.

The fathers of sociology often used another kind of concept; they did not always look for unidimensional concepts, but they were more interested in the cluster of traits. Examples are capitalism, feudalism, bureaucracy and various forms of modernization. Such cluster concepts are also common in medicin where a desease is often defined as the combination of a number of traits; syndroms.

Modernization is probably best defined as a syndrom with a particular cluster of traits which together delineate the process as a simultaneous occurrence of shifts in the structure of production, expansion of education, urbanization, etc. Such a definition, however, will result in more than one process of modernization.

This must be the case since the traditional societies were very different from each other and, thus, they did not need the same process of change. Moreover, "In many instances the traditional forms of behavior (and family life) are very consistent with the changing environment, and there is little need or pressure to modify them." (p. 156). It might even be the case that modernization can get started exactly because the changes are not in conflict with prevalent forms of behaviour (family life).

Peter McDonald devotes his analysis to an evaluation of one of the macro changes of modernization: the population policy of developing countries.

His analysis, however, is consistent with the framework outlined in this coment since he does not only look at the implementation of the population policy; i.e., how families respond to the population policy by accepting or rejecting the policy. He also looks at the implications when families accept to have fewer children. An acceptance of the family policy is said to affect the individual families, their structur, the family relationships and the functioning of the family. Moreover, families with few children are more dependent on the sex of their children and by their success in life, and the population policy can affect the status hierarchy of the society. Peter McDonald explains many of the consequences following from a population policy not only for the families but also for the society-at-large. The population policy must be in agreement with many of additional traits which are part of the syndrom called modernization. Thus, starting with population policy, Peter McDonald arrives at some necessary relationships , correlations, between the traits which constitute the syndrom modernization. Moreover, he points to the ideological bias of population policies and modernization by showing the good match between the family structure with few children and the social organization of the West.

It is a difficult task to make comparisons between early and later modernization, and I believe that Arland Thornton makes a good point by stressing the differences both in outcome and (to a lesser extent) in processes. Arland Thornton finds an important ground for some of the differences in the fact that young people in the West were fairly independent from their parents also prior to modernization which was not the case in China. I think, however, that it was not so much a matter of autonomy for the young even in the West, but it was more a difference in the locus of control. As it is said by Arland Thornton, many young people in the West left their parents to work for other people who also accepted the responsibility for the youth living with them.

Arland Thornton discusses the issue of freedom and autonomy in various parts of the paper, for instance in relation to wage employment. Peter McDonald writes about the increased dependence of families who have to adjust to the changing family policies of their country. These are interesting aspects of the modernization process, and I would have like to see a more systematic analysis of that concept, in particular a discussion of the independence and power of the young compared to that of their parents in a modern society with a growing public sector (including education).

My last comment is about the consequences of a current modernization process compared to its end results. The two papers by Arland Thornton and Peter McDonald analyzes both kinds of change without making very much of the difference. My point is that the process of modernization may have some short-term consequenes for family life that will not last more than during a few years. An example of such an effect is given by Arland Thornton (p.164), "The superior levels of education and access to new ideas among children probably increase the ability and the wilingness of the children to challenge the authority of their parents and cause hesitancy on the part of parents to enforce their rights." This is not because of the new ideas learnt through formal education, but the challenge and the hesitancy are the result of differences in level of education between parents and their children. This reason for a challenge will disappeare in the folowing generation when parents and children once more are equally well educated. Also Peter McDonald writes about the short-term effects of education.

Social stratification seems to be the crucial mechanism. Most economic changes (among which is modernization) affect the stratification in society, and the changes in stratification, in turn, affect family structure and family relationships. The changes in stratification have a direct impact on many families because modernization changes their relative position on the social ladder. More important, however, the change in the system of stratification modifies the impact of the other forces at work during the process of modernization. The status of children is improved relative to that of their parents when education is expanded, but such a relative advante will only last for one generation or a few.

Another example is the suprior opportunities in the labour market for young adults with good education. There is a tendency that the young people with the better education will also get the most attractive jobs. This is not, however, an outcome of their absolute educational achievement but depends on their relative level of education. The situation is different when the level of education does no longer depend on age; many young people with long compulsary schooling can witness this fact.

Thus, modernization brings two kinds of impact, one kind which only occurs and lasts during the period of modernization, and another one which is the end result of the process. Changes in the social stratification are among the mechanisms that can explain the differential impact.

DISCUSSANT PAPERS

SESSION 4 — IUFO SESSION

Theme: The administration of family policy: worldwide trends

- Adam Graycar comments on Presvelou
- Gordon Streib comments on Cliche

The results from the world survey of family policy guidelines and the other material we have just heard, demonstrate powerfully and unequivocally that family policy is, above all, a political construct. Like all political constructs it draws its meaning from ideological imperatives and from the overall polity within which it is conceived, protected, delivered and nurtured. The political dimension can be seen from two perspectives, an ideological and a structural perspective. While these may seem quite separate they are in fact inter-related and interdependent.

Structural questions come about and are highlighted in the extent to which family policy is given recognition in national constitutions, in formal governmental arrangements, and in formal representational milieux. These items have been discussed in the world survey, and what struck me as worthy of further analysis was a study of the methods by which such issues are planted into political structures. It is of great interest to note that there are numerous organizations that are part of the politics of family policy. The International Union of Family Organizations is one peak body representing many interested and active organizations. What we are talking about are pressure groups, and one might try to fit the articulation of interests which come under the rubric "family policy" into a broader understanding of pressure group activity.

All governments are the focus of claims and demands, and pressure groups are those that make claims, on an organized basis, either directly or indirectly so as to influence the making or administering of public policy. They stop short of wanting to exercise the formal powers of government, and when we do see, from time to time, people elected to legislatures on single issue platforms it is as an irritant rather than as potential governors that they make their mark. (There are, in the NSW legislature two members whose main platform is to prevent the erosion of "family values"). Getting back to pressure groups, however, two types can be distinguished, those that have been called sectional associations, and promotional associations.

Sectional associations basically attempt to speak for their sections of society - to defend direct and specific interests, and thus we find numerous organizations representing particular groups of or within business, agriculture, labour; there are groups of aborigines, miners, war veterans, professionals, immigrants, and on and on. Usually the interests are very specific, and in general one might expect family policy organizations to fit in here. Commonly, they fit into the second category - that of promotional associations. Promotional associations seek to promote a cause by appealing, not to a section or a specific group, but to everybody. Organizations which promote causes such as nuclear disarmament, sexual liberation, environmental issues and, I would argue, family policy, fit in here.

Seldom do organizations which promote family policy consist primarily of people who are in the early family formation stages. They consist of people who have views about desirable family patterns and behaviours. Furthermore numerous studies in the political science literature show that organizational membership (with the exception of trade unions) is heavily concentrated in middle and upper income strata. We have a paradoxical situation of promotion of policies by people who are not likely to be direct beneficiaries. It is not for me to speculate on what drives such people or fuels such activity, but it is very obvious that promotional activity has a strong ideological and political component. It is important then to see family policy in its broader context.

Family policy, which has roughly been described by Sheila Kamerman as what the state does by action or inaction to affect people in their roles as family members or to influence the future of the family as an institution, has, in the last half century gone through a number of stages. In the 1930s and 1940s in Europe - and in France and Sweden in particular - there was an emphasis on population replacement and population growth, with government intervention to make such population growth financially bearable for families. The main strategy was on economic intervention and wage supplementation of families with children. During the 1960s the focus, again in Europe, was on income redistribution from those with no children to those with children. Here the taxation system was used as an important tool, and in addition to tax policies there was a growth in social services for families. In the

1970s the focus was on policies responding to changes in family structure as single parenthood, increasing female labour force participation, declining fertility, declining mortality, high population mobility, dual labour markets, etc., all became part of the changing and challenging policy mosaic. At the same time the proportion of households containing a "traditional family" that is a married couple with dependent children in which the wife stays at home and the husband goes to work declined, in Australia for instance, to 17 per cent of households. As you are all aware this would be a very narrow target for policy intervention.

Whatever the structure of families, family policy is about dependency - ideally about limiting dependency, but often about rearranging dependency. Those most obviously dependent in our society are children and elderly people. Public efforts devoted to the needs of very young and very old people are often justified on the grounds that much of the activity is intended to strengthen family life as it is to protect dependent individuals. The main tools to be used include a variety of fiscal tools. Interventions of these types are invariably costly, and we have seen, in recent years a questioning of expenditure patterns and a questioning of patterns of family responsibility - in other words a reappraisal of how we identify and deal with dependency, and how we orient our social policy to handle the issues.

While social policy in the 1960s and part of the 1970s was concerned with seeking initiatives to redress inequalities, and while it was successful in the diversion of considerable sums into welfare coffers, the magnitude of the task was so great that successes were not always clear and apparent. Then, before the welfare task was firmly and legitimately entrenched, a neo-conservative counter-attack was successfully launched.

By the 1980s social policy, which had been on the offensive in earlier decades was clearly on the defensive - responding to changing fortunes rather than trying to shape social futures; working out how best to pick up pieces, rather than developing comprehensive preventive mechanisms. If social policy is to succeed, in the 1980s, as a relevant, credible and humane activity it must provide a theoretical and empirical basis for social intervention, and interventionist activities must be geared to three things: the creation of a social and economic environment which is conducive to redistribution and which provides substantial investment in human capital, and public goods and services; an equitable income support system; a set of personal social services.

In order to create the necessary environment and the appropriate outputs three main actors: governments; voluntary agencies; and families and informal support systems each play significant roles. These actors are able to generate three types of outputs : tangible resources; effective services; and close companionship. It is the combination of these three things - tangible resources, effective services, and close companionship - to which our welfare futures must increasingly be geared. Very crudely, the first is best delivered by government because only government really has the resources to meet the income maintenance needs evident in modern societies. The second comes largely through non-government welfare organizations (NGWOs). The third, companionship, and family support cannot be delivered bureaucratically and analysis here gets us into the realm of informal services, family care systems, informal supports, and all the things that come with kinship and friendship networks.

Each of these three, governments, NGWOs and families are under great pressure and one operationally heuristic tool might be to examine issues of capacity and willingness of the various major actors and delivery systems.

Government is not going to be able to meet all of the demands from the community or even deal with all of the legitimate claims placed on it. But government will have a central role, and for government to operate authoritatively, it must have extractive, regulative and distributive capabilities, as well as be responsive to community interests. It must be able to extract the best skills its citizens can offer, and also be able to extract taxation on an equitable and efficient basis. It must also be able to regulate in areas that affect quality of life and levels of living and it must be able to distribute and redistribute life chances. Some people say these things are too much for government in the sort of societies we live in, but these are the key elements in ensuring the well being not only of families, but of everybody in the community.

I am not going to talk about the second part of the triangle, NGWOs. In our research centre we have published several research reports documenting their strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities as they relate both to governments, and to families.

Informal support is basically the purview of families, and due to demographic and labour force changes, as well as changing socio-cultural expectations and relationships the family is under a great deal of pressure. Politicians who stress the virtues of family care are either unaware of the costs to families of providing that care or are cynically expecting a major shift in social provision and social resources, with the result that those least able to provide adequately will find greater burdens thrust upon them. For a whole host of reasons we cannot formulate care policies particularly for elderly and disabled people on the expectation of the unpaid labour of women. Furthermore we must always remember that not all people have a caring social network which they can call upon if necessary, nor are people always happy to intervene informally in the difficulties of others.

In most industrial societies we are faced with an explosion of care and we can see the traditional care providing organizations all facing different sorts of pressures. What is very obvious is that no one sector alone can provide all that has to be provided. Certainly not government - certainly not voluntary agencies - certainly not families. Different needs are met by different support systems.

In the Social Welfare Research Centre we have done extensive research on the capacities of the three care providing systems and have developed substantial data sources. Government's capacity is determined by its willingness, and in Australia the key lies in reform of the taxation system. From recent experience it can be argued that the tax system has the capacity, but not the willingness. Families have the willingness but not the capacity to provide the care and support that is required, and although the bulk of care which is provided does come through the family, policy makers must ensure that boundaries of capacity are carefully understood and that unrealistic expectations do not become the norm.

The 1980s and beyond will probably see more unequal societies with more people excluded from what we see as the mainstream of modern affluent industrial life. The arguments about present and future performance of the welfare state are arguments about claims on the system, about social, political and economic claims - and about the legitimacy of those claims. With a declining economic surplus and even greater competition for resources, with high unemployment with technological change and uncertain work futures, we are in a claim crisis.

To argue then that it is appropriate to make more claims on the family is not a helpful way through the claim crisis. If we think of governments, NGWOs, and families as in some sort of capacity hierarchy, we can argue that willingness is inversely related to capacity, and that as one moves down the hierarchy the operator in question is less and less able to deflect or reject the claims made. Government with its eligibility requirements can quite dispassionately send claims which it cannot meet onto NGWOs and families. NGWOs likewise can draw lines and pass the excess onto families. Families are the providers both of first and last resort - as our research shows, a repository of willingness, but often lacking in capacity.

From their cross national research data Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kamerman have concluded that in those countries with explicit family policies families with children are generally better off financially than comparable families, in countries in which explicit family policies have not been developed. By analysing income maintenance and taxation systems cross nationally Kahn and Kamerman show that explicit support through the tax transfer system benefits families. One could take this a step further and argue that countries that support horizontal and vertical equity in their tax transfer systems and which have comprehensive social service systems are those which have made an overall social policy commitment. Consequently explicit family policy is a corollary of comprehensive social policy, rather than something seen in isolation. What we ought to be aiming at, I would argue, is thoughtful and humane social policy for all the people in our society, and in that way those in families and those without family supports will have their legitimate claims processed.

If one were to argue that successful social policy is oriented to the minimisation of dependency and the redistribution of life chances, then placing increasing emphasis on family policy is exclusionary rather than inclusionary. What we should be aiming for is a redistributive, protective social infrastructure. We can so easily get ourselves bogged down in defining what a family consists of and the resultant debate could well obscure the objective. What we need are good and broad ranging health policies, income support policies, taxation policies, child care policies, aged care policies and comprehensive social service supports.

Perhaps then, in times of dramatic social change, of changing population structure, of economic re-orientation we might see less of an emphasis on promotional pressure group activity exclusively, and a shift to a combination of promotional activity and sectional activity, so that specific dependent groups can have their claims articulated while at the same time, but not to the exclusion of sectional interests, broad principles of equity and social justice can be promoted.

COMMENT ON PAPER

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Prepared for

XXth International Seminar

SOCIAL CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES

Melbourne, Australia

19-24 August, 1984

Discussion of "Quebec's Family Policy:
Social Policy or Demographic Policy?", by Pierre Cliche

One new and impressive feature of the Cliche paper is the central role he gives to the needs of the family in government planning. Government agencies in the U.S.A. that have programs relating to families do not explicitly state that the family is a partner in the process of social development. I sense both idealism and optimism on the part of the planners and policy makers in Quebec. I hope that it will be possible for professionals in the family studies field to follow the development of the policy paper as it is implemented in action. Public participation in policy-making is an ambitious undertaking. However, one consequence may be the raising of expectations to a high degree so that people will expect more than can be delivered.

The central question asked by the author is how the family policy relates to demographic policy. The author makes clear that the family is the centerpiece and its effect on demography--particularly the birthrate--will be watched carefully. But the promotion of quality family life will be the primary objective, and it is expected that the family programs which result will provide a favorable climate for supporting and rearing children. I question whether this might occur unless the family programs (not policies) have very persuasive--indeed powerful--economic incentives built into them. The world-wide trend generally has been that affluence or a higher standard of living results in a lowered birth rate and smaller families. Perhaps Quebec can make some reversal in this trend.

Let me comment on a few other parts of the paper that I found interesting and provocative. There is a strong emphasis on preventive programs to detect sickness, deficiencies, and psycho-social difficulties. Here again, I heartily endorse the idea of trying to prevent family problems, but the harsh reality is that many policy makers in legislative bodies, at least in the U.S.A., are often crisis-oriented: they concentrate on correction of problems, but do not worry too much about prevention. Social workers and social administrators, sociologists, and others have been writing for perhaps a century that the efficient, humane, and cost-effective way to deal with psycho-social and bio-social problems is to try to locate the major causes and prevent the outbreak of the disease or deficiencey. In the public health field, prevention by inoculation and testing has been proven highly effective. In the psycho-social areas, prevention has been rarely attempted. The two major reasons, in my opinion, are first, the knowledge base is incomplete and problematical. In the social sciences, we can only speak in general terms and about probabilities and there is no vaccine for delinquency as there is for polio. Second, there is the factor that preventive measures in the social field are costly to implement, and the outcomes are sometimes ambiguous. Cause and effect are not clear-cut.

Let me stress again that I think the Quebec Social Development Group is to be commended for the emphasis on prevention. Turning briefly to the end of the discussion, which deals with crises in the family, I would like to comment on the emphasis in the paper on home care and home services. Home care is crisis-oriented. It is not preventive. Mr. Cliche points out three major obstacles: costs, the rigidity of work schedules, and the attitudes of family members toward helping with home services. The notion of having family and kin assist with home services and home care is related to Litwak's theory of shared functions, namely, that formal organizations--bureaucracies--are best organized to deal with uniform tasks, and families and other primary groups are better organized to deal with non-uniform tasks: those activities which may have an irregular basis, require affective bases for judgments, and stress difficult demands. While hospitals are able to deal with non-uniform tasks--feeding, bathing, etc., they perform these services in a rigid bureaucratic way, for a short time period (not for months or years) and they are very, very costly. Home care seems to be the answer to many policy makers. In the U.S.A., however, as elsewhere, there is a growing shortage of home care helpers, because so many women are gainfully employed outside the home. Let me add quickly that I am not advocating or expecting a sudden reversal of the trend for more women to work outside the home. But we must realize and emphasize that women who enjoy the many benefits of gainful, non-home employment may have to pay for home care for old and disabled family members by either direct payment of service or through increased taxes for public, state-supported programs. Let me note that there are many practical difficulties in recruiting, training, and motivating non-family persons (mostly women) to work in home services (chores, visiting, or health care). Furthermore, I do not think a voluntary service can be organized for long-term home care, except for, say, a friendly visitors program.

Here I would like to question the premise that home care is the only answer for many kinds of older persons--particularly those who are very frail and need many services. In the U.S., about 15 percent of the elderly are home-bound. They can get out with difficulty (about 4 million or more elderly).

I think there is a need to start to augment the policy of home care and to think of other alternatives, such as group-organized support systems. Since family helpers are likely to be in short supply in many developed countries, we need to consider a new set of attitudes toward mobility in old age. This goes against the widespread, natural feelings of people who want to live--and often die--in their own home. But I would suggest that perhaps one of the next steps in developed, mobile, affluent societies is that some people may have to live in one of the various kinds of shared living arrangements that are developing in several countries. The Abbeyfield Society in Britain has over 900 small group homes. Here in Australia, the Abbeyfield Society has just received the first government grant to convert an old house into shared housing for the elderly. Such supportive housing arrangements should be added to the options from which the frail elderly can find the environment which best meets their needs.

DISCUSSANT PAPERS

SESSION 5

Theme: Youth policies and the family/work/education relationship

- Art Pearl comments on Eckert/Willems and Edgar/Maas

Each of us brings to a problem a history of a connection to that topic. With youth policies, especially those which draw together the youth movement and the school/family/work nexus my history is that of a youth activist who grew old without ever growing up. It is a history of dismal high school achievement but thanks to accidents of history, (service without distinction in World War II) the opportunity to redeem myself when admission requirements to the university were lapsed and attendance at the university was handsomely recompensed. Without any prior indication I became a 'late bloomer'. A child of the depression whose father showed absolute insensitivity by deciding to die in 1933 when I was eleven years old, I was cast into the hands of an immigrant mother with no formal education who tried to her great frustration to convert me to political radicalism. Although resisting her admirably through a wasted adolescence, some slow maturing accumulated learning must have occurred since I led a demonstration against the war in Vietnam whilst still in the army in Manila in 1946, some eighteen years before the U.S. decided to admit involvement. From thence I was a youth activist in the forties, one of the very few student radicals of that period, a minor casualty of McCarthyism in the fifties, a very active supporter of 1960 movements (although now hardly a youth) and since then a sympathiser and often confidant. It saddens me to see a campus of ultra conservatism, selfish, upwardly mobile, aspiring professionals concerned only with 'No. 1' and beaten into submission minority and poverty stricken youth.

Like all I was impressed with the quality of the Eckert/Willems and Edgar/Maas papers. I found them thorough and thoughtful, the youth movement focus of Eckert/Willems dovetailed nicely with family/school/work emphasis of Edgar/Maas. Studying a problem from diverse perspectives and different settings sparked interest and the treatments reflected both sound scholarship and usefulness to practitioners. Who could ask for more? Only one with a history of implacable perverseness such as myself.

My criticisms are not of what is written but rather of what is omitted. The papers deal with the youth and their settings. I believe the larger society, the political-economy and the visions that guide it have to be considered to a much greater extent than they were in these papers. We need to understand why adult authority has lost legitimacy and what must be done to restore it, if either youth movements are to be productive or youth will gain competence to negotiate their social environments. Decline of adult legitimacy leads as Eckert and Willems describe to political and quasi-political challenges - youth movements, but there are also self-sustaining anomic responses that muddy up the home, school and work connections. Gangs, cults, drugs and alcohol abuse and outbursts of violence - these are almost totally ignored in the papers and cannot be.

Youth movements disconnected to established power systems are almost always transient. Often even at their height they provide only an illusion of power. It is not necessarily true that these movements capture imagination because they 'have nothing to lose' (Eckert and Willems). It may be that they have nothing to gain. It is not that they capture the media, but rather they are captured by it. A media event can be superseded by whatever titillates tomorrow. Certainly the youth movements of the sixties in the U.S. have had no lasting effects and their leaders today sound very much like other establishment figures. On the other hand the alienation grows like cancer - runaways, street kids, squatters, male and female prostitutes, low level functionaries in the drug trade, pilferers, bashers of 'wogs', all spread and burrow themselves in the bloodstream of the socialising institutions. Drugs are not necessarily a rebellious act against family, we have evolved to a point where the family that dope together cope together. A common quality that ties the anti-nuclear and pro-environmental youth groups with the dregs of society is their common vision. Both are dystopian, both are swayed by sirens of doom, and therein lies much of our problem. We who work with youth cannot be 'dreamkillers', we must offer positive visions of the future and help our students, clients, employees, friends to do the same - positive visions with policies to make them real.

The topic we discuss is competence, that is what both papers direct attention to. The competence to be creative and capture the mood of a society, the competence to independently negotiate the systems of a society. Implied is that the marginal are denied opportunity to be competent. Before we accept that thesis we should look critically at our competencies and the competence of those we entrust to be our leaders. What we call competence is rigidity. It is holding on to theories, values and understandings that have long outlived their usefulness. Our leaders have only one talent, they can do nothing but ram the Titanic full-speed and four-square into the iceberg and we serve them responsibly and faithfully by rearranging the Titanic's deckchairs in evermore ingenious patterns. Competence is not something that stands removed from purpose. If we wish to do something other than crash the Titanic we must point ourselves to a target other than the iceberg and then define competencies that can get us there.

This is the crisis. It is a crisis of vision and it is as much a crisis of morality and imagination as it is a failure of political-economic and cultural systems.

The family serves a social function or it is an impediment to progress. The social functions it once served it cannot now serve and a reconstruction of the family as equipper of competence can only be determined once we declare a future course. We must understand why families in current society can only in the rarest circumstances equip children with competence.

Fathers whose employment skills are obsolete cannot pass valuable employment skills to their children, fathers who are marginally connected to the workforce cannot sponsor their children into jobs. With the decline in importance of the local warder and the emergence of centralised, imperious and impossible to comprehend bureaucracies, fathers cannot intercede and mitigate transgressions of their offspring. Mothers cannot teach their daughters to be wives and mothers because to be so oppressed is precisely what their daughters do not want to be. Advantaged parents do pass on to their children their advantages but the advantages are likely to destroy us all.

Parents try to be models of rectitude but how can they succeed when their own pathetic condition becomes increasingly transparent? An immigrant mother demeans herself pleading for mercy for her son and embarrasses him; the same parent failing at one level vents her frustration on her son trying when unable to modify the system to influence him to adapt for 'his own good' and thereby further alienates him. How many broken homes that correlate so highly with unemployment and school failure result as parents project on to each other their sense of failure to be what they believe they are supposed to be?

The hedonism and narcissism that consumes academics these days may be nothing more than resignation of forces too large to fight and too inaccessible to understand.

And yet even today, when the family is eroded and undermined 'experts' and other authorities call upon the family to be responsible for the children and when the family fails take great delight in blaming the victims.

Enter now the school which was asked to replace the parent particularly in labour importing, rapidly growing industrial societies. It was the school's job to socialise the immigrants of the new society, to teach the language and to inspire allegiance to the flag. And schools did it with a vengeance. A system of marvellous efficiency was established - the privileged went to the university to maintain by language and style and access to the arcane their elitist station. Colleges were formed to train the functionaries - teachers, accountants, engineers and technicians - without which civilisation would surely decline. High schools trained the skilled worker and those whose purpose was to carry the hod and dig the coal and collect the tickets on the tram; they were encouraged to leave school before they aspired beyond their station. It was an elegant system, neatly attuned to the outside world and efficient by the standards of the industrial society that spawned it. It was forthrightly and undeniably unfair, but fairness was precisely what it was not supposed to be. It was a wonderful system until it, like all systems, fell victim to progress:

(1) the system grew and became entrenched, rigidified and resistant to change. It was firmly in place when the world outside went crazy. Whole systems of work came and went in a decade. The factory ceased to be the work model, skills, competence, organisation underwent rapid transition. The school became an alien institution, out of phase and out of touch with the world it ostensibly prepared youth for.

(2) the work world not only changed it also lost the ability to absorb. It became saturated. Educational institutions prepared more 'competence' than the system could employ. This was a crisis and in response to that crisis those who crashed the Titanic 'rose standards', they inflated credentials. Unemployment was solved by keeping people in school longer. Adolescence was thus stretched, marriages postponed, a population was put 'on hold' and schools became human warehouses, places to store surplus people until such a day someone, someplace and somehow would need them. Myths were generated. It became common knowledge that in tomorrow's post-industrial world to be employable

workers would have to be more technically competent. Meanwhile in reality the work world was being deskilled, requiring even less technical awareness than was required in the industrial age. Apart from a very small number of specialists (and even here the elite institutions with their existing competencies were slow to accommodate) the rest of those who were to be employed became mere accessories to electronic devices. When schools become warehouses we demonstrate how little the imagination has been stretched. Such an arrangement begs for alienation, crime, violence and destruction. It would be so much wiser to store youth in huge freezers and thaw one out whenever there was a need. This weak effort at satire should at least alert readers to the dangers of even more inhumane 'solutions' to surplus people - mass sterilisation or even gas chambers.

(3) Equality - A system whose function was to maintain inequality, and which did that quite well, thank you, was asked to turn itself around in the name of progress and become the primary if not the exclusive agency of equality. Schools were asked to erase centuries of discrimination, overcome active resistance and disregard the lack of enthusiasm of many staff and administrators and with compensatory and remedial programs, curriculum changes and affirmative action take people from different backgrounds and preparations and equalise the outcome.

And to an amazing extent schools for a time responded to the challenge. In one decade (1965-75) in the U.S. the difference between black and white accomplishments in schools was almost completely eradicated. The gap in test scores have in the next decade also disappeared. Blacks became visible in the professions and women entered what had previously been all-men provinces. But now all of that is crumbling - why? Because as

Edgar and Maas note unemployment is rising and what's worse there are no existing visions of a society which again can boast of full employment.

Therein lies the challenge. Schools did their jobs and produced a surplus of competence. They opened up doors for the historically excluded but the economy, the world outside - can't use them. With competence, it is 'don't call us , we'll call you' and with competence you use it or you lose it.

Pedants and other fools ignore reality and complain that standards have declined. 'It is shocking that students graduate who cannot spell, write an essay or solve a quadratic equation'. That isn't the problem. The problem is that spelling, writing essays and solutions to quadratic equations are not requirements of the job market anymore.

People know no more than they have to and that is the problem. Learning to adjust to a society that has no use for you is exactly what is happening. To get more we need to envision more.

What we need to do is stretch our imagination and design in our minds a society that doesn't require inequality, alienation and uselessness.

There is no fair way to deploy unemployment. There is no fair way to assign some people to exciting, challenging and decently paying work and others to meaningless, dreary, ungratifying and meagerly paying work.

There is no way we can make our visions real without establishing the legitimacy of authority, but the authority to be legitimate - parents or premiers - must offer leadership toward a higher quality of life.

The movement away from the iceberg begins with a vision of full, fair and gratifying employment, organised to produce universal

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quality life without endangering the environment.

That is the challenge before each one of us. It is not a vision to be designed by experts and brought down from the mountain and laid on us. It is ours to the extent to which we help develop it, debate its desirability and its feasibility.

That is what is absent and why we stagnate. We have not debated visions. To the contrary we accept pronouncements that the vision is impossible and rally behind the Dr. Panglasses of our time - the Reagans, the Hawkes, the academic economists - who proclaim as unassailable truth that 'this *is* the best of all possible worlds'. It isn't.

The vision is of itself a tactic of change. Encouraging youth to dream is a step towards breaking the chains that bind them, it is a process of opening up and letting the venom out. Debating the vision and the policies that are necessary for making the visions real is those exercises in intellectual development that we should call competence. It is learning logic, rhetoric and the ability to defend positions with evidence.

A context is established for discussing family as it should be, schools as they should be and work as it should be and their connections as they should be. Large and small issues fall into place. Different models of the future are discussed and how each produces work and non-work. How each define unmet needs? How each establishes the roles of the public and private sector in meeting those needs? How each defines fiscal, monetary and wage policies? Other questions emerge. If needs are met without employing everybody, should we delay entrance (keep youth out) or retire early (keep the old out) or should we reduce work hours or work weeks? Or should we support sabbaticals?

Schools should be a place where futures are debated, where students learn to design a world of peace, prosperity, justice, environmental protection and institutions that serve rather than

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depersonalise. Such schools not only produce competence to negotiate a system, they teach how to change it.

My vision is very different from the technical one that floats around this and other conferences. The technical vision, in my ten year old daughter's language is 'dehumanising to the max'. Mine is a human service society where people's primary responsibility is to help one another. The economy is geared to self-sufficiency and human needs have the highest priority. It is in that context that I make proposals for the schools.

Schools should have many alternatives within a setting (schools within schools) similar to the 9,10,11 experiment at Sunshine High in Melbourne. Parents should be involved in school decisions, sites should have autonomy. There should be student government with control over a significant section of the budget. Curriculums should be organised for solving critical social problems as well as helping each student grow to maximum potential. These two curricular pieces have to be seen as parts of a whole. I envision new career strategies where students are not prepared for work but rather that the work is prepared for people by subjecting all desirable work to functional task analysis with entry positions available to everyone regardless of training experience or knowledge (1). Part entrance for all workers can move logically upward based on combining work with education. Many thousands of supposedly uneducable people were employed in new career programs in the 1960's and '70's with spectacular results. Despite success new career programs were discontinued but unemployment jumped up in the 1970's. Current work experience efforts could with imagination be upgraded to new careers. The Reagan administration expressed interest in reviving new careers before unemployment went sky-high in the first years of his stewardship.

The family in my vision is revitalised more as sanctuary than as equipper of competence. Parents should be given the resources to help their children in the form of continuous education, counselling and other support services. Programs should be initiated stimulating cross-age leisure and cultural activities. Parents should be welcomed into the schools as volunteers, paid aides and guest lecturers and most importantly pressure should be relieved on the family by not requesting parents to do what parents are not prepared to do.

Parents cannot be held responsible for their children's behaviour. They can be assisted in influencing the behaviour, in the form of the logic result as intensification of conflict. In the latter it is movement toward integration.* We have done too much holding parents responsible and far too little helping parents to be legitimate and appreciated authorities. Edgar and Maas support educational entitlements in some form of vouchers that would enable students to exercise choice in senior high schools and tertiary institutions. They draw inspiration from an Ivan Illich type of consumerism. I don't believe the problem will be solved by consumerism approaches in a time of ever increasing monopolisation. The choice becomes illusory. McDonalds vs. Burgerking. Differences that make no differences. The issue is not which school students go to but how they are treated in school. And schools now make their reputation by treating students differently. With or without a voucher Melbourne Grammar or Melbourne Uni. would decide who to welcome and who to discourage and their decision will be supported by establishment spokespersons as the upholding of standards. Much more penetrating reform is needed. That reform can be initiated only as a result of informed public debate. These reforms would involve assurances of students' rights, teacher preparation that stresses intellectual presence and not low level technical skills and curriculum reform. In the absence of such debate what passes for reform today are steps backward in time. Can schools be so reformed? There is no certain answer. It would certainly not be easy but it is hardly impossible. Not trying would be cultural suicide and patching up the periphery is procrastination and wasteful of human energy. Similarly I would feel reforms that focus on transfer payments, moneys provided to youth in the absence of work, will be self-defeating. Transfer payments do not generate feelings of usefulness and competence, they do not bring youth into the centre of commerce and discourse. The issue is employment and employment cannot be put on the back burner.

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* The tape is unclear on these two sentences.

Youth becomes competent by being able to be competent not by prolonged preparation for competence. Systems that combine meaningful work with meaningful schooling and make the family an ally in the process appear on all the evidence to be the way to go. Bypassing what is needed will not be helpful. With Eckert and Willems I believe intergenerational conflict is here to stay. As George Bernard Shaw commented, 'the principal purpose of youth is to joggle the complacency of the older generation'. Our challenge is to create opportunities for conflict to be constructive, to add energy and information to an ongoing debate. More than half a century ago H.G. Wells informed us that we were in a race between 'education and catastrophe'. In the intervening time catastrophe has loomed greater and more imminent and it is time for education to get into the race.

(1) (See Arthur Pearl and Frank Rees, New Careers for the Poor, Macmillan, New York, 1965)

DISCUSSANT PAPERS

SESSION 9

Theme: Legal regulation of the family and the effect of changes in family law

- David Hambly comments on Commaille, Harrison & Eekelaar

LEGAL REGULATION OF THE FAMILY AND THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN FAMILY LAW

A DISCUSSION ON PAPERS PRESENTED BY JACQUES COMMAILLE, MARGARET HARRISON, & JOHN EEKELAAR

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> The family is in trouble; the family is "here to stay". Jobs are more alienating than in the past; jobs provide more security than ever before. The welfare state undermines the family; the welfare state steps in to help families. The human condition in twentieth-century industrialized countries is marked by isolation and the illusion of personal choice; the human condition in twentieth-century industrialized countries is marked by collectively guaranteed care and is devoid of unshared risks.[1]

This wry comment encapsulates some aspects of the general theme of these three papers and of this conference. We are going through a turbulent period in relations between the sexes in the home and in society. Conflicting opinions are held about the nature and significance of the changes that are occurring in attitudes to marriage and the family, and the relationship between these changes and the law of marriage and divorce. As John Eekelaar has written elsewhere, this is a time of "general confusion, at least in western societies, about what the state's attitude to the family should be."[2]

Many contributions to public discussion about divorce, especially by those who resist the easing of legal regulation of divorce, tend to be based on an assumption that the law of divorce exerts a strong and immediate influence on the commitment of individuals to their marriage. The interaction of law and social change is complex, but there seems to be no evidence to support such an assumption and strong reasons for preferring the view that change in the law governing the formal dissolution of marriage is not a major factor affecting the stability of marriage and the quality (however defined) of family relationships. In particular, the divorce rate is not a reliable index of the stability of marriage.

It is more to the point to suggest that the rise in the divorce rate is partly due to changing expectations of marriage. Longer life expectancy, concentration of child-raising obligations into a shorter span of years, the increased participation of married women in the work force and the expansion of social security have meant that a greater number of people, over a longer period of their lives, are no longer utterly dependent on marriage for economic survival for themselves and their children. For many, the predominant purpose of marriage now lies in the emotional satisfactions that marriage is expected to provide. If these expectations are disappointed, more people now than in previous generations can choose (though generally at considerable economic and emotional cost) to obtain a divorce and seek a more fulfilling new relationship. The remarriage rate shows one dimension of the changing character of marraige in Australia. In 32% of marriages celebrated in 1982, at least one of the parties had been married before. In 1975, the proportion was 19%.

The changing attitudes to marriage and family life are accompanied by a world-wide upheaval in family law. New questions are being asked about the role of the law in regulating family relationships. Three themes underlie the international activity in family law reform:

- an easing of the law's control over entry into marriage and the dissolution of marriage;

- an increasing tendency for the law, in regulating the parental and economic aspects of family relationships, to emphasise the welfare of children and the equal status of men and women;

- the encouragement of the settlement of family disputes by conciliation rather than adversary litigation.

The three authors have concentrated on the first two of these themes, and Mr Justice Fogarty, building upon Margaret Harrison's account of the development of the Australian law, has touched on them all. They are drawn together in the passage in M. Connaille's paper which Mr Justice Fogarty took as his starting point. John Eekelaar's paper provides another demonstration of his talent, familiar to readers of Family Law and Social Policy,[3] for marshalling a mass of legal and social data in a new and illuminating way.

I shall seek to supplement their contributions by commenting on two questions which arise from the current upheaval, to which no clear answers have yet emerged. The first concerns the diminishing distinction, in law and society, between family relationships that are based on marriage and those that are not. The second concerns the implications for the law of matrimonial property of an attempt to re-inforce through the law the equal status of husbands and wives.

1. Marriage and Non-Marital Families

The law is withdrawing from comprehensive regulation of the formation and dissolution of marriage, and legal rules that assumed the husband's financial dominance over the wife or bolstered his dominance in their relationship are being overhauled. Despite the retention in many countries of a legal definition of marriage as a union for life to the exclusion of all others, one effect of the new "non-fault" divorce laws is to eliminate the element of permanence from marriage. The law no longer compels any married person to remain married. In that sense, the durability of a marriage depends solely on the continuing consent of both spouses.

The law is also hesitantly responding to a growing social tolerance of non-marital cohabitation. Piecemeal changes in the law are bestowing a growing range of legal incidents upon such relationships. The status of illegitimacy is waning. It is no longer assumed that legal recognition of nonmarital family relationships would weaken the institution of marriage and, hence, the stability of society.

As a result of this convergence, the central place of marriage in the law affecting family relationships is called into question. What are the consequences of the loss of permanence as an element of the formal commitment undertaken upon marriage? Is the distinction between marriage and nonmarital cohabitation "being eroded to the point where it may only consist in the rights [of] marriage formation and the reverse rites [of] marriage dissolution"?[4]

I suggest for discussion two points about the loss of the formal permanence of marriage. First, John Eekelaar (at p.661) has commented that the option now available to either parent "to leave the family and, by divorce, to enter into a new, legally recognised, unit" has the consequence that "family child care is unstable child care" and that the long-term effects of this on the current generation of children affected by divorce cannot be known until they reach adulthood. One could concede this, and yet maintain (as I believe he would) that nothing would be gained for the institution of marriage or the welfare of children by returning to fault-based grounds for divorce with their attendant hypocrisy, humiliation and bitterness. But need this point be conceded? Can it be demonstrated that modern family child care is more unstable and hazardous than the family child care of earlier times? The urgent claim of single parent families for greater support is indisputable. But it is another thing to imply that the current generation of children is at greater risk than their predecessors because of changes in the availability of formal dissolution of marriage. This view has grave implications. It involves complex assumptions, and testing them would present difficulties in making historical comparisons and in isolating causes and effects.

Secondly, tensions arise from the ambivalence of the commitment now undertaken in marriage. In reliance on its permanence commitments are made to parenthood and to long-term financial obligations. If the marriage breaks down, one or both spouses, interpreting the events with a natural tendency to self-justification, may feel that legitimate expectations have been blasted and look to the law for vindication. If vindication is not forthcoming, the anger arising from the marital breakdown may be deflected to the law and those who administer it. One of the most urgent and difficult tasks for family lawyers is to convey to the public an understanding of the limitations of the law and the judicial process in regulating domestic relationships and adjudicating upon disputes that arise from them.

The determination of the basis on which the law should maintain a distinction between marital and nonmarital family relationships is, perhaps, the most fundamental policy issue confronting family lawyers. It is of immediate concern in Australia because the New South Wales Law Reform Commission published in 1983 a comprehensive review of the law affecting parties to de facto relationships. The Commission's report rejected any approach which would formulate a general definition of a de facto relationship that is to be regarded as equivalent to marriage for a range of purposes. Rather, the Commission preferred to examine specific areas of the law to determine whether there were anomalies or injustices requiring correction and, if so, what remedial action should be taken. Different criteria might apply in different areas. The outcome was comprehensive draft legislation, which is awaiting consideration by the New South Wales Parliament. It may provide a model for other Australian States.

Critics of legislative intervention in de facto relationships argue that it aggravates the blurring of the distinction between marriage and nonmarital relationships, thereby undermining the institution of marriage and imposing a compromise on people who opt out of marriage. It seems to me that the essence of the distinction is still that marriage is a public commitment to a potentially lifelong relationship, terminable only according to legally prescribed grounds and procedures. A de facto relationship (however defined) does not involve a formal public commitment. It depends solely on the day to day consent of each of the parties. The distinction could justify a discrimination between married and de facto couples in areas of the law where a potentially permanent, public commitment is relevant (e.g. eligibility to adopt a child with whom the adopters have no previous association).

But how should the law operate on the consequences of the disruption of a de facto relationship? I do not see that anything is gained for the institution of marriage by insisting, for example, that the most effective legal means of protecting people at risk from domestic violence should be reserved for parties to marriages and withheld from those who choose not to marry; or that anomalies and injustices arising from the application of the general law of property and contract to parties to a broken de facto relationship should not be rectified, because the most appropriate and flexible rules for overcoming the defects in the general law would resemble those that have been developed for married people.

Equally, when we are considering remedial legal measures on the disruption of a relationship, it seems pointless to say that those who choose not to marry have chosen to reject legal regulation of their relationship. Legal rules of one kind or another will apply to questions of domestic violence, the welfare of children, or financial and property rights. The question is whether general legal principles will apply, without regard to the parties' domestic relationship, or whether special rules will be developed which take account of the parties' relationship. If it is decided that general legal principles would be unsatisfactory and special rules are preferred, it will not be surprising if those rules resemble to some extent the rules that apply to married people. This will be due to the attempt to take account of the domestic relationship that has existed between the parties, and not to a policy of equating de facto relationships with marriage.

2. Matrimonial property and the equality of spouses

Connaille and Eekelaar have referred to the studies in England and the United States which have demonstrated the unequal economic impact of marital separation upon husbands and upon wives who retain responsibility for the care of children. All the authors have referred to the inadequacy of maintenance and social security as a corrective device. Eekelaar has suggested that a solution may ultimately only be found in moulding employment law and practice to promote complete equality in the commitment of both sexes to child care and workforce participation. Many would accept this as a goal for social policy and it has been extensively discussed at this conference. But, in the meantime, the task for family law is to find a means of adjusting the economic interests of members of separating families as equitably as possible.

Where separating spouses own property, how should it be allocated between them consistently with the stipulation that the law should re-inforce the equality of husbands and wives?

In Australia, England and many States of the USA, a court is given a wide discretion to re-allocate property, having assessed the contributions each spouse has made during the marriage, whether financial or non-financial (such as contributions as a homemaker or parent), and their respective future needs and their ability to fulfil them. This approach emphasises the uniqueness of each marriage, but critics attack its expense and uncertainty. Other countries adopt a community property system under which there is a general rule of equal division of assets that are classified as "matrimonial property".

Is the equality principle best expressed though a requirement that the division of property on marital breakdown should depend wholly or partly on an assessment of the parties' respective contributions? It may be argued that this has no explicit bias, and that the parties' individuality is recognised by an evaluation of the efforts of each of them. But how can the extent and value of household services be measured, and by what standard are they to be compared with financial contributions? Consider the implications of this exposition by a judge of the High Court of Australia in a recent case:

> [E]quality will be the measure, other things being equal, only if the quality of the respective contributions of husband and wife, each judged by reference to their own sphere, are equal. The quality of the contribution made by a wife as home maker or parent may

> vary enormously, from the inadequate to the adequate to the exceptionally good. She may be an admirable housewife in every way or she may fulfil little more than the minimum requirements. Similarly, the contribution of the breadwinner may vary enormously and deserves to be evaluated in comparison with that of the other party. It follows that it cannot be said of every case where the parties reside together that equal value must be attributed to the contribution of each. That will be appropriate only to the extent that the respective contributions of the parties are each made to an equivalent degree. What the Act requires is that in considering an order that is just and equitable the Court shall "take into account" any contribution made by a party in the capacity of homemaker or parent. It is a wide discretion which requires the Court to assess the value of that contribution in terms of what is just and equitable in all the circumstances of a particular case. There can be no fixed rule of general application.[5]

An alternative approach is to prescribe an equal division of assets, either as a general rule to which exceptions may be attached, or as a presumption or starting point, with specified grounds for variation. This would be accompanied by a stipulation that financial contributions to the family should not be presumed to be of greater value than non-financial contributions. Such an approach would acknowledge that spouses may share as they wish the three aspects of the economic commitment involved in marriage: the acquisition and management of income and property, the nurture of their children and the management of their household. Whatever the distribution of roles, the commitment of their time and talents to the marriage should be taken to be equal. Whatever the merit of this approach as a matter of principle, some would advocate it on pragmatic grounds:

> It is difficult to defend [equal division of property acquired by gainful activity during the marriage] as a rule of fairness, given that the economic or other contributions of persons associated in marriage are never precisely equal. But given what is just as true - that no human judge can ever ascertain or quantify the true contributions of each spouse - the equal division of acquests commends itself as a rule of convenience without substantial demerit. It has the additional advantage of automatically linking the scope of property-sharing to the duration of the marriage. It avoids the unpredictability of leaving property division to judicial discretion, thereby exposing the fortune or future of the parties to the vagaries and expense of the adversary process, the competence of counsel, and the luck of the judicial draw. ... Equal division of acquests would also discourage, to a large extent, that rehashing of the history of the marriage which is invited by "guidelines" to judicial discretion. Finally, it has the merit of serving as a framework for private ordering of the financial aspects of divorce by enabling the spouses to know what the likely result will be if their affairs are settled by a judge. All in all, it is a sensible acknowledgement of the limits of law.[6]

Is the principle of equality adequately served if property is divided at the end of the marriage according either to the parties' contributions or to a rule or presumption of equal division? Such an approach treats property division as the settling of the accounts of the matrimonial partnership, and it is accepted in many recent reforming measures which have adopted the community model. But those who are impressed by the evidence of the economic plight of many former spouses (usually women with children) would argue that such an approach maintains the appearance of equality while aggravating the economic inequality that typically arises from a wife's commitment to her family. Rather than seeking a formal equality in the rules for property division, they would argue for an equality of result, by dividing property in a way which compensates for any imbalance, attributable to the marriage, in the parties' ability to meet their future reasonable requirements.

This is a crucial issue. If 'equality of result' is to be the aim, an element of discretion and uncertainty, involving an assessment of the parties' present circumstances and their prospects, is inevitable. If equal division of property is preferred, this will have consequences for the law of maintenance and social security. The choice involves a further consideration. To what extent should the need to provide for the future welfare of the children influence the adjustment of the property and finances between divorcing parents?

This issue vividly demonstrates the need for lawyers to turn to the other social sciences for aid in understanding the social context in which the law operates and in formulating policies. In its current review of the law of matrimonial property, the Australian Law Reform Commission has the great advantage of being able to examine issues such as this in co-operation with the Institute of Family Studies.

NOTES

1. M. Minow, "The Properties of Family and the Families of Property" (1982) Yale LJ 376.

2. J. Eekelaar, Family Law and Social Policy (2nd ed, 1984) 20.

3. Ibid

4. M.A. Glendon, State, Law and Family (1977) 82.

5. Mallet v Mallet [1984] FLC 91-507 (79,126)(Wilson J).

6. M.A. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981) 63-4.

FREE PAPERS

Effects of population policy on families in contemporary China

by WEI ZHANGLING

Every country has its own population problems, although the nature and extent of the problems are varied according to different systems, politics, economics, traditions, cultures and social values. In order to keep abreast of the times and adapt its thinking to the changing circumstances, each nation must formulate its own population policy. Generally speaking, there is a sharp contradiction between population growth and economic development in the developing countries. The causes for that could be traced from history and the solutions to that should be probed into the reality. China is one of the developing countries, and its large population has been causing a lot of problems in all aspects of potitics, economics, and social life. Now it is imperative for our country to adopt an appropriate population policy to control the population growth and at the same time stimulate economic production.

It is well-known that China has witnessed a history of more than four thousand years. According to some ancient books and records such as 《通典》 (Tongdian), in the closing period of the Chinese primitive society the population was more than 13.55 million. At that time, some wars of larger size exercized influence on population growth. As early as more than three thousand years ago there were population investigations in China already. In general the historians of contemporary China consider that the slave society in China lingered more than one thousand and five hundred years. And the rate of the population growth was rather low because of the cruel wars, the low fertility of the slaves and the savage system of burying living slaves with their deceased masters (sometimes even burying several hundred or thousand slaves). At the height the population of Chinese slave society reached nearly to 20 million. The feudal society of China dragged more than two thousand and three hundred years. The population development of the Chinese feudal society was extremely unstable, for example, in the late period of East Han dynasty the Chinese population reached to more than 56 million, but after the slaughters of the wars for more than half a century, only a few million survived. After the first decade of Tang Dynasty, the population of the whole country was still less than 3 million. However, in 1623 (in Ming Dynasty), the population rose to 51.65 million; in 1651 (in Qing Dynasty), it reduced to 10.63 million. Later, Qing Dynasty got a rapid growth in population in company with the development of capitalist sprout. In 1840 the population rose to 412 million (412,814,828). The semi-feudal and semi-colonial society of China lasted for more than one hundred years (1840-1949), and its growth rate of population was very low (only 0.25% per year). The characteristics of the population for that period were high fertility, high mortality and low growth. In 1949 the whole population was 541 million. Until July 1 of 1982 the population of the Mainland was more than one billion (1,008,175,288), it constitutes 22% of the world population.

Bearing the above brief profile in mind we can see clearly the rapid growth of the Chinese population after 1949. On the whole, the characteristics of the population has changed from high fertility, high mortality and low growth to high fertility, low mortality and high growth. But in recent years the Chinese government has been striding forward to lower down the population growth. We can easily recognize this from the following figures: from 1970 to 1982 the growth rate decreased from 2.88% to 1.47% and the decreasing rate was 49%, that's quite unusual in the world. And this achievement has been won by combined efforts of enforced law and ideological persuasion. Since the persueing of the family planning policy throughout China great changes have been taking place in Chinese society and families. The enactment of the new Marriage Law of 1980 has further strengthened the family planning policy, and we can see this clearly from the comparison between the new Marriage Law (1980) and the old one (1950). First, the minimum legal marriage age is raised from 18 to 20 for the female and from 20 to 22 for the male. Second, the 12th article of the new Marriage Law stipulates that both the husband and wife in a family have the obligation to take family planning into practice.

In regard to different policies of the Chinese government toward marriage, family and population we can divide the 35 years (since the liberation of 1949) into three periods:

1. From 1949 to 1963 (except 1958-1960[1])there was a high tide of marriages and a high rate of fertility in general. At the same time the mortality rate got down quickly and the natural growth rate of the population was rising rather quickly.

2. From 1964 to 1977 the government advocated the young people to marry at a later age and began to control fertility.

3. From 1978 up to the present the policy of the government first encouraged and then stipulated couples to bear one child.

In my presentation I will discuss the main effects of Chinese population policy on Chinese families in the above three periods, and I will also probe into the future and far-reaching influence of the policy to the chinese families.

When we talk about the main effects of population policy on Chinese families, it is necessary to point out the following three basic facts of Chinese society from the very beginning:

First, China has a large population, vast territory and abundant resources.

Second, China is a state with centralized authority, and the consistent philosophy and ideology have emphasized collectivism instead of individualism. No matter how different are the contents and standpoints, Confucius, Sun Zhongshan and Mao Tsetung all advocate the ideology of collectivism. And this is the consistent philosophy for the past and present to combine the centralized state with the scattered families in China.

And third, for more than two thousand years the Chinese peasants are the decisive force to finalize ups and downs of the country. Until now they still constitute 79.4% (according to 1982 census) of the Chinese population. They are just like water that can float the boat as well as sink it. In Chinese history it is mainly the peasants' uprisings to overthrow the old regimes and replace the old with the new. One of the significant reasons for the successful revolution led by Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party is the strong and heartfelt supports by the majority of the peasants.

Therefore, when we think of the effects of population policy on Chinese families, we must keep the above basic facts in memory.

First Period: from 1949 to 1963

The year 1949 went down in history as a turning point in modern times of China. On May 1, 1950, the newly-built government promulgated a marriage law. It strongly advocated monogamy, free love and marriage, and equal rights between men and women. It claimed the just rights and interests of women and children, and therefore, added a spur to women's liberation movement.

To my own opinion, the Chinese population policy of this period was formulated under the influence of Marxist concepts on population, Chinese own culture and tradition, and Soviet model. At that time, the Chinese academic world vigorously criticized Malthusian population theory. All-women Federation of China and its local federations in varied levels were established to safeguard the rights and interests of women, appeal Chinese women to shake off the yoke of patriarchal clan system and feudalistic arranged marriage and mercenary marriage, encourage women to get jobs, to receive education, to take part in social activities, and to become independent persons. Before liberation, child daughters-in-law had an even harder lot than most toiling women, and the Marriage Law of 1950 abolished this old inhuman system of child-bride, and turned thousands of girls into self-supported laborers. The new government successfully controlled inflation, forbade prostitution, drugs (such as opium) and gambling, and tried every means to enhance the population quality. At that time divorce rate were rather high than any time in chinese history and this was a result to abolish polygamy, child-bride, arranged marriage and mercenary marriage.

Because of poverty and long-term wars against Japanese invasion and K.M.T. regime, there were a lot of bachelars among workers and peasants in low status. And besides, many sodiers and cadres of the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army and the revolutionary ranks had little chance to get married during the war time. So, after liberation, the new government's policy is to develop economic production and recuperate and multiply to normal. Free marriage and pregnancy were encouraged. Soviet "mother heroine" (an honour to mothers who bore a lot of children) were advocated on the newspapers. While in doing this, there was a high rate of fertility in company with a high tide of marriage. At the same time, the mortality rate lowered down quickly as a result of a stable situation, improved living standard and medical service (for example, several mortal diseases were controlled). Under such circumstances, the natural growth rate of the whole population was rising high. According to the first census since liberation, in 1953, the Chinese population in the Mainland rose to more than 580 million. In 1963 the fertility rate reached its climax to 43.6‰. For the mortality , it fell down from 28‰ in 1930s and 20‰ in 1949 to 7.13‰ (for the cities) and 10.49‰ (for the countryside) in 1963.

During this period the main effects of the population policy on Chinese families are as follows:

1. First and foremost, the policy heightened the social status of women and brought great and profound changes to Chinese traditional families, and at the same time, it caused a lot of conflicts between the old and the new social values.

The population policy along with other national policies strongly advocate equal rights between men and women, between husbands and wives in the families. In old China, the status of women were extremely low. The girls must obey the orders of the elder and the brothers of the family. The mojority of the marriages were arranged by the senior members of the families or by the woman matchmakers. Even in their childhood the girls were forced to foot-binding — a vile feudal practice which crippled women both physically and spiritually for all their lives. They were forbidden to speak to men outside and could never see their future bridegrooms before marriage. The majority of them had little opportunity to go to school and get jobs. They had no right in politics and economics at all. They were forced to do strenuous housework and confined in a narrow world for the whole life.

Under the leadership of the new government, All—China Women's Federation and its local federations in varied levels sent a lot of propaganda teams to carry out the new policies. They firmly stood by the side of women to fight against feudalistic remnants and influence. They resolutely safeguarded the just rights and interests of women. The old habit of killing and injuring the female babies were absolutely forbidden by the new government. And the sex ratio therefore changed positively, for example, in 1947 the sex ratio of the whole nation was 110, and in 1953, it changed to 105.93.

In the old traditional society the Chinese women were forced to keep three obediences —— to father before marriage, to husband after marriage, and to son after the death of husband; as well as the four virtues —— morality, proper speech, modest manner and diligent work. These spiritual fetters imposed on women in feudal society for more than two thousand years were finally smashed after liberation. With the rising of their political and economic status, the chinese women became more independent and self - confident than ever before.

More and more girls got the opportunity to go to school and receive higher education. Hundreds and thousands of women got jobs and went to the larger society to give full play to their intellegence and wisdom. The significant changes of the status of chinese women in social and family life won widespread acclaim among the people. But, they also confronted resistance from the old and young diehards of feudalistic system. In spite of the repeated propaganda and persuasion, the old ideas such as considering male superior to female, forcing women to undertake the whole housework, and readily resorting to persecuting women —— still existed. Nevertheless, if we compare this period with the past, the old ideas changed in many ways. Before liberation, there was an old chinese saying prevailing over the whole country: "For women, if you marry a chicken, then you must obey the chicken; if you marry a dog, then you must obey the dog." Since liberation, the saying has changed like this: "Men and women are equal. Women can hold half the sky."

2. The policy influenced the family size. And the general tendency is from a large family size to a small one. In accord with this, the family structure changed from extended families to nuclear families.

According to the official household statistics in old China, the family size was between 5.17 and 5.38 in average from the beginning of this century to the founding of the People's Republic of China. At that time, the official statistics were not accurate, with reference to the investigations done by the nongovernmental scholars, the nation -wide family size was between 4.84 and 5.80 during 1930s.

In 1947, the family size was 5.35; but in 1953, it became 4.30 according to the first national census. Of course, there were many reasons for the decrease of the family size, among them, the tremendous changes of social system, population policy, family structure and natural population growth were most important. As regards to population policy, the propaganda of free marriage made more couples to leave their origional families and set up the new households; the encouragement of social mobility made thousands of peasants becoming residents of the cities and therefore divided one big family into two or more small families; the mobilization of the urbanites moving into countryside and the interior citizens migrating to the border areas also led to the tendency of small-sized families.

Under the new situation, extended families could not be suited to the requirements of the population policy, and social reforms changed the economic structure, social relations and values, and all these combined to speed up the shift from extended families to nuclear ones. During this period, the extended families of three or more generations living together reduced sharply. And so did the families of two or more married brothers living in the same household. Meanwhile, the nuclear families including a couple and their children became common in the new society. And households of one or two people increased more quickly than before. At the same time, families of the old people also increased to some extent.

3. The policy inclined to high birthrate and finally led to the anarchy of population growth.

Following the restoration period of the national economy from the end of 1949 to 1952, our country began to carry out the first five year plan of national economic development. During this period, both population growth and economic growth were rapid. From 1953 to 1957, the average increase rate of national income for each year was 8.9%; of industrial and agricutural gross output value, 10.9% (of industrial, 18%; of agricultural, 4.5%); of population growth, 2.4%. The ratio for the above three was: 3.7:4.5:1.0. Although the ratio was normal, the population growth was rather high. That's because,China was still a backward country, in 1957, the average personal income of the whole country was only 140 chinese yuan; the average personal grain was 603 chinese jin. As regards to population, it increased from 574.82 million in 1952 to 646.53 million. So, there was a contradiction between the speedy population growth and national economic development. Later, this contradiction became sharper and sharper.

From 1958 to 1962, because of the natural calamities and some wrong policies of the government, there was a decline both in national economic growth and population growth. Among these five years, the average increase rate of national income for each year was -3.1%; of industrial and agricultural gross output value, 0.6%; of population growth, 0.80%. The ratio for the above three was: -3.9:0.75:1.0. The whole economy was confronted with tremendous difficulties. Until 1963, the situation took a favourable turn.

Generally speaking, from 1949 to 1963, there was little family planning in China, and the government's population policy had both positive and negative effects on chinese families as above-stated.

Second Period: from 1964 to 1977

The Chinese government drew lessons from the past and recognized the serious problem of a large population with a developing economy.

In 1964 the second national census was carried out in the whole country. The statistics showed that the chinese population in the Mainland reached to 694.58 million, the fertility was as high as 39.14‰, the mortality was 11.5‰, the sex ratio was 105.46.

In December, 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai emphasized family planning in his report on the work of the government. In the same year, the State Council of China established an institution——the Family Planning Office. with the nation-wide propaganda for later-aged marriage and later child-bearing, the population policy had a gradual shift from encouraging marriage and child-bearing to urging the young people to marry and bear children at a later age, a shift from the anarchy of fertility to the control of fertility.

During this period the main effects of the population policy on Chinese families are as follows:

1. The policy furthered to liberate women from old and traditional fetters. In any society, to bear and rear children is mainly women's job. In order to control birth rate, the Chinese government contributed a lot to change the old ideology about marriage, family and child-bearing among the people. These efforts helped the women to shake off the old yoke upon them. For centuries, the chinese (especially the rural people) like to have more boys instead of girls. If a woman bore nine daughters, her family would ask her to bear one more child hoping that the tenth might be a boy.

Of course, the fertility could hardly lower down from this traditional viewpoint. Now, the Chinese government strongly advocated the equality between men and women, saying that it was just the same for women to bear boys or girls, and both the girls and boys were flowers of our motherland. Indeed, this policy was beneficial to the women's liberation movement and effectively changed the relationship of family members.

2. The policy suceeded in increasing the average first marriage age of the whole country, and therefore helped to change the family size and structure. The general tendency of the shift in family size was still from large to small, and in family structure, also from extended families to nuclear families.

According to the first Marriage Law of 1950, the legal marriage age is: 18 for female and 20 for male. In 1950s, the average first marriage age of female of the whole country was 19.02; in 1960s, it was 19.81; and in 1970s, it was 21.59, From these figures, we can see a tendency of an increase in the average first marriage age.

In new China, household registration includes two kinds: one is collective household, and the other is family household. The first one means that those unmarried young people live in collective dormitories of their work units. This phenomenon also serves to lower down the family size.

During this period, the governments in varied levels strictly controlled the marriage age of the young people. When people decided to get married, they should get approval of their work units, otherwise they would be refused to have marriage registration. For a few years the allowable marriage age was calculated like this: to plus the age of the boy with the age of the girl, if the sum was above 50 years old, then they could get approval, otherwise, they must wait. Frankly speaking, this means was not so wise and brought many negative effects on marriage and family. It fought against the natural law and met with resistance.

3. Together with other policies to develop the economy, the population policy did a contribution to raise the living standard of the people. But it also caused conflicts between collective interests and individual interests.

From 1963 to 1966 the average growth rate of national income each year was 15.3%; of gross industrial and agricultural output value, 16.1%; of population, 2.6%; and the ratio of the three was: 5.9:6.2:1.0. Although the ratio was appropriate, the population growth rate was too high.

From 1967 to 1976 the average growth rates of the above three were: 5%, 7.1% and 2.3%, and the ratio of them was: 2.2:3.1:1.0. In 1967, the three figures were: -7.2%, -9.6% and 2.6%. In 1967, -6.5%, -4.2% and 2.7%. These figures indicate that the economic development and population growth did not match well during this period.

The old ideas and traditional customs were obstinate. Especially in the countryside the peasants used to let things take their own course. They didn't like family planning at all. They liked more children, and they preferred boys. But, the policy of family planning and later marriage and child-bearing mainly pointed to the peasants, because they were the majority of the whole population. Enforced methods sometimes impaired women's health and caused a lot of troubles. It was really a hard job to pursue family planning throughout the whole country. Nevertheless, through the combined efforts of political mobilization, technological methods and legislation, the Chinese government reached its primary goal in 1970s. Although in general people believed that the population policy was for the interests of the whole nation, and it was really necessary and imperative to control the population growth, when they take it into practice, they might feel in another way. Sometimes different views in a family brought quarrels between husband and wife, or between young couple and their parents. Usually the young people more inclined to accept the new ideas and changes, but the old people did not. In such a way, the population policy enlarged the generation gap to some degree.

Nevertheless, since the year 1973 the family planning has won great achivements, as a result, the natural population growth rate decreased to 1.2% in 1979. And the unsuitable situation for economic development and population growth took a turn for the better.

Third Period: from 1978 up to the present

Since 1978 the chinese government has concentrated its efforts to control fertility. The restriction on the first marriage age has been gradually relaxed.

The new Marriage Law promulgated on September 10, 1980 (taking effect on January 1,1981). It stipulates the minimum legal marriage age as 20 for the female and 22 for the male. The 12th article of the Law especially stipulates: Both the husband and wife in a family have the obligation to take family planning into practice. The concrete contents in practice are rich and varied.

As a matter of fact, as early as in 1978, the government began to encourage the young couples only to bear one child. At that time, the slogan was: "One child is best." In recent years the rules and regulations of birth control are being perfected. Now, the presentations are as follows: "Among the national cadres, workers and urbanites, one couple is only allowed to bear one child, except those people who are approved by the authorities as exceptional cases." "In the countryside we advocate that one couple only to bear one child in general. For some masses, if they really have practical difficulties and require to bear the second child, it could be arranged into plan after examination and approval. In any case, it is unallowable to bear the third child. As regards national minorities, the demand could be properly relaxed."

In sum, the Chinese general population policy at present is to restrict population quantity, to raise population quality, to adapt the population growth to economic development and therefore, to promote the Four Modernizations.[2]

From 1979 to 1982, the average growth rate of national income each year was 6.3%; of gross industrial and agricultural output value, 7.3%; of population, 1.3%; and the ratio of the three was: 4.8:5.6:1.0. We could not be optimistic and satisfied with this ratio, because of the long-term high growth rate of the population and the difficulties in economic development, it is a long way for us to cast off the dilemma.

In 1982 the third national census was carried out in China. The statistics showed that on July 1, 1982 the Chinese population in the Mainland reached to 1 billion (1,006, 175, 288), in 1981 the fertility was 20.91‰, the mortality was 6.36‰, the natural growth rate of the population was 14.55‰,the sex ratio of the newly-born babies was 108.47. In 1982 the urbanites constituted 20.6% (206.59 million), the national minorities constituted 6.7% (5.8% in 1964), the average number of the national family households was 4.43, the divorce rate was 0.9% for the male and 0.3% for the female, As China is a highly organized society, it is more available for the social workers to do investigations, and the above figures are rather accurate.

Then, what are the main effects of the population policy on the families at present? Let me figure them out in the following aspects:

1. The policy develops in a direction favourable to clear away the old and backward family ideas, customs and habits, such as patriarchal-feudal clan system, inferior position of women, patriarchal behaviour, superstitious belief, tedious family etiquette, etc. In doing so, it will contribute a lot to women's liberation and to the tendency from large families to small ones, from extended families to nuclear ones.

2. The policy serves to raise the quality of the population. Since only one child is allowed to bear in a family, it will lead the whole society and all families to pay great attention to the birth, nurture, care and education of the children. In this sense, eugenics will develop in our country. Now, the system of physical examination for marriage has been strengthened. And sex education among adolescents and adults has been encouraged, but just a few years ago, this had been a forbidden zone for many generations.

3. The policy will renders support to enlarge social welfare and security and employ this as an effective measure to relieve the fear of the old people. Since liberation, many old folks' homes have been set up. And the whole society has showed solicitude for the old people. More and more articles have been published in newspapers and magazines to discuss this topic. As a result, this policy will lead more and more old people to become independent of their offsprings, although the official propaganda and public opinion have appealed to the younger generations to take good care of the elders. And this tendency will gradually bring forth great changes to family structures.

4. The policy has already caused a lot of problems on the education of the only-child familes. The parents and grandparents used to spoil the only son or daughter. From sociological and psychological points, the only child inclines to be wilful, arrogant, unsociable and eccentric. He is lack of peers to play with in his childhood. He has no brothers and sisters to speed up his socialization. He will be overloaded with the responsibilities of the family when he grows up. Now, it's time for us to attach importance to these problems.

From a long-term point of view, the population policy will have profound and far-reaching influence to the future. At present the government has made up its mind to control the population growth within 1.2 billion scope until the year 2000. That is really a difficult task. And it means from now on, the average natural growth rate of the population each year to the end of this century must keep under 9.5‰. But as I mentioned before, in 1981 the natural growth rate of the population was 14.55‰, if following this rate, then, to the end of this century, the population in the Mainland will be 1.317 billion. Whether the population goal can be fulfilled or not, it will be decided by many factors such as Chinese politics, economy, social stability, etc.

Lastly, I would like to talk something about the profound and far-reaching influence of the population policy to the Chinese society and families. The clues I have thought are as follows:

1. The policy will help to develop the national economy, to raise the national income and living standard.

2. The policy will stimulate women's education and employment, encourage women's liberation movement, and promote the equality between men and women.

3. The policy will enhance the cultural and educational levels of the Chinese people, and also raise the quality of the population.

4. The policy will push forward social mobility and social communications.

5. The policy will give an impetus to the development of sociology and psychology.

6. The policy will lead the only-child education problem to become more serious in the forthcoming future and last for a long period.

7. The policy will make the sex ratio to become somewhat inappropriate. That's because, the only-child policy will lead some people fond of boys to kill or injure the girl-babies, or use some secret recipe (handed down from generation to generation) to control sex selection of babies. Whether in history or at present, the Chinese sex ratio has been rather high in the whole country (except shanghai and Tibet)[3]. This phenomenon has something to do

with the old idea which take sons superior to daughters. How long will this last? It is a complicated problem.

8. The population policy may give rise to single men and women. This problem is out of the inappropriate sex ratio, as well as the change in family values.

9. The policy may give rise to divorce rate. The reasons for that are varied and complex. The changes in social and family values, the wilfulness of the only-child, the less burden of less children, the inappropriate sex ratio, etc. may exercise influence on the divorce matter.

10. The policy will impel the ageing of the population. That's because, the mortality in China has become rather low and this tendency will continue. If the fertility is controlled successfully, then the numbers of the old people will raise quickly. In 1984, we have 80 million old people, but to the end of this century, we may have 130 millon old people.

In short, the Chinese government has varied its population policy according to different periods since liberation. In each period the policy bestows favour as well as exerts pressure on Chinese families. The unified leadership goes well hand in hand with the long-standing ideology of collectivism. The populalion policy is carried out in accord with the liberation movement of the Chinese women. The key to the success of the policy is to win the support of the Chinese peasants. The main goal of the policy is to control fertility and reduce the natural growth rate of the population. On the whole, for more than thirty years since 1949, the growth rate of economic development has exceeded that of the population. From 1953 to 1982, the average growth rate of national income each year was 5.9%; of gross industrial and agricultural output value, 8.1% (10.7% for industry and 3.8% for agriculture); of population, 1.9%. But, as China is a developing country, its large population has become an extremely urgent problem to be solved. There is no other way but family planning to be resorted to. The Chinese government has tried every means to find out the laws and ways of controlling birth rate, and its efforts have been crowned with success, though at the same time it has been confronted with a lot of troubles. Anyway, the Chinese sociologists and social workers should do more research and investigations on the subject and probe into the essence of the things in order to seek truth.

TABLES AND CHARTS

1.Natural growth rate of population in China (1952-1982)

（表1） 1952——1982人口自然增长率单位：%

[illegible]																
(1)	1952	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
(2)	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.0	2.1	2.3	1.7	1.0	−0.46	0.4	2.7	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.6
(3)	1968	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	
(4)	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.4	

(1) and (3) : year

(2) and (4) : Natural growth rate

2. Increase rate of national income in China (1952-1982)

（表2） 1952——1982年国民收入比上年增长率单位：%

[illegible]																
(1)	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
(2)	22.2	14.0	5.8	6.4	14.1	4.5	22.0	8.2	−1.4	−29.7	−6.5	10.7	16.5	17.0	17.0	[illegible]
(3)	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	
(4)	6.5	19.3	23.3	7.0	2.9	8.3	1.1	8.3	−2.3	7.8	12.3	7.0	6.1	4.8	7.4	

(1) and (3) : year

(2) and (4) : increase rate

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3. Natural increase rate of population in China (1952-1982)



(1) : Natural increase rate of population

(2) : year

4. Increase rate of national income (1952-1982)



(1) :Increase rate of national income

(2) : year

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5. Fertinity of China, Japan, France and USA



中国、日本、法国、美国的生育率

（表3）

年龄组 (1)	生育率（‰）(4)			
	中国 (5)（1981）	日本 (6)（1980）	法国 (7)（1980）	美国 (8)（1979）
(2) 全体育龄妇女	83.31	51.6	62.5	61.5
(3) 15—19岁	6.20	3.6	18.1	54.5
20—24岁	146.63	76.5	122.5	115.5
25—29岁	238.73	179.8	144.0	115.5
30—34岁	86.19	72.0	79.7	61.8
35—39岁	33.24	12.8	27.1	19.4
40—44岁	11.37	1.7	5.3	3.9
45—49岁	3.15	0.1	0.4	0.2

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(1) : age group

(2) : Total women in child-bearing age

(3) : age

(4) : fertility

(5) : China

(6) : Japan

(7) : France

(8) : USA

6. Percent of baby-number born and average baby-number for Chinese women in 1981

[illegible]

[illegible]

(1)	(3) (4) (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2.01
[illegible]—19岁	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	75.11	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.30
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	3.71	5.99	[illegible]	4.24
[illegible]—14岁	[illegible]	2.72	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1.96	[illegible]	[illegible]

(1) : Female age group

(2) : Total child-bearing women

(3) : age

(4) : percent of baby-number

(5) : percent of one baby

(6) : percent of two babies

(7) : percent of more babies

(8) : average baby-number

7. Sex ratio for each age group of the Chinese population on July 1, 1982

[illegible]

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	91.73
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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(1), (3), (5) and (7) : age

(2), (4), (6) and (8): sex ratio

8. Sex ratio for each age group of the Chinese population on July 1, 1982



图2. 1982年7月1日中国人口分年龄性别比

(1) : sex ratio

(2) : age

9. Percent of unmarried people in different age



(1)[illegible]	(2)[illegible]	(3)[illegible]
20	93.1	73.1
21	87.1	62.5
22	76.2	48.6
23	63.6	33.2
24	51.0	21.0
25	38.5	12.0
26	28.5	5.8
27	21.0	3.1
28	16.2	2.2
29	12.9	1.4

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(1) : age

(2) : male

(3) : female

10. Mortality for 1-4 years old

1 – 1 [illegible]

(1)	(2)	
	(3)	(4)
2	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	[illegible]
1	2.15	2.24

(1) : age

(2) : mortality

(3) : male

(4) : female

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11. Mortality of different age in China, Sweden and Afghanistan



图4.中国、瑞典、阿富汗的分年龄死亡率

(1) : mortality

(2) : age

(3) : Afghanistan

(4),(8) and (11) : female

(5), (6) and (9) : male

(7) : China

(10) : Sweden

12. Average household size in Old China



(1);Year

(2) : Total households

(3) : Total population

(4) : Average household size

(5) : Resources

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13. Family household size according to first, second and third national census of China since 1949

三次人口普查的家庭户规模

单位(3)：人(4)

年份 (1)	全国 (2)	市镇 (5)	乡村 (6)
1953	4.30	4.60	4.26
1964	4.29	4.11	4.35
1982	4.43	3.9[illegible]	4.57

(1) : year

(2) : whole nation

(3) : unit

(4) : person

(5) : cities and towns

(6) : countryside

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NOTES

1. From 1958 to 1960 because of the natural calamities and the faults out of some policies the fertility reduced sharply in an unusual situation.

2. The " Four Modernizations " refers to the modernizations of industry, agriculture, science and national defense.

3. According to 1982 Census, the sex ratio of Shanghai was 99.3, and of Tibet, 97.8.

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Family policy and the implementation of the Constitutional Equal Rights Clause in the Federal Republic of Germany

by WOLFGANG VOEGELI and BARBARA WILLENBACHER

1. Exposition

Today sex-equality is deemed to be in effect in marriage law. In this paper we shall analyse the changes of family law caused by the Equal Rights Clause of the Constitution . We shall concentrate on the development of the marriage law between 1952 and 1977 - especially regarding the personal relationship of the spouses, sex-typed roles and dominance in marriage and the family. A further point of focus will be marital property.
The change of legal systems is a main topic of Sociology of Law and the Family[1]. The transisition from patriachal to egalitarian marriage forms is often accentuated. The incongruence of legal norms and social reality is another relevant topic[2]. Less frequently the effects of family law are analysed[3].
We shall try to analyse the legislation process, juridical and social reality of marriage law. We shall present the alternative legal concepts of sex equality that were discussed and their adherent partisans. Of special interest is, of course, the attitude of the legal profession.
The controversial reasons presented by the actors may be classified by their assumptions of family law effectivity. One the one hand there is the hypothesis that family law determines family behaviour. And in contrast we find the opinion that family law has consequences only in legal action, especially in the dissolution of marriage. It is therefore interesting to see which of the alleged consequences of the diverse concepts of sex equality can be confirmed by legal and sociological studies concerning

- the acceptance of sex equality by the population
- the factual dominant roles in marriage and the family
- the extent of sex-typed roles regarding house-keeping and gainful employment
- the use of legal alternatives that family law provides for
- the extent of litigation in case of dispute.

2. The genesis of the Equal Rights Clause and the scope of alternative interpretations

2.1 The dispute in the Constitutional Convention

Initially the Constitutional Convention of the Federal Republic of Germany refused to accept the Equal Rights Clause in fear to cancell the personal family law and the matrimonial property law, which were highly patriachal in character.After furious remonstrations by women's organisations and trade unions, though, it was unanimously passed.

Although its protagonists intended to abolish all norms of family law that confered unequal rights to men and women, this argument was not accentuated during the constitutional debate. Rather the symbolic acknowlegement of the achievements and performance of women promoted consent of this clause.

Basically the actors in the dispute over the Equal Rights Clause in the Constitutional Convention were the same as they had orginally entered the scene at the end of the 19th century: the initiative came from the Social Democratic Party, publicly assisted by the women's organisations. The antagonists were the conservative, especially the ecclesiastically oriented parties publicly assisted the the churches.

2.2 Alternative interpretations of the Equal Rights Clause

The scope of interpretations that were discussed in public is rather large. It was decisively narrowed down by the legislation and especially by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Two basic dimensions of interpretation may be distinguished: the first regards the comparative legal status of men and women, which is governed by a ban on discrimination. Here the scope of interpretation ranges from absolute prohibition of discrimination only allowing the consideration of biological differences such as pregnancy, delivery and nursing to a mere prohibition of arbitrary measures, considering reasonable sex differentiations.

The second dimension regards the relation of liberal versus social basic rights. Insofar the Equal Rights Clause guarantees equal chances of participation to men and women and affirmative actions to overcome social disadvantages of women.

The Equal Rights Clause allows the following interepretations in family law:

- formal equality of the legal status of men and women even regarding unequal social roles
- acknowlegement of essential sex-typed social roles through legislation in family law
- compensation of the consequences of sex-typed norms and social roles by confering their legal equivalence and/or by granting material compensation claims.

In the fifties formal legal equality was put off as mechanistic, radically individualistic and hostile to the institution of the family. It was supposed to have negative effects for women by imposing upon them equal obligations which were in contrast to the factual sex-typed division of labour in the family. It was alleged that every married women would be forced to take up a gainful employment. Especially the women's movement was expostulated by the legal profession for advocating the concept of formal equality.

In contrast a functional or organic interpretation, which allowed 'reasonable' discriminations was looked upon as the adequate solution, as the christian-occidental moral philosophy and the natural order demanded unequal legal treatment of men and women. Without upholding traditional sex-typed roles the stability of the family, society and the state seemed to be endangered. These arguments have been used since 1900 by the antagonists of equal rights for both sexes.

In their majority the protagonists of a functional organic interpretation opposed the abolition of legally sanctioned sex-typed roles. Only a minority demanded that the law should still be based on religious concepts and conserve hierarchical structures.The abolition of religious ideals in family law - a process typical for legal change in the 20th century[4] - was essentially promoted by the Equal Rights Clause.

3. Equal rights through judge-made law

The situation between 1953 and 1958

As parliament had not passed a family reform bill within the time limit prescribed by the constitution the Equal Rights Clause took effect as directly applicable law on April 1, 1953. For the time between April1, 1953 and June 30, 1958, when the Equal Rights Bill was enacted, a legal chaos was apprehended by some members of the legal profession. But no chaos arose. Generally,in court decisions not more than two alternatives of interpretation were formulated which almost invariably were then decided upon by the Federal Court. Identical monetary maintenance obligations for women did not arise. The courts used both the model of formal equality and the functional model to interprete the Equal Rights Clause, depending on the nature of the subject. They adopted opinions, the legal profession had elaborated since the time of the Weimarer Republic, when the family law reform was already discussed. In some fields of jurisdiction a wide spread consensus had been reached, of which the congresses of the "Deutsche Juristentag" 1924 and 1931 , the most importent professional organisation occupied with the debate of legal policy, bear evidence.

In view that juridical solutions for all publicly debated problems existed at that time, the arguments stressing problematical consequences of formal sex equality are rather obscure. Furthermore the relevant court decisions between 1953 and 1958 show that the legal system had to deal with problems of separation and dissolution of marriage, as well as problems concerning the relation to third parties. This confirms the hypothesis that only when social relations dissolve legal disputes between family members arise.

The specific legal constructions developed by the courts, political parties and other organisations involved shall now be analysed.

4. Basic concepts

Only the personal marriage law was contested including the status of men and women regarding custody. The dispute was focused on the definition of male and female roles and the decisionmaking in marriage. The new matrimonial property law, though, found a broad consent.

4.1 The model of formal legal equality

This concept of personal law is based upon:

- free choice of the common family name
- no legal model of male and female roles in marriage, division of labour by mutual agreement
- identical custodial rights, joint legal representation
- free choice for women between household activities and employment; no obligation to marital collaboration
- mutual authority to obligate and represent another in transactions concerning household needs

This strictly egalitarianconcept was promoted in the legislative process only by the Social Democrats and the women's organisations. It was not realized in family law before 1977. Within the legal profession this dogmatically stringent concept of equal rights and obligations, as well as the abolition of normative sex-typed roles finds but little support before 197o. Especially female lawyers were its protagonists.

Concerning marital property the supporters of strict equality , too, favor a functional interpretation of sex-equality in order to compensate the unequal earning capacity of men and women:

- imputations of equal contributions to family property increments and to family maintenance through household activity and gainful employment
- compensation of economic disadvantages in consequence of marital division of labour through a splitting of property increments comprising social security assets.

The principle of splitting marital property increments in combination with separation of property during marriage has found widespread support not only within the legal profession but also among political parties and other organisations and became the statutory marital property regime through the Equal Rights Bill in 1958. The equation of social security assets in case of divorce, though, came into the statutes in 1977, only. Partnership models for social security pensions are at present being discussed.

4.2 The model of functional sex-equality

A functional model was promoted by the overwhelming majority of the legal profession in the fifties. It has the following characteristics:

- family name is the husbands name, women may add their birth-name
- legal model of the breadwinner-housewife marriage with the obligation of women to manage the household personally
- right of women to gainful employment as far as compatible with household activities; mutual obligation to marital collaboration
- unilateral authority of women to obligate and represent their husbands in transactions concerning household needs
- equal status in all decisions concerning marital life and custody, joint legal representation

The primary goal of this model was to secure the ideal of the breadwinner-housewife marriage in family law. It was deemed necessary that family law state the traditional sex-typed division of labour as legally different obligations for men and women.

4.3 The patriachal model

The federal government, the Christian Democratic Party, the protestant and catholic church and a minority of the legal profession promoted a patriachal concept of marriage. Its characteristics differed from the functional model in regard to decisionmaking:

- male competence to decide in all questions regarding marital life and custody in cases of dispute
- legal representation of the children only by the father

As the egalitarian concept found no marjority in the fifties, neither in

Parliament nor in the legal profession, the dispute over the implementation of the Equal Rights Clause took place between the legal profession on the one hand and the federal government, parliamentary majority and the churches on the other. Both sides though had a common base in laying down the sex-typed division of labour as a rule in family law. The question was whether a patriachal hierarchy was to be preserved in family law.

It was not before the early seventies that a broad consensus emerged to abolish all legal ascription of sex roles.

Taking public opinion polls into account a substantial increase in acceptance of sex equality is found in the recent years. In the fifties, though, only a narrow majority of the population supported the ideal of sex-equality. However legal privileges for men were backed up only by a minority. Especially the attitude towards regulating employment of married women has changed. Whereas 1960 the majority of the population favoured to ban gainful employment of mothers, in the seventies the majority is against it.

The changing interpretations of the Equal Rights Clause in family law by parliament and the legal profession developed parallel to the changing attitudes of the population. This is true especially for the legal regulation of gainful employment of married women. The functional concept of sex equality in family law is interpreted in accordance with the current stereotypes of sex roles within the population.

The dispute how to implement the Equal Rights Clause in family law centered around emotional attitudes that are connected with different concepts of sex roles. In contrast, arguments based on practical juridical experience were hardly acknowledged.

In the following chapters we shall analyse decisionmaking in marriage and the family, the legal definition of sex roles and marital property law in regard to the legislation process, court decisions and social reality.

5. Dominance in marriage and the family

In the dispute, if the husband/father should be last entitled to make decisions in marriage and family life the conservative protagonists asserted that the traditional , christian occidental ideal of marriage and the family had to be unchangeable by law.Changes in social reality and family values were looked as cultural deformations. Traditional values should be reinforced by family law counteracting the social change. This view was shared by a minority of the legal profession and the protestant and catholic church. Especially the churches demanded that the authority of the father that had been eroded during the last century should be restaured by law. Patriachal family law was deemed to be necessary to ensure stability in marriage, family and society. Compulsory joint decisions of both parents were seen as giving an incentive to continous disputes in family.

The protagonists of sex-equality in turn asserted that one-sided privileges of men did not accord to the essence of marriage and did humiliate women in their most important role as mothers. Furthermore, disputes between spouses were seen as not justiciable. Patriachally defined rights intensified the marital dispute, it was argued. Legal dispute was only expected in case of separation and dissolution and therefore the entitlement of men to make last decisions in family matters would lead only to disadvantages of women in regard to the ascription of fault in divorce. In addition it was doubted whether men were capable to use their patriachal rights for the best of the family, because experience in and after the second world war had shown that women's attachment to marriage was more stable and that they considered the welfare of the children better than their husbands. In reality patriachally defined rights of men would therefore improve the instability of marriages.

Social change should be recognized by family law, as only a minority of the population still accepted patriachal family values.

In the legislative process only the last entitlement of the father to make decisions in questions of custody and the unilateral legal representation of the child by the father were enacted 1957. This decision of the parliament was insofar astonishing for as early as we see 1953 the Federal Constitutional Court had decided that the natural differences of the sexes may no longer be employed as a legally relevant reason to differiate between the sexes in questions of custody. This opinion had already become established practice in the lower courts and in the Federal court. Even in view of the enacted Equal Rights Bill of 1957 that took effect in July 1958, in February 1958 the Federal Court confirmed the joint legal representation by both parents whereas the Equal Rights Bill provided for unilateral representation by the father. As it was to be expected, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the entitlement of the father to make last decisions in questions of custody and the unilateral representation by the father were a violation of the Equal Rights Clause as early as July 1959. It objected to the consideration of religious ideals in questions of custody. Even functional differences of the sexes were of no importance in respect to the parent-child-relationship and especially in disturbed marriages the best of the child necessitated an equivalent influence of the mother.

The protagonists of patriachal hierarchy on the parliamentary plain were defeated and the supporters of a functional concept of sex-equality from the side of the legal profession succeeded. The functional concept recognizes the empirical differences between the sexes. It is of interest, therefore, how these differences were ascertained and whether the factual legal consequences and social behaviour were considered in the juridic debate. The Constitutional Court paints out the extremely low number of legal suits in family disputes, which moreover, regularly were filed during sepatation. This corroborates the opinion that legal regulation of the family is relevant especially in juridic actions of dissolved families.

But the question whether there was empirical male dominance in the family was considered only to a small extent in the juridic debate. Just like its opponents the Constitutional Court uses the essence of marriage and custodial power as the main argument. Only a part of the protagonists of sex equality refered to research in family sociology and to the empirical plurality of dominance patterns in family. And the antagonists of sex equality took up the only argument of family sociologists who objected the increasing dominance of mothers which is reason for them to demand the strengthening of paternal authority.

Results of family research show that in the fifties only a small majority of the population declared to decide jointly in marital and family matters. Approximately 5o% of all families stated that there was either male or female dominance in decisionmaking. Almost one half of the population were in favor to entitle the father to the last decision, more men than women favouring a decisive influence of the father. But the population did not wish legally regulated dominance patterns. On the contrary, the majority of the population opposed unequal rights of men and women. This is no evidence of an egalitarian attitude of the population in marital and family life. But a legal regulation of the familial sphere is objected to.

The intention of the political parties and the churches to interfere with social change and to improve the paternal authority was judged sceptically by family sociologists, because there was no significant impact of dominance patterns on family stability.

Recent research gives evidence that male and female dominance is decreasing and joint decisionmaking increases. The social change of family patterns and the legal change of family law take a parallel course.
The decision of the parliamentary majority in the fifties to adhere to paternal dominance against all opposition which had made them the object of ridicule, seems unintelligible only in respect to the attitude of the legal profession, especially that of the higher courts. The opinion polls of the fifties show that male dominance patterns had many supporters within the population especially amongst men and that egalitarian attitudes had not yet prevailed. Therefore the attempt to influence the process of social change had at that time a realistic base.

6. The discussion of sex-typed roles in family law

The discussion whether a legal regulation of the sex typed division of labour was permissible centered around the legal obligation of married women to household duties. The supporters of such regulation referred to christian occidental ideals of marriage as well as to a natural division of duties between the sexes.
§ 1356 BGB as amended by the Equal Rights Bill upheld housekeeping as an obligation and a right of women. In the following time this was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, referring to current views as legitimation. In the legislative process and among the legal profession the majority of the actors pleaded for legal regulation of sex-typed roles.The following arguments were put forth to support such regulation: the supposed identity of legal regulation and social reality, the necessity to counteract the danger posed by gainful employment of mothers to childrearing and the protection for women against the double burden of employment and childrearing.
The Social Democratic Party, the trade-unions, women' s organisations and a part of the legal profession demanded to abolish the legal regulation of sex typed roles. They, in contrast, asserted that there was no natural division of labour for the sexes and that sex roles were socially and culturally defined. Dual wage-earner families existed as well as one wage-earner families. In view of the Equal Rights Clause therefore the Legislator may not privilege one empirical pattern of marriage against the other. The division of labour in the family should be the result of free agreements between the spouses. Legal regulations in regard to the sex-typed division of labour should only refer to the unequal earning capacity of men and

women and treat functionally different contributions to family maintenance as equivalent.

Furthermore it was argued that a legal ascription of sex-typed duties violated the essence of marriage and the personal rights of women. The application of family law showed that the legal regulation of sex roles was relevant only for the ascription of fault in case of divorce. The gainful employment of women could not be influenced by family law.

Legal regulation of sex-typed roles prevailed in the legislative process and in case law in the fifties. Only the 38th "Deutsche Juristentag" adopted 1951 the abolishment of sex-typed regulations .After the Equal Rights Bill became effective 1958 the legal ascription of sex-roles was seen as cogent law. During the sixties in juridical literature the opinion prevailed that the division of labour in marriage was at the disposition of the spouses. The courts followed in the early seventies. In 1975, shortly before the reformbill of 1977 abolished all legal regulation of sex-typed roles, the Constitutional Court pronounced as legally settled that the division of duties in marriage was subject to free agreement of the spouses.

The importance of the house-wife/breadwinner marriage is depicted in the fifties by the low employmentrate of married women. Though almost 3o% of married women were employed, only 1o% worked outside the family. And this ratio even decreased for mothers.Most married women had to work because of economic problems of the family. These data give no evidence for the importance attached to the employment of married women in the fifties by sociologists and jurists.

The employmentrate of married women rose especially between 196o and 197o. Furthermore an important structural change took place, today employment is in the overwhelming majority located outside the home.

As early as 1962 there was an initiative by the Social Democratic Party for an investigation of the situation of women in occupation, family and society. On the basis of the findings of this investigation it was argued that the sex-equality guaranteed by the constitution had not been reached in social reality. New demands to reform family law arose. A broad consensus emerged to abolish the legal regulation of sex-typed duties by family law. In 1967 then a committee was appointed by the federal government to review marriage law. On the basis of the committee report a new personal law was enacted without any dispute.All sex-typed regulations were extinguished in regard to the male supporter and the female homemaker role, family maintenance, marital collaboration and the family name.

These items we shall not follow up here. The regulation governing the family name were the only section of the reform bill that was contested. Twice the Bundesrat (second chamber of Parliament) refused to let it pass.

The opinions of the legal profession and the population correlate in regard to the sex-typed division of labour. And the legitimation of legal regulation changed considerably. Although the Equal Rights Bill already asserted to reflect social change, the relevant arguments in the political debate of the fifties generally referred to the nature and essence of the sexes. In the sixties increasingly investigations and census material were used to give reasons to abolish sex-typed regulations. But even this dispute is led on a symbolic level: the adequacy of ideals is discussed. Reflections on concrete legal consequences, in the law of torts for example, are generally missing. As the divorce law was also changed, the only consequence of legal disputes over marriage law between family members, the ascription of fault in case of divorce before July 1977 had also ceased to exist.

7. Matrimonial Property Law

There was widespread consent, that the matrimonial property regime in force till March 31, 1953: administration and male right of usufruct of female property was unconstitutional. Since the 33rd "Deutsche Juristentag" in 1924 the regime of splitting property increments found general acclaim. The matrimonial property regime inaugurated by the Equal Rights Bill combines individual property rights with compensation claims mainly at the time of the dissolution of marriage. This regulation seemed more practical than all community property regimes. The splitting of property increments accrued during marriage was legitimated with the necessity to compensate for the economic disadvantages of the traditional sex-typed division of labour and to appreciate the homemaker role.
According to opinion polls the idea of joint spousal participation in property increments during marriage found broad consent. Only a minority of the population favored separation of property, especially represented among farmers. In contrast to the legal profession which was critical of community property regimes because of the problems caused for business transactions the population favored joint ownershipof property.

Furthermore the possibility to preclude the statutory matrimonial property by marriage contract was and is rarely used. Farmers and businessmen are more prone to make marriage contracts and prefer separate property. It may be that marriage contracts are seldom concluded because the effects of the statutory regime take place mainly in case of the dissolution of marriage. During marriage joint decisions in property matters as well as joint utilization are prefered. Only in case of dispute individual decisions are of importance.
Despite of the statutory regime of matrimonial property being overwhelmingly accepted its impact is negligible except for the event of succession. The rate of compensation payments at divorce is relatively low, only 10% of the cases. Economic reasons may cause this ineffectivity, as after a short duration of marriage there is a greater need to regulate the debts.

The matrimonial property law, the splitting of accrued property gains during marriage, was seen as the most important part of the Equal Rights Bill of 1958. For the first time the functional interpretation of the Equal Rights Clause produced a regulation for compensating economic disadvantages of married women.Whereas for the personal law in the long range a process of deregulation was initiated by the constitutional Equal Rights Clause at the same time a process of intensified regulation of the economic consequences of marriage started.

8. Statutory Pension Equalization

The concept of equal contributions of the spouses to the joint property increments that legitimates the splitting of accrued property gains is also the foundation of the statutory system of splitting social security assets. In contrast to the equalization of property increments the concept to split social security assets, promoted by the Social Democratic Party in the fifties, did not find a majority among the relevant actors till the seventies. Then the reform of the social security system for women was generally discussed. Thus the aforementioned government commission advocated to introduce an independent social security claim of women through a compulsary insurance scheme as well as an equalization of social security assets at divorce. The intention was to link the reform of the system of survivor's pension to the reform of the regulation of divorce consequences. This intention was headed by the social security organisations and the trade unions. However, the women's organisations demanded to institute immediately the splitting of social security assets at divorce in the family reform bill.They hoped to extend this principle to the general social security reform for women.

This concept passed parliament without dispute and was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 198o. The splitting of social security assets was acclaimed by the majority of all relevant actors.

The reasoning in respect to the pension-splitting in case of divorce is essentially the same as in respect to the general reform of social security for women. The low claims of women and the short periods of paying membership of married women in the social security system were prinicpally referred. The protagonists of pension splitting predicted that gaps between periods of paying membership in the social security system would be closed by pension splitting for women.

The critique only took up possible singular consequences of pension splitting: the danger of insufficient mini-pensions in special cases, the possible decline of men's inclination to marry, the possible decline of divorced men to remarry, unjustified compensations of the lower earning capacity of women which was caused by the labour market and not by marriage. The basic concept of pension splitting was not disputed. Only a minority of family lawyers forwarded the opinion, that pension splitting was a constitutionally inadmissible interference in property rights but were rebuffed by the experts in constitutional law and subsequently by the Constitutional Court.

Opinion polls show, that the majority of the population is in favour of the concept of pension splitting. But consent varies considerably with the sexes. Only a small majority of men and a vast majority of women accept pension splitting.It is hardly ruled out by way of marriage contracts. According to the judicial statistics in two thirds of divorce cases an equalization of pension assets is carried through. The rest of the cases childless spouses, generally both employed, waive their claims. The assumption that pension splitting generally works out in favour of women is supported.

In contrast to all other changes in family law the concept of pension splitting was not developed by the legal profession but instead by political committees and some experts of social security law. Furthermore in contrast to all other family law reforms pension splitting has substantial effects. Just as in the case of the matrimonial property regime the spouses show little inclination during marriage to make use of legal possibilities to exclude pension splitting by marriage contract. Only in case of divorce such possibilities are used, generally in order to waive claims by childless double wage-earners. Therefore the argument of an unjustified compensation may not be supported.

. Conclusions

The formal principle of sex-equality is supplemented in general by a functional compensatory one. No proof can be found for the anticipated legal consequences that critiques of formal sex-equality had referred to.

The Equal Rights Clause simultaneously initiated processes of deregulation and of increased regulation. It led to the abolishment of legal regulation of sex-typed roles in personal law. Regarding the economic consequences of marriage the concept of equal participation through compensation claims was developed.

Disputes in parliament over the Equal Rights Clause and its interpretation were predominantly led on level of Weltanschauung and of poltical conceptions of sex-typed roles. The actors of this dispute are established by tradition. The great importance attached to this dispute on a symbolic level can only be understood on the basis of the assumption that family law is determining family behaviour. Factual consequences of legal changes are seldom reflected with the exception of pension splitting.

The concepts that were promoted by the legal profession are modified parallel to social change and not because of refined juridical argumentations.

Regulations of family law only become relevant in case of the dissolution of marriage. Only regulations in social security law, such as the pension splitting system, have far reaching economic consequences. The attitude of the population towards legal regulation gives no evidence for law effectivity. Public acclaim of family law regulations is also predominantly uttered on a symbolic level.

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Changing ideals about the family and other life styles in their macro-sociological significance in the Netherlands

by ITEKA WEEDA

A view of sociology practice

It is not unjust that theory forming in sociology has always been considered of great importance. For a long time it has been tried to separate cause and consequence by means of a theory but many a sociologist let go this pretension. The desirability of discovering such laws is no longer valued. Add to this that the final cause, the cause of the existence of a certain cuase, remains unknown in the end. With regard to the complex social reality, and certainly that of living arrangements, it may make much more sense to give a view of connected tendencies of change; a view which can be supported by empirical research and which enables a redefinition of future developments.

In our society it belongs to the primary tasks of the sociologist to do research in such a way that points of discussion about the future clearly come forth. Empirical research only will stimulate the push model in addition to which trends found in social reality are extended to the future. An essayist view only, will stimulate the pull model in addition to which future in its new possibilities will creatively be moulded. A theoretical framework which is also supported and adjusted empirically offers the possibility of connecting both models. Based on three foundations thinking for the future has important perspectives. First of all there has to be knowledge of important developments in values and actual behaviour. Then there has to be knowledge of social structures and institutions which hamper or stimulate coming innovations. Finally an important starting point is made out by an integral theoretical framework which can indicate more or less autonomous developments and which separates crucial innovation tendencies from short-living fashionable trends.

Such a way of "scientific" handling of the future offers possibilities to redefine eventual problems, to indicate openings, to signaline (side-)effects of certain developments and most of all to decide on the main points. In that view future is seen neither as "fate" which befalls us nor as a product which, in rough lines, can be made. In this view the future is a challenge within limited borders. From this vision this paper has been written.

Social trends which influence the primary life styles

The *social crisis* at the end of the sixties, which was supported by a number of important social developments, announced a new era for the family and other life styles. It was just this area which was touched by drastic changes in thinking and doings, while the time was right. The social crisis, which in every respect, had democratination very high, has broken through rusted structures and enabled tentative innovation tendencies to come forth.

The women's liberation movement comfortably fell on to the mattress which spung and vibrated with the changing social circumstances. The average educational level of women had increased; the average family number had decreased, besides children left home ever earlier; domestic apparatus and housebuilding lightened the housewife's work. The dissension with her isolated position struck at all levels of the population. A place in society and economic independence became "new" needs of married women.

Continuing *individuation and secularization* are closely connected with the processes taking place in the family and other life styles. People became more and more aware of their own needs and existing structures and consequently the latter were put to discussion. Ever more often fixed regimens, legitimated among others by religion, were subject to a critical consideration. Making individual choices, negotiation and personal responsibility were stressed. These fundamental processes were accompanied by a growing need of individual privacy. All was rapidly spread among the population because of the increased influence of the *media*. New view points had a chance to reach broad levels of the population in a relatively short time. Because of this social institution the pace of the changes was influenced.

Mechanisms of change around the family and other life styles

During this century the individualized family, the independent unit of husband and wife and their unmarried children who still live at home entered into broad levels of the population. In connection with the industrial society, the release of the family from its enclosed position has been a gradual process. Mostly developments in the primary life style gradually take place because it is about strong inner values and about the basic design of society. Attempts to create fast revolutions, as in Russia in the twenties, don't meet with much success.

On the other hand nowadays one may also talk of rapid changes. Remarkable changes are the growing pluriformity of household forms, which go with the social developments and the diversity of household forms in a life-time. Even less people follow the same well-known "family pattern". Family decrease and atomination (living alone) have rapidly increased during fifteen years. A new generation has to make completely other choices than its preceding generation.

With good reason the nuclear family may be called the foundation of society, be it that in this paper we don't have . romantic idea of that in mind. In the middle of this century the nuclear family, with the women working at home and the man outside to earn a living, was so generally accepted as a normal choice, that many important social sectors were entirely attuned to it. During the growing prosperity, the structures of housing, social security, the tax system, social service, etc. were easily based on it. In those days only a single person ventured to say that maybe it was little flexible with a view to possible changes. And in fact it could be predicted that changes would come. The composition of the family and other life styles has been subject to changes for centuries. Why should the closed, exclusive nuclear family be the finished article? But meanwhile that closed nuclear family has been bombarded to foundation. The complexity of our present society makes it very difficult to dig out and replace this heavily sagging foundation, which sometimes nearly causes the entire building to collapse (individualization, redistribution of income, mutual assistance), by a new one which will be more adequatly be adapted to time and future. Changes in the living arrangements are partly autonomous and difficult to stop by obsolete structures. Against the background of a new mentality these obsolete structures may even speed up the process of change because people take the liberty to make choices (for example, living alone is promoted by our social security system).

Research into value-systems

Family life and other forms of primary life styles contain many codes for behaviour. Just the norms and values which are an important force behind the developments changed rapidly during the past fifteen years. Middendorp (1975) showed that these changes took place relatively fast in comparison with other fields such as politics and religion. Kooy too drew an adequate picture of the many changes in the field of marriage and family.

Based on family sociological and demographic literature and based on my own research I arrived at the formulation of seven value systems (Weeda, 1982) which can all be measured in our days, be it that the oldest patterns (the closed family- and neighbourhood-life) and the newest ones (networks of friends) are found in a form adjusted to our times. The hypothetic framework, in which individuation is considered the main force, has been formulated on the basis of literature. Thereafter the significance of the value system has been measured by means of detailed interviews and surveys all over the country. A very important question then was about the consistency of values and norms in various fields. This consistency could be proven to a very high degree.

Although the value systems may be found in many intermediate and transitional forms, among the population as a whole there is a tendency from an exclusive, closed nuclear family-life towards a more open marriage and nuclear family-life. Strong familism is hardly found anymore and living within networks of friends is still in an embryonic stage. Within the various sub-categories of the population the rapidity of the change can clearly be noticed. New ideas will first be found with higher educated, non-religious and younger people. Idealization of the traditional closed family model will be found most within the labour class, with elderly and religious people. Systems of ideas which were generally accepted in a further past may still be found in a number of small rural communities in the Netherlands.

Three value systems shortly typified

Now three value systems will be described in detail. These three have been chosen because they are the three main forms which are important now or seem to become more important in the future. Three of the seven distinguished value systems have been typified as transition forms; they contain a combination of characterisitcs of the previous and following model. The only main form which is left out of consideration is the integrated family- and neighbourhood-life. Those who support this trend have become so few during the second half of our century that a description can be left out within the framework of the developments during the seventies. Thereafter the separate value systems will be discussed with regard to ten crucial sub-fields.

I. The closed, exclusive, romantic marriage and nuclear family model

Significance of the pair relation and of the marriage. The hetero sexual pair relation is the natural way of life for an adult. A human being has been destined to live his life in a pair relation. Marriage is the most unique bond a human being enters into during his life, it has an intrinsic meaning. Partner choice takes place on a basis of love and this mutual love is an essential foundation for a further happy family-life. Marriage ought to be sanctioned by law and eventually confirmed by the church.

Man-woman relation. Man and woman are equal but differently disposed. The woman is more emotional, caring-cherishing; the man rational and full of initiative. They complete each other nicely, they need each other and they form a unit. In principal they are hierarchically equal but real important decisions are the man's work. He has a better survey.

Significance of family, friends, acquaintances, neighbours. The own nuclear family has to operate as independent as possible. The privacy of the nuclear family is fundamentally important for a good family-life. Social contacts are kept at some distance among others to prevent interference. The existing contacts with family and acquaintances are mainly maintained as a pair or as a nuclear family. It is also necessary not to let family problems come out; the dirty linen has to remain inside. When there is a real necessity, professional assistance will be asked.

Form of Living. The most appropriate form of living is the family house with living, kitchen (eventually garden) in the ground floor and nursery, playroom, parent's bedroom and bathroom in the first floor. This form quarantees the privacy of the nuclear family (not that of its individual members). A three or four room flat is also satisfactory although the privacy of the nuclear family will not always be guaranteed.

Sexual relation. The woman oughts to be a virgin when she marries or her first sexual experience should be with her future husband. It is important to utter one's feelings and tenderness in sexuality; beside the man needs sexual intercourse more often. The man will mostly take the initiative. Sexuality out of wedlock, both a relation and a pleasure trip, is very dangerous for the marriage. It has to be avoided at all costs. To fall in love with or flirt with a third party is not desirable either. The marriage partners ought to need no one else but each other in love, intimacy and sexual needs.

Motherhood and fatherhood. It is the woman's natural destination to become a mother. To husband and wife children mean the crown of there love- and marriage-bond. Naturally the mother is the more cherishing parent whereas the father by nature delegates authority. A marriage without children remains incomplete.

Education of the children. It is important for a well-balanced education of the child that it should receive love and a sense of security, a warm nest and during the first years the safety of the almost continuous presence of the mother. Such a protected youth causes the child to be able to take a responsible place in society. Besides it is important to impart discipline and obedience to a child and moreover it is desirable to give the son particularly a good education in order that he will go further than his father. Father and mother ought to pull together; it is wrong to quarrel in the children's presence.

Allocation of tasks. To bring in sufficient money is mainly the man's responsibility, the woman being the one who is mainly responsible for the housekeeping and taking care of the children. Technical jobs inside the house belong more to the man's field. He may spend a part of his leisure time on them.

Leisure time. For the man leisure time has been structured much clearer than for the woman; it is the time left after his working hours. For the woman this leisure time has much more been spread over the day and the amount of leisure time is strongly dependent on the family phase she is in. It is desirable that the pair or the nuclear family spend as much time together as is possible. Holidays are spent together.

Durability and divorce. Marriage is meant for life. Divorce means that (one of) the two have (has) failed. One is strongly inclined to look for a guilty party and there is much rancour after the divorce. The best thing to do is to leave the past marriage behind by having as few contacts as possible and to found a nuclear family again. If this second marriage does succeed, the first may be considered an unhappy mistake.

II. The open, companiable, individualized marriage and nuclear family model

Significance of the pair relation and of the marriage. A hetero or homo sexual relation of two persons is the form of living every adult looks for in the end, but certainly not in first instance. Such a pair relation does offer a handhold for a stable life. Marriage itself does not have an intrinsic meaning but an instrumental one. Some businesslike matters have to be settled through it. Personally drafted contracts may be a better means to fix mutual arrangements. Cohabitation without being married has the same status. Partner-choice is based on love, companionship and agreement about values. However, it is good to live alone for a while before starting a lasting relation, be it cohabitation or marriage. (When hereafter we talk about man and woman that may also be man-man or woman-woman.)

Man-woman relation. Man and woman are hierarchically equal. As all people they are differently disposed but not specifically according to sexual characteristics. Within the marriage the individual identity of both partners will be preserved, it is not necessary to pose as a unity. Decisions are possibly taken independently and in consultation with each other if it concerns both. To a certain degree it is possible to satisfy one's need of emotional support with others, but the partner remains most important.

Significance of family, friends, acquaintances and neighbours. Friends and also relatives and neighbours who are considered friends, occupy a more important place than with the closed nuclear family. The openness of the marriage relation is particularly characterized by a larger significance of friendship and notably separate friendships. It occurs less often that friends are lost because of the marriage because both partners have friends of their own. The relation with these friends also has a certain degree of intimacy. One will look for emotional-affective support with the partner first of all but next to him/her with friends. Important (relation)problems may be discussed with friends.

Form of living. The privacy of the pair or the nuclear family still is in high esteem. However, next to it there exists a need of privacy for the individual family-members in the house by means of a room of one's own for everybody in which one may withdraw if one wishes so. The average family-house cannot meet this need.

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Sexual relation. It is desirable to experiment with relations, also in sexual respect, before starting a lasting marriage or cohabitation. In the sexual relation both man and woman need to have a say; the moulding of the relation depends on the nature of those involved, which has nothing to do with the specifically male or specifically female characteristics. Relations out of wedlock and pleasure trips are all but appreciated, principally a "monogamous" relation is preferred. However, sexual experiences with others are not considered and treated as disastrous events. It is accepted to fall in love with an other person and to create an erotic atmosphere although it is realized that this may rouse the partner's jealousy.

Motherhood and fatherhood. Parenthood is a conscious choice. Marriage does not automatically mean that children are wanted. Voluntary childlessness has the same status as having children. Both man and woman have a share in shaping the child's personality on the basis of their individual nature.

The education of the children. Friendship, accompaniment, independence and having a say are central concepts in the ideal about education. It is desirable that the father too occupies himself intensively with the child; it is undesirable that one of the two parents spends his or her entire day on that. Neither for the development of the child nor for the activity pattern of the mother (father) a continuous presence of always the same adult during the child's first years is to be preferred. In front of the child the parents need not always form one unity; for a child it is good to notice that they are two individuals. To quarrel in the children's presence won't do any harm. After all the child oughts to be educated according to its capacities. It is not in the first place necessary to go far.

Allocation of tasks. Man and woman share the tasks with regard to earning money, housekeeping and taking care of the children. Jobs in and around the house are divided based on individual preference and skills.

Leisure time. Leisure time is partly spent separately and partly together. The joint care of the children and a (part-time) job each require good arrangements and in certain family phases a strict organization. One has to take care that the two partners don't arrive at cross purposes. If necessary joint activities have to be arranged.

Durability and divorce. Marriage or living together is meant to be durable but one does not think it a matter of course that in that form the relation will last until death. Growing apart or important problems may make it desirable for all parties, also for children if concerned, to break the relation. After some time there won't be much rancour left. In the course of time the relation can get a new content which is more or less friendly. After divorce it is important first to recover yourself and to live independently. A new relation and remarriage are

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no first priorities but, if the circumstances are favourable, they may be taken into consideration.

III. Individuals in networks of friends

Significance of the pair relation and of the marriage. Living as a pair has no relatively high status. The importance of the marriage is nil. The adult human being has more friends who all have a different significance to her or him. The important inter-human relations have to be satisfied with various people and not all with the same person. Based on sympathies and conformities of ideas friends are chosen. If necessary important inter-human arrangements may be settled by contract.

Man-woman relation. In contacts between men and women there is hierarchical equality. The different natures and courses of life of people make it desirable to build up a certain degree of intimacy with various people. The personal development may easily be hampered by putting one person in the centre.

Significance of family, friends, acquaintances, neighbours. The framework of living is formed by the circle of friends. Relatives and neighbours may also belong to this circle. According to the individual's character this circle of friends will be large or small, with many superficial or some intensive contacts. Circles of friends are no separate wholes. They fade into each other and are changeable. Relatives are less kept at a distance because one shares an important part of history with these people and one does not intend to protect one special relation. (Relation) problems are discussed with friends in the first place.

Form of living. Personal privacy has a high status. Living alone, living within integrated living unities and living groups are the most appropriate forms of living. A drawback of living groups is that they demand energy to have everything run smoothly and that there is always the danger that the personal privacy gets in among the crowd. The advantage of this form of living is that inter-human needs, practical matters such as cooking dinner, child care, etc., may be arranged efficiently; there is less chance to become solitary and to suffer from a lack of attendence in case of illness. Within a living group it is necessary to make clear mutual arrangements.

Sexual relation. Sexuality is less important than in the previous models. Eroticism and sexuality are not strictly separated. Based on his/her nature a human being may prefer (periods of) no sexual intercourse, a more or less durable hetero- or homosexual relation with one other person or more sexual relations at the same time. With this last form there may be talk of both hetero- and homosexual contacts. One human being should not consider another human being his possession, but has to take care that his/her own conduct does not hurt people (s)he cares about and with whom (s)he has an intimite relation.

Motherhood and fatherhood. According to individual nature there will be the wish of having a child (children) or not. One person (man or woman) has the "final responsibility" for a child, the child will stay with that person at removals. A child can be raised within various household forms. Such a form is the living together of one adult with one or more children where friends are actively involved. The living group or Central Living is an other possibility. For a child it is important to confide in various adults from his or hers youth up. It is not good when a child only has an intimate bond with the father and mother. More contacts are a basis for a many-sided development of the personality and they may further an independent and flexible standpoint in after years.

Education of the children. Independence, flexible attitude, liberty, creative accompaniment, they are all key-words to a good education. Moreover an important aim in education is responsibility for other people with giving up one's own identity. To function well in a micro society is considered more important than a high education.

Allocation of tasks. Every individual has an income of his or hers own, obtained either through an official job or trough informal economic circuits. Within a living group "house tasks are settled by arrangements. It is not necessary that everybody does the same amount of work. It depends on other activities of the members of the group. One has to take care that the traditional allocation of tasks between men and women does not (gradually) slip in. For people who live alone it is desirable to regularly share some things with other people, for example cooking food

Leisure time. Leisure time is alternably spent with different friends; it is normal that a rather stable pattern develops. If one lives in a living group it is absolutely not necessary to spend much leisure time together with the other members of the group; one takes the line that every individual also has a life of one's own outside the living group.

Durability and divorce. Relations with friends are meant to be durable, but serious problems, growing apart or removal may (unexpectedly) end them. However, a more normal course of things is that in the course of time relations with friends are gradually changing with regard to content or intensity. Sexual relations may pass into non sexual ones. The frequency of contacts may decrease or increase. Mutual feelings may change. Temporarily people may be very important to each other to go one's own way more or less after some time. On the whole durability in the friendships is strived after but without making large concessions or giving up the individual identity.

Unequal changes of pace

In various ways there is talk of unequal paces in which value changes take place.

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Already discussed are the *sub-categories* of the population into which new value systems penetrate relatively fast or relatively slow. Mostly new ideas are accepted first by young adults (25-35 years old), by highly educated people, by non-religious people and in towns. Young people under 25 often have a relatively traditional attitude, which gives use to the idea that old forms come back again. The cause of this "bend" in the age effect is the lack of experience in the primary sphere of living of the young people. Then the example of the parental home still is central in their thinking. However, during the seventies a remarkable change occured. Whereas, until the end of the sixties, mostly women appeared to be the most conservative category of the population,in the beginning of the eighties not seldom this category is more progressive then the male part of the population. Accelerated women's emancipation and an emancipation of men which is lagging behind are the explanation of this development.

A second form of unequal paces of change has to do with the *fractions* of the value systems. A clear acceleration can be noticed with regard to the acceptance of and the wish to do paid work out of the house by the married woman. The idea that an equal allocation of tasks inside the house is desirable also has rapidly acquired a number of followers. With regard to togetherness of the partners an ambivalant situation may often be seen. The old norm of doing many things together, self-sacrifice, adaption, forming a unity, is proclaimed while at the same time the new form of each having own activities, giving room to each other, standing for yourself and freedom, is also supported. For married people and people who are cohabiting it is often considered less positive to have friends of one's own and to go on a holiday separately. Social forces such as an economic crisis, influence the rapidity with which various values are changing. Under the pressure of the economic problems and the looking for new structures, ideas about the allocation of tasks between man and woman rather faster tend to a larger equality than to a traditional cast. Compared to this ideas about leisure time, social contacts and divorce are lagging behind.

A third form of unequality in paces of change may be found in the teamwork between the primary life styles and other *social sectors*. Because of the fact that, in the traditional family model, the nuclear family is the independent, attending unit, in case of problems (illness, relation problems, etc.) one is thrown on professional support which is subsidized by the government. For a large part also care for the elderly is in professional hands. Slowly ideas about self-help, help of friends become more concrete. They are clearly connected with a growing individuation and a change in value systems towards a more open idea of the nuclear family and a larger significance of friends. However, under the pressure of the economic problems these "cheap" ideas are being propagated without the primary life styles being developed in such a way that these ideas fit in. The closed nuclear family model goes with guarantees of society in case of problems. There is

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no intermediate framework with an intrinsic meaning which can take over the tasks of society. Such an intermediate framework does exist with the networks of friends and to a lesser degree also with the open family model. However, a small majority of the population still lives within more or less traditional forms. That is why the drastic turning back of the provisions by society for economic reasons will be accompanied by important tensions and, in a somewhat longer run, maybe also will accelerate renewals in thinking. It will become clear that it is impossible to press cheap renewals into the traditional closed, nuclear family model. This closed nuclear family model does not possess the adequate characteristics for that.
An other example of an unequal rapidity in various sectors may be seen with divorce. For about fifteen years economic independence for women has been propagated by emancipation-movements. That does not alter the fact that many have shaped their lives according to the traditional model and also have a divorce against the background of that model. During the settlement of alimony etc. it does not seldom occur that it is pointed out that nowadays a woman should be able to provide for herself. That does not correspond with the real world of certain groups. They are the problems which accompany the development to new systems, where individuals may easily suffer for it. It is for example very well possible that, for considerable time, women are charged with a double task because the ideas about and reality of the woman doing paid work outdoors is changing more rapidly than those of the man doing domestic work and taking care of the children.

Family and other life styles are a matter of politics

From the preceding it will be clear that the characteristics of the primary sphere of living is interwoven with macro-social structures to a high degree. Quite unjustly that which takes place in the primary life styles is often remitted to the "soft" private sector, as if it is of no concern to the policy-makers. Present social tensions, the economic crisis too, are clearly connected with drastic changes in that area. In many fields government intervention has its consequences for the family and other life styles. To a certain degree the developments in this sphere are autonomous. but legislations, proviisions,
financial regulations, housing etc. may accelerate or delay these developments. Now three fields will be discussed in detail. They give a good illustration of the meant interwovenness.
First the *demographic developments* will be discussed. This is an outstanding example of an inconvenient relation between policy and personal life. Reproduction is a private affair; everybody may decide for him- or herself to have children or not and also the number is a personal choice. The government should not try to direct this process. That is the general opinion, a heavy taboo rests on a directed population policy, but indirectly it happens continually. A very essential change

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in our society during this century is the fact that elderly people are taken care of by the means of an old age pension. So the children no longer have to take care of their parents in case of need. On the contrary the financial care of young children still is mainly the task of the parents. In a small nuclear family the children's allowance absolutely does not meet the costs. These political choices involve that having children only results in financial charges and no financial gains. Moreover the scale of salaries has as a consequence that people who are in the family phase with little children earn a relatively low salary. When moreover it is an important value that the woman ends her paid job when a child is born and when there is no good child care for the very young children the conclusion is justified that society unloads the poverty on the children and their mothers (fathers). In a period in which voluntary childlessness is going to be accepted more generally these economic circumstances will encourage the choice of having no children. This is a part of the present population policy, which may be worth thinking about. The autonomous character of the developments in the primary life styles appears from the fact that the positive acceptance of voluntary childlessness will first be found with people who are economically less in want (higher education, higher incomes). It is not uncommon that such new visions reach broad population classes within some decennia.

It is obvious from the framework of our *social security system* that the family and other life styles are a matter of politics. It was shaped in the fifties, a period in which the line was taken that founding a family would remain the "normal choice" for every adult. Single persons could be advantaged with a relatively high salary and a relatively high benefit, for it was a situation people in fact would not choose. Marriage was the model, also for pension- and sickness insurance. Because of the rise of cohabitation, living-apart-together relations and because of the strong increase in the number of single persons the system gets into a tight place. Elderly people on the dole and women on a benefit prefer not to take a partner in their house also because they will then (partly) loose their income. In that way our present system stimulates a form of living which already was rising in esteem, namely living alone. A central question is whether in the social security system one has to start from the individual or from the financial strength of the economic living unit. For the time being the latter is done which involves enormous privacy problems. In a society in which the pluriformity of life styles is increasing it becomes ever more difficult to fix the criteria for the existence of an economic unit. It is clear though, that economic individualisation will render living alone less attractive.

At last life in and around the house will be discussed here. For this *housing of the people* and the increase in the informal economy are important structures.

The first oughts to be a great concern because of the durable character of the buildings. Nuclear family houses are built in huge quantities. Because they are generally known, it is a cheap form of building now. But more and more these houses will have to be altered or emptiness of them will increase. Pre-eminently the housing of the people should be focused on new trends within the primary sphere of living, because one build for the future. However, at the moment there is hardly talk of an increase in the building of flexible living units, Central Living projects, integrated small living units and large houses for living groups. Because of the present building forms new choices with regard to primary life styles are severely restricted and hampered.

Our economy is in a transitional stage and it is not unlikely that an informal economy (with a right of benefit) will take an important place within the system. Partly this economy is a neighbourhood economy and will strongly influence the composition of the family and other life styles. It seems to be synchronous with the development towards a growing packet of tasks of friends, towards an institutionalisation of a social intermediate network. For the time being, economists still have problems with notions as falsification of competition and in the social sector it is not easy to attune the developments to each other in such a way that the number of victims remains limited.

Generally it may be said that sociologists have an important task in "accompanying" such developments both for policy makers and individuals. Becuase of the necessity of replacing old structures by new ones, the present time demands relatively much energy.

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Family change and social policy: shared living for the elderly

by GORDON F. STREIB

In developed societies around the world, family structures and functions are slowly changing because of demographic factors. There is an increasing number of older persons, particularly widows over the age of 75. A second major change is the increasing number of women who are employed full time. These two trends result in a smaller number of traditional care-givers available to help older family members, who are often living alone. Various alternatives to traditional family care for the elderly have been formed to meet these needs: small group homes, shared living arrangements, house matching, granny flats, and multi-level retirement villages. There is a growing awareness that new forms of living arrangements must be considered as alternatives to the nursing home, which in the past decades has been considered the solution for the frail elderly unable to live alone.

This paper will present results and conclusions from five years of research on small group homes for the elderly (Streib, Folts and Hilker, 1984). The report focuses on the 80 shared homes studied in the United States and a sample of Abbeyfield Homes in the United Kingdom. These endeavors have been very successful in providing family-like environments for older people, usually at a much lower cost than institutional arrangements such as nursing homes or retirement homes.

What is a "Family?"

First, as sociologists, we must define, what is a family? The family is both a basic social institution and a human group. When we refer to a family

In this discussion, we are not speaking of the family as a social institution, similar to the polity or economy. Nor is our idea of the family a legal one--a group legally defined by blood, marriage, or adoption. Nor are we thinking of that near-universal family form, the nuclear family. Our concept of "family" is closer to that of the household, which Gerald Leslie (1979:20) has defined: "A group of people who share a common dwelling." Normally, a household is tied together by persons who are related by marriage, blood, or adoption, but demographers and census takers have pointed out that a household does not need to be a traditional family group, for it may be an unrelated group of people who share living quarters.

A commonly held conception of the family is the nuclear family of father, mother, and children. Although in the United States this is a minority of families at the present time, it serves as a prototypical grouping in the minds of many people. Its characteristics are viewed positively, and when people think of the family, they usually think of the nuclear form of parents and children. The child-rearing and launching stages of the family cycle are part of people's basic orientation to the family because they constituted such important parts of their own family-life experience. The nuclear family was a source of nurturance, love, and affection, and its memories linger on. Reality may be quite different, but many persons, even those whose experience in a nuclear family was unpleasant, may recall it in a rosier light than was really the case. The difference between ideal and reality is transformed in many cases by some sort of dissonance reduction. So when practitioners, policy makers, and idealists think of an alternative family form for frail older persons, they expect a model that will provide a warm, sharing, supportive environment for older persons. They also hope that a better micro-environment can be established than that of the typical institution: nursing home, rest home, or hospital.

Examples of Alternative Family Forms

In order to provide an empirical base for the paper, I would like to describe briefly two different living arrangements which I have been studying: the first is Share-A-Home, which started in Central Florida and has now spread to a few other states, and the second a British model called the Abbeyfield Society (Streib, Folts, and Hilker, 1984).

Share-A-Home consists of family-like units of elderly, unrelated persons. The families own or rent large homes which can house six to fifteen elderly people who share in the activities of daily life. Each person may have his or her own room, or shares a room with another person. They may bring their own furniture if they like. A manager and household staff provide services for each family. Costs are shared by residents, including the rental of a family car which can be used to take family members to doctor's appointments, church, hairdresser, etc. Some social activities are organized in the home, depending on the wishes and interests of the residents. All persons must be ambulatory and have reasonably good health so they can dress, bathe, and feed themselves, for no nursing care is provided. The Share-A-Home families are privately managed and do not receive any subsidy from any level of government although the residents may be eligible for programs on an individual basis.

The second example of alternative living arrangements that I have been studying is the Abbeyfield Society in Great Britain. This society is a British charitable organization founded in 1958 to provide homelike, noninstitutional living arrangements for ambulatory, healthy older persons. One major goal of Abbeyfield is to overcome the loneliness of old age because of the loss of spouse, kin, friends, and neighbors which is an inexorable part of the aging process in all societies. Abbeyfield is organized under the sponsorship of a national society which provides information, consultation, national leadership, visibility, and coordination for the 450 local societies scattered throughout the British Isles. These societies operate over 900 houses which provide housing for more than 6,000 older persons. Most of the buildings are older private dwellings in established residential neighborhoods. They have been adapted for the use of five or more unrelated older persons and residential accommodations for a live-in housekeeper.

The pivotal group in the operation of Abbeyfield is the local Abbeyfield Society committee of private citizens. This autonomous and independent non-profit charitable organization initiates the process of obtaining the house, the housekeeper, the staff, and selects the residents. The work of the local committee is usually divided between the two sub-committees: Development Committee and Management Committee. The Development Committee is concerned with the organizing and funding of the local house, and is often composed of newly retired business and professional men. The Management Committee is involved in the day-to-day operation of the house itself, and tends to have more women serving on it. Thus, there is continuing community involvement in the house, and frequent interaction with the elderly family members.

In addition, my colleagues and I at the University of Florida have been assembling an inventory of other kinds of family-like arrangements throughout the United States, and visiting them if possible. We have now gathered information on around 80 different units. Most of these were started independently by their sponsors, and in most instances, the organizers had no knowledge of other such initiatives.

Sociological Issues

Let us ask the question in a direct fashion: Are alternative living arrangements genuine families? The question is of concern both to sociologists of the family and to policy makers and practitioners. Sociologists are interested because the growing variety of family forms requires conceptualizations for research purposes. Policy makers are also concerned because these alternatives involve practical issues such as compliance with zoning regulations. An awareness of the new family varieties should enable policy makers to address issues with a clearer understanding of changes in the traditional family and its functions and the need for alternatives.

Many of these alternatives have a sharing and caring atmosphere and encourage behaviors which approximate what we think of as primary group characteristics observed in some families. Indeed, some of these alternatives may have a more supportive and benign atmostphere than many natural families. However, there are some basic features of these alternatives which differentiate them from natural families:

1. First, they are formed and operated by non-residents--individuals or groups who are not participating family members. Almost all of the 80 known intentional families in the United States were set up by non-family members--persons wishing to serve or to help elderly people--often not related to them. The basic reason for this is that the frail elderly in the household often do not have the physical, emotional, or intellectual strength to organize such a group. Furthermore, their period of residence in the family group may be limited, depending on age and health. Thus the families change in composition yearly--sometimes even monthly, and there is a need for an ongoing, stable supervision by someone other than the family members themselves. This is in sharp contrast to the biological family.

2. Second, the economic viability of the household is crucial, for without it, the family dissolves, no matter how warm or caring the atmosphere. Since these residences do not have the glue of kinship obligations, the economic arrangements are the key to survival. The financial arrangements are usually cooperative with an equitable sharing of costs, but this is a limited kind of economic involvement, and family members do not have any economic responsibility for persons other than themselves. And in some cases the payments are made by third parties who are not involved in the enterprise or have any tie to the living arrangement.

3. Third, many members choose to live in these arrangements as a last resort in most cases, not as their preferred life style. The decision to move to one is basically because of frailty which makes other forms of living precarious, dangerous, or undesirable.

4. Fourth, any sense of obligation to other members of the household is often limited and the persons participating may leave at almost any time. In most alternative living arrangements, residents have few financial or legal obligations, and can decide to terminate the residence upon short notice with no risk or sacrifice. The organizers of the households assume the risk and financial obligation if a vacancy occurs.

5. Fifth, there is the possibility of governmental intervention. The entire area of certification, licensure, inspection, and rules and regulations varies considerably from one area to another. However, the fact that many of these arrangements come under a variety of service or housing programs which may require some kind of licensure or certification suggests that they are not families in a legal sense of the term. There have been instances where the authorities have treated these alternatives as "families" and they have enjoyed some freedom from government regulation, inspection, or

certification. Share-A-Home, for example, was recognized by a court in Florida as a "family" in a zoning dispute. However, the trend seems to be in the opposite direction, with local, state, and federal regulatory agencies seeking to become involved.

The physical setting of the family may take on more importance than that in a kinship-based family, not only because of the desires of the individuals, and the wishes of their relatives and friends, but because city and government agencies may become concerned and involved. While a biological family can choose to live in almost any sort of conditions, as soon as a "family" is organized by others, standards may be set for fire safety, cleanliness, food standards, etc

6. The sixth issue, integration, in terms of age, sex, religion, and race, is an area of perennial interest to sociologists. We have mentioned there is variation in the ways in which age and sex integration have developed. Some homes are integrated and some are segregated in terms of both age and sex. The modal pattern is a home whose residents have an average age of over 80, of whom about 75 percent are women. The families tend to be integrated in terms of religion and cultural background, with a variety of religious backgrounds and affiliations. There is also a mixed pattern of socio-economic status. Some organizers have tried to seek residents of similar educational and socio-economic backgrounds in order to increase social compatibility, congeniality, and conversational interchange, but in general, the desire to fill up the house has meant that most applicants in good enough health are accepted.

The one issue which most houses have not had to face is that of racial integration. Many of the projects are racially integrated in theory because of public support provided, but in practice, almost no Black persons have applied for membership in a "family." However, it can be anticipated that racial integration is an issue that will have to be considered by some groups in the not too distant future.

To sum up, the groups are not genuine families, but are pseudo-families or households. They have many characteristics of families, as do other households of non-kin persons. The loosening of familial norms has brought about changes in traditional housing facilities and greater diversity of life styles and living arrangements in modern societies. Some sponsoring groups of shared housing for the elderly have argued that existing zoning regulations should reflect these trends and permit the establishment of various forms of shared housing arrangements for the elderly.

Interpretations and Social Policy Implications

Now let us turn to some of the policy issues of this new amalgam family form. Should these arrangements be encouraged and perhaps given more support from the local community, from policy makers, and from government bodies?

Our research indicates that these small, family-like homes generally provide a supportive, caring, positive environment for the frail elderly who cannot live alone. In most instances, the costs are economical for residents, being much less expensive than institutional care.

In the U.S., there has been virtually no government involvement in such alternative family groups, for they have been sponsored by private organizations, usually religious. In the U.K., the Abbeyfield Society has been more successful in tapping government resources and securing loans for construction or remodeling of older homes to enable such alternative family arrangements to get started. Furthermore, in the U.K., the Abbeyfield Society has negotiated financial arrangements with government agencies so that lower income persons can be accommodated.

Australia has followed a different course from those noted in North America and in Britain. Australians have shown the distinctiveness of their culture by realizing that aging is a national issue and transcends local communities and even the state boundaries. They realize that it is essential to coordinate efforts in treating the problems of their older citizens.

I was pleased to learn while in Melbourne that there is an active Australian Abbeyfield Society. Moreover, the National Executive Committee in Victoria has involved board members from outside Victoria to work in developing a national plan. Awareness of the bureaucratic complexities is evidenced by the fact that the Victoria Society has tried to work with other government agencies that might be concerned with the development of new options and choices. As a result, the Department of Local Government and the Department of Planning and the Environment, as well as the Department of Community Welfare Services, have been involved in conversations about Abbeyfield as one of the options for the future.

Financial assistance in setting up such family-like groups is a matter of pressing concern to the organizers. Some groups have benefited from legacies and charitable gifts to renovate and establish the homes. Others have sought long-term, low-interest loans from public authorities. In my opinion, financial assistance is merited and policy-makers should not be negative about these new living arrangements, simply because they do not conform to the often rigid specifications required of hospitals and nursing facilities. There should be more latitude and flexibility shown to the sponsoring organizations--volunteers who give many hours of time and effort to benefit elderly people in the local community.

In conclusion, we are going to need all of the innovative housing arrangements we can develop, for in the decades ahead the United States and other industrialized societies will require an expansion of the number and kinds of living arrangements for our frail older citizens.

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SUMMARY SESSION

Closing Address

by Dr Don Edgar

Dr. Don Edgar

It is difficult to look at this International Seminar and put one label on it. The Seminar was a long time in gestation, a couple of years at least, and we understood from the beginning that it would inevitably cover too much in not enough detail. I think the sessions themselves have probably demonstrated that. I have found them stimulating and exciting but at the same time frustrating because we never really had enough time for discussion. With such a large group as this it is difficult to allow everybody time to participate.

We decided quite deliberately not to split the Seminar into discussion groups because one of the main advantages of the CFR Seminars in the past, and I hope this time also, has been that every participant hears every presentation and is part of the discussion and exchange. The papers were, to the best of our ability, distributed in advance, and those not available beforehand will be printed in a fifth volume and sent to you later. I hope you will take these papers back to your home country, or your home state, and use them in a variety of ways.

If you recall from the beginning of our planning when we first sent out notices, we wanted the Seminar to tackle two main approaches to the topic of 'Social Change and Family Policies'.

First, we wanted to look at the current impact that policies have on families, that is the passive-descriptive side of things. I think we've had much of that during this Seminar. We've seen how, for example, current policies in the children's area, in the economic and welfare system area, and to do with youth, the aged, and the law, have an effect on families. If nothing else, this Seminar will have helped to make people realise that what they do in Departments of Housing, or Social Welfare, Health, Education or Youth, is in fact affecting family life.

As far as the Institute of Family Studies in Australia is concerned that has been one of our major difficulties. In the first four years of our life we have tried very hard to document the way in which policies do affect families. Now to some extent, as I say, it is a passive exercise of mapping the field, but unless we can map that field there is absolutely no hope whatsoever that policy-makers will take family situations into account. I have been quite amazed at the ignorance at the political level and at the administrative level of just what governments are doing with our money. The money that comes through taxation to the government is being spent in a variety of ways which may or may not harm or help family life, but when you are dealing with people who think in macro economic terms, with people who think only in terms of votes, and with people who think only in terms of the efficiency of their administrative system, it is very difficult to get through the message that every single part of their administrative procedure and every political decision they make affects people in their daily lives and, on the whole, that means the lives people lead within families.

The other side of the coin for this Seminar is perhaps the more active side of things; that is the way in which social changes in themselves impel us towards new policies. Itke Weeda's comments in the last paper remind us of the purpose of the first session on changing values. We have seen in fact that we live in a time where old values no longer hold across the board, where young people in particular are searching for new ways of leading their lives. Policy-makers must take cognizance of that. Politics of course, we've been reminded, is a matter of morality. Moral politics means the imposition of a particular set of views which, of course, in a pluralistic democracy such as most of us come from, will shift from time to time. While a particular party in power with a particular view may itself change, all parties and governments are subject to the moral pressures of the age.

We have been reminded of the demographic shifts which in themselves are quite important. We have seen that cohort differences can be quite startling, particularly when we look at young people and the way a cohort such as my own, which grew up during the 1950s, moved into marriage and family and adult life in a quite different fashion, a very easy fashion, compared with the way in which young people now are moving toward new forms of family life.

We have discussed at great length an essential theme, that of economic policy impacts on families. That is perhaps the most difficult area to understand, to come to grips with, for which to suggest new alternatives. I would imagine that we were all most unsatisfied with the conclusion of that discussion because we only devoted one half day to it. It is an area that we must have many more conferences on, because in the Australian context at least, I anticipate that after the forthcoming federal election, we will be into a quite different economic debate. The debate will no longer be simply about balancing the budget and keeping the deficit down. The debate will quite clearly be about, 'how can we reform the system to bring taxation and welfare structures together in a way which will benefit everybody in the community'.

In deciding on the theme for this International Seminar, the term 'policies' and not 'policy' was very deliberately used. I think we have been able quite conclusively to decide there is no such thing as 'family policy', but there are many family policies, many aspects of policies, which affect families and so we will need to think very hard about how those policies interact.

I said this morning that the legal regulation of family is an overarching theme. The discussion this morning was stimulating, very enjoyable, and covered many issues. I think two issues perhaps were not given enough attention and I want to remind you of those. The first is that we change laws in a variety of ways, laws which while not called family law, have clear family effects. In Australia, as in many countries, the major laws which have been changed in recent years that affect the family are the equal opportunity law, and the anti-discrimination law. That theme has emerged several times; there have been many comments from the viewpoint of men and women, but too often that debate gets stuck in arguments about women's liberation or about men versus women which is not really what we are on about at all. We are talking about the establishment legally and politically of equal rights between individuals in the community. That must have an effect on family life, it will have an effect on family life, and I think from the first day you have seen it is already having an effect on family life.

Now in relation to the legal situation of families, I think one further reminder is necessary; that is, that too often when we talk about family law, we start from the wrong end. We talk about divorce which is the end of marriage instead of about marriage itself. I would suggest that we have no clear law of marriage and perhaps will not have; perhaps this is one of the major shifts that we are seeing in society now. However, I think we will need to do a lot more talking and thinking about what marriage means legally. We did not get much mention this morning of the notion of a marriage contract, yet I remind you that that is a major theme in the literature on family law, on legal rights, on equal opportunity, and on economic structures within society.

The notion of a marriage contract can also be linked to the central discussion that we had the other day on the 'individual versus the family'. The debate has, of necessity, to cease to be the individual versus the family; it has to look at the individual within the family, and equal rights within the family. I would suggest that we can be very optimistic about the future of family life. We will see new forms but the basic new form, it seems to me, may not be some form of communal living, may not be some strange aberration of the old form of the family, it will be really what marriage has always been about in a new style; that is, a cooperative enterprise between a group of people who decide they want to be related to one another. They may be related legally, they may be related by adoption, they may be related by kinship, but it is a cooperative economy, a collective economy within which people choose to live.

Now, as I say, the individual is central to the major ethical and political themes of our society. Professor Wei has reminded us that this is not true necessarily in her society; it is indeed not true in many other societies around the world. She has also given us a timely reminder that much of what we talk about here, as though we can influence it, is perhaps impelled by larger forces such as the sheer size of population. We need to tell ourselves over and over again that morality and politics and administrative structures are as much determined by the necessities and exigencies of a particular population, a particular cohort, as they are influenced by us ourselves as active constructing individuals.

I think we need to think fairly carefully about where this Seminar may lead and if you will indulge me for half a minute I'd like to outline briefly where I think it will lead us as an Institute. It has become clear to me over the last three years, as we have made contact with family researchers around the world, that the Institute of Family Studies in Australia is unique. It is one of the few central government funded research institutes devoted to family research. It is one of the few which is an independent body in that we take no brief from the Commonwealth government. The Institute is run by a Board of Management, it has a very cooperative staff structure, and it determines priorities as it proceeds. It is an enormous responsibility and one which the Institute does not take lightly. It is one which leads us into a variety of dilemmas that have come up through this International Seminar.

First is the question simply of research. I have been very pleased at the way in which research has been presented at this Seminar because it has not been presented simply in a so-called 'objective' fashion. People have had the courage of their convictions and they have indicated where the research leads us. This though is the nub of the dilemma. As soon as one researcher begins to spell out the policy implications of what one is finding, the politicians hone in with warnings: 'careful - you should only be doing objective research - none of this political advice, none of this comment, none of this going beyond your brief'. In my view, we as researchers must continue to insist that research as such is useless unless the researchers themselves interpret and extrapolate beyond the data. Those extrapolations will not necessarily please everybody and much of the Institute's research has not pleased everybody. However, we must also make sure that the research is not biased in other senses, that is, that it begins with something to prove, that it is aiming in a certain direction to demonstrate what perhaps may not be desirable. At this Institute we have certainly tried very hard to avoid that. We have been accused at various times of 'presiding over the destruction of the Australian family'. That I find quite absurd because the Australian family is not being destroyed, nor is our research going to have that sort of effect. On the other hand we have been accused of our research being too 'conservative' because we have shown that families are surviving, that support networks are operating, that couples do love one another and sometimes do live together for the whole of their lives and some people don't want us to say these things.

I suppose that illustrates where we are at and why this International Seminar was run on this topic. I have found in reading much of the overseas literature a great deal that is interesting, a great deal that is relevant, but quite often a great deal that is not tied down to the reality of the political world and to suggestions for changes that will assist families to live the lives they wish to lead in a satisfactory fashion. If this Seminar has done anything at all, I think it has helped us at the Institute to clarify a number of our ideas. I assure you that the level of our debate has risen enormously just over the last few months as we received the key papers. It will continue to improve as a result of this Seminar, but I make a plea for those of you on the world scene, and I make this plea to myself too, (as somebody earlier today suggested to me) that the Institute publish at least one paper which documents the way in which various policies affect families in Australia. It may be a book rather than a paper as it is a large task; but I make a plea to you from overseas to do the same for your countries. We have had hints of that during the Seminar, and some wonderful examples of alternative approaches to policy. Madame Ancelin's paper, for example, showed how the welfare system in France is basically a family oriented one and how that switches the whole debate, the whole discussion. Instead of talking about welfare and the poor and people 'dropping off the edge', policy in France seems to be oriented towards family support.

Family support is a major theme of all of the Institute's work and I think has obviously been a major theme at the Seminar. We also had a plea this morning for more emphasis on an integration of the helping professions and the comment was made that politically such an idea bears little credence. The helping professions are too often seen as soft, as wishy-washy, as waffly, as head-shrinking, as something that perhaps is not worth paying too much money for. This is a significant problem to be overcome. We really do have to mount a concerted effort to press governments, other political parties, other people in the society, to think in terms of providing positive support for families rather that simply patching up the system.

That is I think, in sum, the picture that has emerged from this Seminar. In every session we have been told time and time again that government efforts to patch up have been inadequate, that there has been no concerted approach at integrating a policy approach towards support of family life. Note that this is very different from calling for a family policy. I shudder at the thought of any government in this day and age in a country such as this talking about 'a' family policy, because it pre-supposes that somebody has the wisdom to say, 'This is the ideal family, and this is the way everybody should live'. We can no longer do that. We have to accept that families are forming themselves into new combinations, that every individual has some involvement in providing family support and therefore we have to look for mechanisms that allow them to draw upon those supports as they need them. So we are not looking for a monolithic family policy at all. We are looking for a greater awareness on the part of policy-makers at every level of the fact that their actions do affect family life in very clear ways.

If this Seminar has clarified some of those issues, and if we can take the message a little further, then well and good. I want to make it possible for any one of you to comment on where you think the Seminar should lead. As you know, the Committee on Family Research runs Seminars from time to time, this being the 20th, and I have hit on what I think are some of the central purposes and themes and outcomes of this Seminar in a very brief fashion, but I would like to call particularly on Monsieur Rauget of the IUFO and Professor Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy of the CFR to make some final comment on the Seminar. So I would defer to whichever of you first wishes to speak. Thank you all.

Professor Cseh-Szombathy

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the end of a five day Seminar where we listened to more than 25 key speakers, to about the same number of discussants and to more than 100 interventions from the floor, it is I think too early to make a complete balance of the Seminar regarding its contributions to the development of family sociology. Nevertheless, we can already establish that most of the papers were of high quality, the discussions were lively, sometimes even passionate. In many cases, only the lack of time put an end to them. I think that all of us will leave the Seminar with a lot of new information and some new ideas which might give inspiration in our work in the next months. And that is exactly what the CFR Seminars intend to achieve.

Therefore I would like to say that I consider the Seminar very successful and I have to congratulate the organisers as this success is the outcome of their long and careful preparation. In the name of the Board of the CFR I would like to express our gratitude to His Excellency, the Governor-General of Australia, for inviting the participants of the Seminar to an opening dinner, to the Government of Victoria for its reception which gave us the possibility to make new social contact. I am afraid that the next year of our Seminar will not be able to keep up with as high a result which was accorded to this Seminar by the organisers in respect to the social programs. We enjoyed them so very much and they have given us the opportunity to get better acquainted with one another, coming as we do from different parts of the world.

Besides our congratulations on the success of the Seminar, I would like to thank Dr. Edgar in the name of CFR for the masterful management of this Seminar and also thank the Board of the Australian Institute of Family Studies for their very active participation in the work of the Seminar and the whole staff of the Institute for making the work of the Seminar so smooth.

We are at the end of a successful CFR Seminar and we have already to plan our next meetings. I would like to inform the participants of the Seminar that the next meeting will take place in New Delhi in the framework of the ISA World Congress where we shall have the opportunity to organise eight or ten sessions on different topics. The next issue of the CFR Newsletter, which all participants of the Melbourne Seminar will receive, will contain detailed information on the program and on the ways to contact the organiser, Professor Quah. As for the Seminar to follow, we might probably have it at the beginning of 1986 in Israel and after that, one in Hungary in 1987 on the 'Role of Kinship in Today's Society'. I hope that in the capacity, no longer as President of CFR but as member of our local organisation, I shall have the pleasure of personally welcoming many of you at the 1987 Seminar in Hungary. Thank you very much.

Monsieur Andre Rauget

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Be very careful for I will try to speak English. You have to know when a Frenchman speaks in French he is very long-winded; when he speaks in English he is very brief. Mr. Chairman, dear Dr. Edgar, when I met you two years ago in December 1982 I was very impressed by the Institute of Family Studies of Australia and when you said that in the world there are not many institutes like yours, it is true. You gave a demonstration during this Seminar that your Institute is indeed very good, and is able to organise such an International Seminar. On behalf of the International Union of Family Organisations I am very glad to thank you, Dr. Don Edgar, your colleagues and collaborators. And I am very glad also to say to Professor Cseh-Szombathy how interesting it was for the International Union of Family Organisation to collaborate with the Committee on Family Research for a main contribution of this Seminar. We must develop a close collaboration between researchers, sociologists, policy-makers and family organisations in the respect of the specific role of each partner. I think it is important and I am glad and very hopeful for I think that this Melbourne CFR Seminar is the beginning of a fruitful collaboration and I don't know if the King is dead but I can say viva Melbourne, viva la Institute of Family Studies Melbourne. Thank you.

Professor Roland Eckert, West Germany

Being one of the foreign delegates and speakers, let me say thank you to the Institute of Family Studies, to Don Edgar and his (I found no other word to fit) excellent staff. They have all not only presented very clear papers on each subject of the Seminar which have been empirical, well-grounded and theoretically indicative, they have also acted as friendly discussants and good fellows. Together with Jill Atkinson's Conference Service they made this Seminar as pleasant as it was. Three years ago I was convinced that nobody could compete with Wilfried Dumon's 19th CFR Seminar in Belgium. No, now I know the Aussies can.

As I experienced, we received very helpful comments on our first drafts from the Seminar Committee. Although the Committee members are anonymous they should receive our acknowledgements. I wish to say thanks to all Australian participants who have taught us a lot, not only on social change, not only on family, not only on policies, but also on Australia - the way of life, the problems they have here and the many 'no problems' they have here, which make this country so admirable. So we thank the Australian people, this excellent Institute and thereby our Seminar too.

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'Social Change & Family Policies'
August 19 - 24, 1984.

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